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Abstract 
 
This thesis compares the political culture of university students in South Korea before 
and after the democratic transition in 1987. It identifies the changes in the following:  
the attitudes to politics, government and media; the political socialization process; the 
experience of political participation; and the reasons for political participation and 
non-participation. Qualitative analysis was used to analyse the data collected from 
interviews and surveys conducted on respondents who were university students in the 
1980s and current university students. It was found that compared to university 
students in the 1980s, current university students held less intensely negative attitudes 
towards the government. However, although current university students were 
interested in politics, they were still distrustful of politicians, did not have a political 
party they supported and had low levels of perceived political efficacy and political 
participation.  
 
Based on these findings, this thesis examined three different types of theories to 
explain the changes in the political culture of university students. First, demand-side 
theories that focus on underlying socioeconomic changes to explain changes in the 
political culture were used to analyse the changes in the reasons for political 
participation and the changes in the political socialization process. Second, 
intermediary-side theories that emphasise the role of media were used to examine the 
changes in the attitudes towards the media and the experience of latent political 
participation. Finally, supply-side theories that focus on the supply of politics and 
governance were used to explain the changes in the other elements of political culture. 
Close examination into the workings of democracy in South Korea since the 
democratic transition in 1987 revealed that there were indications of cartelisation of 
the political party system, which explains the low levels of political trust and 
perceived political efficacy reported by current university students.  
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Map of South Korea 
 
Figure 1. Map of the regions of South Korea1 
 
(Source: http://d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car=50445&lang=en)  
  
                                            
1 The map shows the provinces of South Korea. There are also wider regions in Korea, each 
encompassing several provinces. The most prominent of these regions are Yeongnam and Honam. 
Yeongnam consists of the North and South Gyeongsang, Daegu, and Busan areas in the southeast of the 
country. Honam consists of the North and South Jeolla and Gwangju in the southwest of the country. 
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I    Introduction 
 
1 Introduction 
 
On 26 June 1987, over one million citizens in 33 cities and four districts poured out 
onto the streets of South Korea demanding democracy and direct elections. By 29 June 
1987, the dictatorial Chun Doo-hwan regime had succumbed to popular will and 
announced that it would discard the authoritarian constitution and hold direct 
presidential elections. Since the establishment of South Korea as an independent 
country in 1948 following Japanese colonial rule (1910-1945) and U.S. Army Military 
Government (1945-1948), Korea had been ruled by three successive dictatorships led 
by Rhee Syng-man (1948-1960), Park Chung-hee (1962-1979) and Chun Doo-hwan 
(1980-1987). In between these dictatorial regimes there had been short, ill-fated 
attempts at democratic rule that were soon cut short by military coup d’état. However, 
unlike earlier attempts at the same, the democratic transition in 1987 was successful 
and enduring. Today, South Korea is cited as one of the most successful cases of 
political, social and economic development amongst the Third Wave democracies.  
 
One of the key social groups that led Korea’s successful democratic transition were 
university students. Traditionally, university students had been very active in the 
protests against oppressive regimes since the beginning of the twentieth century (Park, 
M., 2012: 125). Universities served as an important political socialization institution 
for young citizens to learn about politics, democracy and civic engagement. They also 
served as an arena for ideological debates, which served as the intellectual basis for the 
rest of the democratic movement (Cho, H. Y., 1988). University student activist 
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groups also served as important non-governmental organisations that negotiated with 
and supported opposition political parties to challenge the incumbent Chun regime 
(Lee, G. H., 2010). In addition, the self-sacrificial political participation demonstrated 
by university students served as catalysts to motivate the mass public to participate in 
the protests (Seo, J. S., 2010). In the 1980s, university students in South Korea were 
highly engaged in politics and played an important role in the democratic transition.  
 
Yet, nearly three decades since the democratic transition in 1987, student activism is 
much less prominent on university campuses. Koreans in their 20s have the lowest rate 
of electoral participation and party membership compared to other age groups. Studies 
find that Korean university students are generally apathetic and uninterested in politics 
(Noh, H. H., Song, J. M. and Kang, W. T., 2013; Lee, Y. M., 2010; Jung, H. G., 2010).  
Studies also find that young people in Korea have low levels of political efficacy and 
low levels of trust in political actors (Park, J. S., 2012; Lee, Y. M., 2010). Political 
efficacy relates to the belief that one can understand political affairs and effectively 
participate and that the political system will be responsive to such participation (Park, 
J. S., 2012). 
 
In other established democracies in Western Europe and the US, the so-called ‘youth 
in crisis’ phenomenon has long been observed (Lerner, 1954; Larkin, 1979; Davis and 
Matza, 1999; Quinnan, 2002; Childers, 2012). Some researchers such as Milbrath and 
Goel (1977) explain this in terms of the life cycle effect, observing that ‘participation 
increases steadily with age until it reaches a peak in the middle years, and then 
gradually declines with old age’. They say that as young people marry, find steady 
employment and begin a family, their level of political participation increases. 
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However, other scholars are concerned about the disaffection and apathy they observe 
in the so-called ‘Generation X’ and the slightly younger ‘Generation Y’ (Mattson, 
2003; Levine, 2007). In fact, this withdrawal from political participation has not been 
confined to the demographic of young people. Wider political culture studies have 
expressed concern at the growing political apathy and voter disaffection in established 
democracies in Western Europe and the US (Abramson and Aldrich, 1981; Putnam, 
2000; Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000; Kitschelt, 2000; Heath, 2007).  
 
Whether the decline in political participation is a symptom of an underlying problem 
with the workings of modern democracies or whether it is something more benign 
depends on the causes of this change. For instance, citizens may not participate in 
politics because they are generally satisfied with politics.  Citizens may perceive no 
serious problems with politics and choose to focus on other priorities in their lives. If 
this is the cause, low political participation may not necessarily be detrimental to the 
functioning of democracy (Theiss-Morse and Hibbing 2005; Norris, 1999; Schudson, 
1996, 1998). However, the decline in political participation may instead be caused by 
a decline in the quality of democratic governance, which in turn leads to low levels of 
political trust and low political efficacy. This may indicate an erosion of democracy 
from the inside (Putnam, 2000). By investigating the explanations for the changes in 
political culture, it becomes possible to identify further implications for both theory 
and policy.  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to compare the political culture of university students in 
South Korea in the 1980s before the democratic transition and the political culture of 
university students today and find explanations for this change. It is hoped that an in-
  4 
depth qualitative analysis into the political culture of university students in South 
Korea may reveal findings that shed light on the wider issue of declining political 
participation in other democracies. 
 
1.1 Purpose and contribution of research 
 
The purpose of this research is two-fold: first, to compare the political culture of 
university students in the 1980s to that of current university students; and second, to 
investigate the explanations for the changes. 
 
In the Korean context, the particular sub-culture of university students is important 
because university students have traditionally been important political actors. 
University students often acted as the intellectual vanguards against oppressive and 
unjust political regimes in anti-colonialism and anti-dictatorship movements (Park, M., 
2012). Yet, today many commentators and academics note that Korean university 
students have become apathetic towards and uninterested in politics (Noh, H. H., 
Song, J. M. and Kang, W. T., 2013; Lee, Y. M., 2010; Jung, H. G., 2010). The first 
objective of this thesis is to ascertain whether these observations are true, and if so, to 
what extent.  
 
The second objective of this research is to identify explanations for the changes in the 
political culture of university students in Korea since the democratic transition in 
1987. By comparing the political culture of university students today to the political 
culture of university students in the 1980s, this study will be able to identify both what 
factors motivated student activism in the 1980s and what factors discourage political 
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participation for university students today. It is hoped that this research will reveal 
findings that can identify further agendas for research and policy development.  
 
1.2 Scope of research 
 
This research will focus on the case of South Korea. South Korea is a meaningful case 
study because it is one of the few countries that have been able to successfully 
overcome the legacy of colonialism, civil war, and military dictatorship in a relatively 
short period of time. Studying the political culture of South Korea before the 
democratic transition and during the period of democratic consolidation may assist in 
identifying further research agendas for both new and advanced democracies.   
 
This research will focus on the university students of South Korea as the primary 
subject. I have chosen to focus on this specific sub-culture because university students 
have great potential as political actors. University students are uniquely placed to 
experience ‘the pull of modern ideas’ (Altbach, 1982: 174). They are often 
socioeconomically positioned to be the future elites of society, particularly in post-
colonial and modernising countries (Weiss and Aspinall, 2012: 5). In the case of South 
Korea, as in many developing nations, student-led uprisings proved critical in igniting 
social change to facilitate the transition from authoritarian rule (Park, M., 2012: 125). 
Yet, in the subsequent phase of democratic consolidation, the influence of university 
students in politics has decreased significantly. By identifying the changes in the 
political culture of university students and the reasons for the change, this research 
aims to find out what motivates or demotivates political participation.  
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This study will focus on the time periods of the 1980s and the 2010s. The 1980s in 
South Korea was a period of transition from authoritarian rule with President Chun 
stepping down and direct presidential elections being introduced in 1987. The 1990s 
saw a transition period in which the political elite from the Chun regime was gradually 
replaced by new elites. The 2000s was a period of democratic consolidation, with the 
election of the first liberal President Kim Dae-jung in 1998 and the election of the first 
non-dictatorship era President Roh Moo-hyun in 2003. In the years 2008-2015, there 
has been a continued period of conservative party rule in the presidency. It is this 
period that this research focuses on when references to ‘university students today’ or 
‘current university students’ are made.  
 
The scope of this study does not include a detailed investigation into how the role of 
university students in wider Korean society has changed. Such a study will require 
data collection from other social groups and age groups in wider Korean society so 
that meaningful comparisons may be made. In addition, such a study will require 
evaluation of how individual and collective participation by university students impact 
Korean politics. Though such a study would be interesting and informative, this issue 
is reserved as a further research topic.   
 
The scope of this study also does not include a normative evaluation of whether the 
changes in the political culture of university students have good or bad consequences 
on the Korean political system. Such an assessment requires several assumptions: (1) 
that the political culture of university students has a causal effect on political 
outcomes; (2) that there is an ideal political culture that leads to good political 
outcomes; (3) that there are objectively good political outcomes. These assumptions 
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are beyond the scope of this thesis because they require a more theoretical 
investigation of the concepts of democracy and political culture. Yet, it is hoped that 
the empirical findings in this thesis would inform the development of political theory 
on these assumptions and the relationship between political culture and 
democratisation.  
 
1.3 Outline of thesis 
 
This thesis begins with a discussion of the literature review and research design. The 
literature review introduces the existing literature on the changes in the political 
culture of university students in Korea and more generally in other democracies. It 
also discusses the concept of political culture and political participation and sets out 
the theoretical and conceptual basis for the empirical analysis of this thesis. The 
research design chapter describes the data collection and analysis methods of empirical 
evidence.  
 
The next substantive chapters in this thesis proceed to present the empirical findings 
on the political culture of university students. The first set of chapters examines the 
political culture of university students in the 1980s and the second set of chapters 
examines the political culture of university students today. The two sets of chapters on 
each period have similar structures with seven chapters each. Each set of chapters 
starts with an introductory chapter, which includes a brief historical overview of the 
political environment of each period. They then proceed to discuss the empirical 
findings on the attitudes towards government and politics, attitudes towards media, the 
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political socialization process, the experience of political participation and the reasons 
for political participation and non-participation.  
 
This thesis then proceeds to compare the political culture of university students in the 
1980s and the political culture of university students today. We analyse potential 
explanations for the changes in the political culture of university students based on the 
empirical findings. Demand-side, intermediary and supply-side explanations are 
applied to the Korean case study with reference to statistical data and findings from 
primary and secondary sources. Demand-side theories explain changes in political 
culture by reference to underlying social, economic and cultural shifts in the society. 
Intermediary theories focus on the impact of media coverage of politics on political 
culture. Supply-side theories explain changes in political culture by reference to 
changes in the political system and the quality of governance (Norris, 1999). 
 
Finally, the conclusion sums up the findings and discusses the theoretical and policy 
implications of the research. It also includes a discussion of the limitations of the 
thesis as well as the agenda for further research.  
  9 
2 Literature review 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
In the literature review, we will review the existing literature that this thesis aims to 
expand on. We begin with a discussion of the significance of political culture studies 
and the concepts of political culture and political participation. These concepts are 
important for outlining which aspects of political culture and political participation 
will be examined in the empirical findings of this thesis.  
 
We proceed to examine the literature on the political culture of young people in 
democracies in advanced Western democracies. There is a general consensus in the 
literature that there has been a decline in voter participation and support for political 
parties amongst young people. Though other forms of civic engagement such as 
volunteering have become more popular, these forms of participation are not 
necessarily ‘political’ and studies find that young people are generally apathetic 
towards politics and uninterested in politics.  
 
The decline in voter participation and falling support for political parties is not 
confined to the demographic of young people. Indeed, this is not even a new 
phenomenon. The so-called ‘crisis of democracy’ has been posited since the 1970s and 
has experienced periods of popularity as well as decline. However, there has been a 
growing consensus in the recent literature that there is a lack of political trust, lack of 
support for political parties, and the rise of ‘critical citizens’. The literature is divided 
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on whether the effects of the withdrawal of the ordinary citizens from politics in 
democracies should be a cause for concern.  
 
However, the consequences and implications of this change in political culture depend 
on the inherent causes of the change in the political culture. Therefore we proceed to 
examine the key explanations for the changes in the political culture of democracies. 
There are broadly three categories of explanations: demand-side explanations, 
intermediary explanations, and supply-side explanations (Norris, 1999). Each of these 
types of explanations is introduced in the literature review and will be used to explain 
the changes in the political culture of university students in Korea.  
 
We then proceed to examine the existing studies on the political culture of university 
students in South Korea. Historically, university students played an active role in the 
political development of South Korea. However, since the democratic transition, 
student activism has declined. There is a general consensus in Korean academia that 
young people exhibit political apathy and are uninterested in politics, have low levels 
of political efficacy, low levels of political trust, and low levels of political 
participation. Many studies in the Korean literature focus on the generational, age and 
period effects to explain the political culture of young people in Korea. 
 
Finally, the literature review concludes with a discussion of the contribution that this 
thesis aims to make to the existing literature. 
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2.2 Political culture 
 
2.2.1 The importance of political culture 
 
It is widely accepted in the literature that mass political orientations are crucial for 
democratic transitions and democratic consolidation (Dalton, 1999, 2004; Diamond, 
1999; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Mattes and Bratton, 2007; Qi and Shin, D. C., 2011; 
Shin, D. C., 2007; Welzel, 2007). In particular, it has been argued that new 
democracies become fully consolidated liberal democracies only when an 
overwhelming majority of the mass citizenry embraces democratic governance as ‘the 
only game in town’ (Diamond, 1999, 2008; Linz and Stepan, 1996; Shin, D. C., 2007). 
This is because political activity is the result of not only physical resources but also 
psychological engagement with the political world (Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 
1995: 354). A great deal of empirical research has demonstrated that various attitudes 
and orientations towards politics substantially contribute to the tendency of citizens to 
participate in politics (Bean, 1989).  
 
For this reason, how ordinary citizens view democracy and react to its institutions and 
processes has recently become a key issue in research and theory on the 
legitimatisation of democratic rule (Booth and Seligson, 2009; Dalton, 2004; Fails and 
Pierce, 2008; Gibson, Caldeira and Spence, 2003; Kuan and Lau, 2002; Nathan, 2007; 
McDonough, Barnes and Pina, 1986, 1998; Norris, 1999, 2011; Shin, D. C. and Wells, 
2005; Tyler, 2006). As stated by Inglehart and Welzel (2005: 300): 
 
Democracy is not simply the result of clever elite bargaining and constitutional 
engineering. It depends on deep-rooted orientations among the people themselves. These 
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orientations motivate them to press for freedom, effective civil and political rights, and 
genuinely responsive government – and to exert continual vigilance to ensure that the 
governing elites remain responsive to them. 
 
Political culture is important not only because it helps to explain the process of 
transition to democracy, but can also be employed to study the process of democratic 
consolidation. ‘Democratic consolidation’ refers to the process of making new 
democracies stable and protecting them from regressing to authoritarianism (Schedler, 
1998: 91). The idea behind this concept is that there are two main phases of transition 
in the democratization process: ‘transition from authoritarian rule’ and ‘democratic 
consolidation’ (Mainwaring, O’Donnell and Valenzuela, 1992). While the first 
transition focuses on undermining the authoritarian regime and is more ‘anti-
authoritarian than pre-democratic’, the second transition consists of a broader and 
more complex process associated with the institutionalization of a new, democratic set 
of political rules (Munck, 1994: 356). While the ‘transition from authoritarian rule’ is 
more easily determined through assessing the existence of fair and free elections and 
the toppling of the dictatorial regime, ‘democratic consolidation’ is less easily defined. 
Due to the teleological and imprecise nature of this latter concept of ‘democratic 
consolidation’, the ‘conditions of democratic consolidation’ have come to include such 
divergent terms as:  
 
popular legitimation, the diffusion of democratic values, the neutralization of anti-system 
actors, civilian supremacy over the military, the elimination of authoritarian enclaves, 
party building, the organization of functional interests, the stabilization of electoral rules, 
the routinization of politics, the decentralization of state power, the introduction of 
mechanisms of direct democracy, judicial reform, the alleviation of poverty, and economic 
stabilization (Schedler, 1998: 91-92).  
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In fact, there is no consensus in the literature on what democratic consolidation 
entails and how it can be measured. However, the ‘conditions of democratic 
consolidation’ that Schedler notes above are the very things that are measured in 
a study of political culture. In this way, political culture can be a useful way for 
measuring the extent of democratic consolidation of a new democracy. For 
instance, findings on the political culture of a new democracy that citizens are 
supportive of the democratic political system, satisfied with political outcomes 
and perceive their political participation to be effective would be strong 
indicators of a successful consolidation of democracy.  
 
2.2.2 What is political culture? 
 
According to Almond, ‘every political system is embedded with a particular pattern of 
orientations to political action’ and this pattern is the ‘political culture’ of that society 
(Almond, 1956: 396). Political culture includes: (1) ‘cognitive orientation’, or 
knowledge of and beliefs about the structure and functions of the political system; (2) 
‘affective orientation’, or feelings about the political system, its roles and personnel; 
and (3) ‘evaluative orientation’, the judgements and opinions about the performance of 
the political system and other political objects (Almond and Verba, 1963: 15). Political 
culture is essentially ‘a set of attitudes – cognitions, value standards, and feelings – 
toward the political system, its various roles, and its role incumbents’ (Kim, Y. C., 
1964).  
 
In particular, the elements of political culture that will be the focus of the empirical 
findings of this thesis are: 
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• attitudes towards government and politics; 
• attitudes towards the media; 
• the political socialization process; 
• the experience of political participation; and  
• reasons for political participation and non-participation. 
 
Firstly, the attitudes towards government and politics reveal all of the cognitive, 
affective and evaluative orientations towards the political system. Through the 
interviewees’ responses on attitudes towards the presidential administration and the 
political situation, it is possible to observe how well they know about the structure and 
functions of the political system. It is also possible to learn about their opinions about 
the political system, its personnel and the performance of the political system.  
 
Secondly, the attitudes towards media is an important element of political culture. The 
media are the main conduit of information between the political elite and the public. 
The media shape the cognitive orientation of the public towards politics and also have 
a significant impact on their affective and evaluative orientation.  
 
Thirdly, the political socialization process is an important element of political culture 
because it is the process through which people come to hold the political views they 
do.  
 
Fourthly, the experience of political participation is the element of political culture 
that is linked to the actions directed to affect politics. As will be discussed further 
below, there are latent and manifest forms of political participation. Non-participation 
  15 
is also an important element of political participation. All of these forms of political 
participation are the output of the cognitive, affective and evaluative orientations that 
people hold towards politics.  
 
Fifthly, reasons for political participation and non-participation are important elements 
of political culture because they indicate the role that citizens perceive themselves to 
play in the political system. Changes in the reasons for political participation and non-
participation reflect changes in the political system and the socioeconomic structure of 
society and can have important policy implications.  
 
The discussion of the five elements of political culture above are essentially designed 
to provide a comprehensive examination of the attitudes the respondents hold towards 
politics, how they came to hold those views and how these views affected their 
political actions.  
 
2.2.3 What is political participation? 
 
Political participation is an important element of political culture. According to Verba, 
Nie and Kim (1978: 1) political participation refers to ‘those legal acts by private 
citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of 
governmental personnel and/or the actions that they take’. The problem with this 
definition for our purposes is that the main form of political participation amongst 
university students in the 1980s was participating in protests, which was an illegal 
activity under the Chun administration. A wider definition that we therefore adopt is 
that of Kasse and Marsch (1979: 42), which defines political participation as ‘all 
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voluntary activities by individual citizens intended to influence either directly or 
indirectly political choices at various levels of the political system’.  
 
There are different types of political participation. In our analysis of the political 
participation of university students in South Korea, we will use the following typology 
of political participation.  
 
Table 1. Typology of Political Participation 
Type Activity category Examples of activities 
Manifest Political 
Participation 
Voting Voting in local, parliamentary 
and presidential elections 
Campaign activity Volunteering for campaigns, 
giving money to particular 
political parties 
Contacting political parties or 
groups 
Writing to public officials, 
becoming a member of a 
political party 
Protest activity  Participating in demonstrations, 
protests, strikes, candlelight 
vigils 
Latent Political 
Participation 
Keeping informed of political 
issues 
Reading books on political 
issues or newspapers, watching 
televised debates  
Discussing political issues 
with family, friends and peers 
Discussing political issues with 
others in societies, debating 
political issues with others 
online or offline 
Non-Participation Anti-political non-
participation 
No manifest political 
participation  
Apolitical non-participation No latent political participation 
(Source: Modified from Ekman and Amna, 2012) 
Broadly, there are three types of political participation: latent political participation, 
manifest political participation and non-participation. Latent political participation 
includes keeping informed of political issues and discussing these issues with others. 
Manifest political participation includes formal participation and extra-parliamentary 
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participation, which can be legal or illegal. Non-participation can be either anti-
political, which is actively choosing not to participate, or apolitical, which is passively 
not participating (Ekman and Amna, 2012).  
 
Within manifest political participation, there can also be many different dimensions. 
Verba and Nie (1972: 56-63) identify four dimensions: (1) voting; (2) campaign 
activity; (3) contacting public officials; and (4) cooperative or communal activities. To 
this analysis, Teorell, Torcal and Montero (2007) adds protest activity, which includes 
participation in demonstrations and strikes. Of the four dimensions of political 
participation that Verba and Nie (1972) identified, cooperative or communal activities 
were not included in the typology. This is because a distinction has to be made 
between ‘political participation’ and ‘civic engagement’.  
 
Following Robert Putnam’s Bowling Alone (2000), there has been a lot of research on 
‘civic engagement’. Yet, after reviewing the existing definitions of the term, Adler and 
Goggin (2005) concluded that there was no single agreed-upon meaning of civic 
engagement. Their own definition was that civic engagement is basically about ‘how 
an active citizen participates in the life of a community in order to improve conditions 
for others or to help shape the community’s future’ (2005: 241). Civic engagement is 
usually operationalized as a list of variables. Scott Keeter and associates (2002) 
designed a large-scale survey of civic engagement, using questions that emerged from 
focus group interviews. The 19 Core Indicators of Engagement they developed 
include: 
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● indicators of community participation including membership in various types 
of non-profit voluntary associations, regular volunteering and fundraising, and 
community problem-solving; 
● indicators of political engagement including registering to vote, voting, and 
various activities that might influence other people’s votes, including 
volunteering for campaigns, displaying political stickers and signs and giving 
money to parties and campaigns; and 
● indicators of political voice including protesting, canvassing, signing petitions, 
contacting the mass media, contacting elected officials, boycotting products, 
and ‘buycotting’ products or companies (purchasing something because you 
like the social or political values of the company). 
 
In the literature on civic engagement, the concept of ‘politics’ is broadened to include 
things like the political-ethical based patterns of consumption at local markets 
(Micheletti, 2003) and food preferences (Micheletti and Stolle, 2009). 
 
The increase in academic interest on such a wide-encompassing term like civic 
engagement may be because people are moving away from political participation 
aimed at changing public policy and moving towards influencing companies, 
lifestyles, charities and the media as governments are ceasing to be the main arbiters of 
public activity. However, civic engagement does not equal political participation 
(Theiss-Morse and Hibbing, 2005). Since the focus of this thesis is on ‘political’ 
participation, we have not included civic engagement in the scope of the research.  
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2.3 Young people in democracy today 
 
Young people possess the potential to challenge the existing norms of society. 
Historically, young people have often been at the forefront of challenging non-
democratic regimes and once a democratic transition has taken place, have the 
potential to play an influential role in the consolidation of that democracy in the 
coming years. However, this potential may remain unrealised if they become 
uninterested in political participation or lack the capacity to contribute to democratic 
citizenship.  
 
According to Finlay, Wray-Lake and Flanagan (2010), there is considerable evidence 
that if civic engagement begins in adolescence, it can continue throughout the life 
course. During adolescence, young people ‘chart a course for their future and take 
stock of the values they live by and the world they want to be part of’ (Flanagan and 
Levine, 2010: 160). Political participation by young people is important for them to 
grow into active, engaged citizens. It has been argued that: ‘[c]itizens in a democracy 
need to be taught to know and value what it means to participate in and be responsible 
for the care and improvement of our common and collective life’ (Woolin, 1989: 139).  
 
However, within the literature on young people in established democracies in Western 
Europe and North America today, there has been a growing concern over what has 
been termed the ‘youth in crisis’ (Lerner, 1954; Larkin, 1979; Quinnan, 2002; 
Childers, 2012). Studies have found that young people have become less likely to vote 
over time (Fieldhouse, Tramner and Russell, 2007; Norris, 2002; Phelps, 2005; 
Wattenberg, 2002) and that the current generation of young people have a weaker 
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sense of duty and are less likely to see voting as an obligation (Blais, Gidengil and 
Nevitte, 2004: 229). Others have identified that not only are younger individuals less 
likely to vote but also are less likely to engage in campaign activities and join a 
political party than older cohorts (Dalton, 2008; Franklin, 2004; Esser and de Vrees, 
2007; Mycock and Tonge, 2012). Along the same lines, Henn and Weinstein (2006: 
525) found a low level of party identification among young people. Similarly, 
Wattenberg (2002: 90) finds that young people in the US do not believe that political 
parties represent their interests. Some scholars have explained this phenomenon by 
reference to the life-cycle effect. For instance, Milbrath and Goel (1977) observed that 
‘participation increases steadily with age until it reaches a peak in the middle years, 
and then gradually declines with old age’. Somewhat similarly, Rosenstone and 
Hansen (1993: 136-137) write: ‘In general, as people grow older, their involvement in 
politics deepens.’  
 
Yet, some studies have found that young people today are less likely to participate in 
politics than young people several decades ago. For instance, Flanagan and Levine 
(2010) find that young adults today are less likely than their counterparts in the 1970s 
to belong to a union, read newspapers at least once a week, vote, be contacted by a 
political party, work on a community project, attend club meetings and believe that 
people are trustworthy. Volunteering was the only indicator that has seen an increase 
since the 1970s. Depending on the circumstances, Fiorina (2002) argues, voluntarism 
can be political. Although Putnam (2000) writes that young people being more 
interested in volunteering is a good thing, Mattson (2003) points out that at the same 
time, these young people are more apathetic towards politics. Volunteering is not the 
same as political participation, and the fact remains that young people today are not as 
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actively engaged in politics as their counterparts in previous generations. This 
interpretation of the increasing political apathy or alienation of young people has been 
referred to as ‘dissenting citizenship’ (O’Loughlin and Gillespie, 2012) or ‘partisan 
dealignment’ (Phelps, 2012).  
 
On the other hand, some scholars have argued that forms of civic engagement are 
changing, rather than declining (Sherrod, Flannagan and Youniss, 2002). Stolle and 
Hooghe (2011: 119) argue that young people have become involved ‘in emerging 
forms of civic engagement that take place outside the institutionalised sphere of 
politics’. Sherrod, Flanagan and Youniss (2002) found that young people are more 
likely to engage in informal networks and online communities than read newspapers or 
join political parties or trade unions. Social networking sites provide a forum for 
ordinary young people to engage with others and express themselves in an ‘intimate, 
social, unregulated youth space’ (Harris, Wyn and Younes, 2010: 27). Some studies 
find that social networking sites are being utilised in existing forms of engagement and 
have a positive impact on civic and political action for young adults (Gil de Zuniga, 
Jung and Valenzuela, 2012; Valenzuela, 2013). However, no research has yet shown 
precisely the extent to which new forms of political activity have compensated for the 
decline of old ones (Phelps, 2012). 
 
2.4 The historical evolution of the crisis of democracy theory 
 
The perceived decline of political participation in Western Europe and the US has not 
been restricted to young people. In fact, over the past several decades, there has been a 
growing academic interest in the rise and fall of political participation among ordinary 
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citizens in the established democracies. Much of this research was driven by the 
concern about declining levels of voter turnout and party membership accompanied by 
deteriorating public confidence and increased public weariness, scepticism, cynicism 
and lack of trust in political parties and politicians (Ekman and Amna, 2012).  
 
The seminal work that sparked this academic debate was The Crisis of Democracy by 
Crozier, Huntington and Watanuki (1975). Crozier, Huntington and Watanuki argued 
that weakening confidence in politicians and political institutions in Western Europe, 
the US and Japan was caused by increasing demands from interest groups and new 
social movements, the increase of mass protests and civil disobedience, greater 
polarisation of ideologies and issues and the apparent inability of governments to deal 
with the international economic recession produced by the OPEC oil shocks. The 
social backdrop of this analysis was the violent protests over the Vietnam War and the 
civil rights riots in the US and the student radicalism and industrial strife in Western 
Europe in the 1970s (Norris, 1999).  
 
In the 1960s and 1970s, new democracies in Latin America were struggling with 
internal conflicts between rising public demands and weak economic development 
resulting in violent reversions to authoritarian rule (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986). 
Nascent democracies collapsed throughout Latin America in a succession of military 
coups: Peru (1962), Brazil and Bolivia (1964), Argentine (1966), Chile and Uruguay 
(1973). Elsewhere in the world, dictatorships maintained firm strongholds: Greece, 
Turkey, Nigeria, Pakistan, Indonesia, the Philippines, India and South Korea. Some of 
these countries had been democracies that had collapsed; others had just been 
decolonised. The diversity of historical legacies that resulted in the failed democratic 
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outcomes fuelled the concern about the future stability of democracy and its suitability 
to developing nations (Norris, 1999).  
 
However, in the 1980s, the ‘crisis’ theories tended to fall out of intellectual fashion. 
The third wave of democratisation kicked off with the restoration of elected civilian 
administrations in Greece, Spain and Portugal (Morlino and Montero, 1995). This was 
followed by successful democratic transitions across Latin America and Asia, 
culminating in the establishment of electoral democracies in many former Soviet-
dominated nations in Central and Eastern Europe. These historic developments 
brought a heady mood of optimism in the West. Huntington described this wave of 
democracy as follows: 
 
Although obviously there were resistance and setbacks, as in China in 1989, the movement 
towards democracy seemed to take on the character of an almost irreversible global tide 
moving on from one triumph to the next (Huntington, 1991: 21). 
 
By the 1980s in the US and Western Europe, democracy adapted to the challenges it 
had faced in the 1960s and 1970s. Protests became part of the conventional repertoire 
of middle-class political participation (Barnes and Kasse, 1979; Topf, 1995). 
Conservatism led by Reagan in the US and Thatcher in the UK reduced public services 
and lowered public expectations (Hoover and Plant, 1989; Krieger, 1986; Norporth, 
1992). New social movements like feminism and environmentalism became 
incorporated into the mainstream policy process (Dalton and Kuechler, 1990; 
McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1996).  
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The evidence for the ‘crisis’ thesis came under strong challenge from a group of 
scholars studying the trends of political support and participation. The five-volume 
‘Beliefs in Government’ research project (Klingemann and Fuchs, 1995; Niedermayer 
and Sinnott, 1995; Borre and Scarborough, 1995; van Deth and Scarborough, 1995; 
Kaase and Newton, 1995) thoroughly examined public opinion of democratic 
governments, institutions and politicians based on the series of Eurobarometer surveys 
from 1973 to 1990. The wide range of contributors to this project found little evidence 
for widespread signs of growing ‘malaise of democracy’ during these decades. 
Instead, diverse patterns of political support were found in different European 
societies, measured by satisfaction with the workings of the democratic process 
(Fuchs, 1995), voter turnout (Topf, 1995), and trust in politicians and institutional 
confidence (Listhaug and Wilberg, 1995). The only evidence consistent with the 
‘crisis’ thesis was a general cross-national decline in the attachment of the electorate to 
political parties. As summarised by Budge and Newton (1997: 132):  
 
There is little evidence to support the various theories of crisis, contradiction and catastrophe. 
There are few signs of a general decline in trust, confidence in public institutions, political 
interest, or faith in democracy; nor is there much evidence of an increase in apathy, alienation 
or faith in democracy. 
 
Yet, by the 1990s, many commentators sensed a more diffused mood of angst and self-
doubt in democracies, particularly in the US. American voters were described as 
‘ready to revolt’, ‘angry’, ‘disgusted’ and ‘frustrated’ (Dionne, 1991; Tolchin, 1996) 
with deep mistrust of the government (Nye, Zelikow and King, 1997). Studies 
confirmed a decline in the public trust for federal government and major institutions in 
America (Nye et al., 1997) with the US Congress held in especially low regard 
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(Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2001). In the seminal work Bowling Alone (2000), Robert 
Putnam found that young Americans were less likely to engage in politics and 
community life and also less likely to trust their fellow citizens.  
 
In Western Europe, scholars have raised similar concerns, finding that public 
disaffection with politics has spread (Torcal and Montero, 2006; Dogan, 2005) and 
that people hate politics (Hay, 2007). The electorate has become more sceptical (Curtis 
and Jowell, 1997) and there has been an erosion of trust in politicians (Holmberg, 
1999). There has been evidence of lower voter turnout (Franklin, 2004) and declining 
party membership (Biesen, Mair and Poguntke, 2009), with political parties losing 
loyal voters (Franklin, Mackie and Valen, 1991; Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000) as well 
as grassroots members (Mair and Biezen, 2001). This trend that has been apparent 
since the mid 1990s has been termed the era of ‘post-democracy’ (Crouch, 2004) and 
even the ‘death of democracy’ (Keane, 2009).  
 
In advanced Western democracies, it has recently been found that a growing number 
of citizens report having lost the ‘sense that they can influence decisions and that the 
political system is responsive to them and well-functioning’ (Stoker, 2010: 51). Dalton 
(2004: 191) finds that by almost any measure, ‘public confidence and trust in, and 
support, for politicians, political parties and political institutions have eroded over the 
past generation’. Dalton (2004) concludes that although citizens in established 
Western societies remain staunchly committed to democratic principles, they have 
gradually become more distrustful of politicians, detached from political parties and 
sceptical about public institutions. Similarly, Norris (1999, 2011) identifies the rise of 
the ‘critical citizens’ in democracies today. ‘Critical citizens’ aspire to democracy as 
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their ideal form of government, but still remain deeply doubtful about the actual 
workings of the core institutions of democracy, especially political parties, parliaments 
and governments.  
 
2.5 Consequences and interpretations 
 
Whether the trend of decline of political participation is interpreted pessimistically or 
optimistically depends on which normative concept of democracy is adopted. For 
instance, if the participatory democracy model as described by Pateman (1980) is 
adopted, political passivity may be interpreted to be detrimental to democracy. On the 
other hand, if the minimalist model of democracy described by Przeworski (1999) is 
adopted, democracy does not require mass participation, except at the ballot box. The 
intermediate position is that of the representative democracy model as espoused by 
Almond and Verba (1963). Almond and Verba (1963: 346) argued that the ideal 
political culture was a combination of political interest and a sense of civic duty with 
some level of passivity, giving the incumbent government leaders the freedom to 
decide on most issues on their own. 
 
Pessimistic interpretations argue that the decline in social capital results in the erosion 
of democracy from the inside (Putnam, 2000). Growing voter scepticism and cynicism 
may contribute to the rise of protest politics and radical anti-state parties (Craig and 
Maggiotto, 1981; Muller, 1979; Muller, Jukam and Seligson, 1982; Cheles, Ferguson 
and Vaughan, 1995). At the elite level it may also perhaps deter the best and brightest 
from entering public service (Nye, Zelikow and King, 1997; Norris, 1997). The fall of 
political trust may limit the discretion of policymakers and restrict voluntary 
  27 
compliance with government authority (Hetherington, 1998). In the democratisation 
literature, it has been long assumed that a democratic political culture was a necessary 
condition for democratic consolidation (Lipset, 1959; Almond and Verba, 1963; Dahl, 
1971; Linz 1978; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Diamond, Linz and Lipset, 1995; 
Linz and Stephan 1996). In addition, low political trust and participation have been 
thought to jeopardise regime legitimacy and threaten the stability of new democracies 
(Crozier, Huntington and Watanuki, 1975). 
 
Optimistic interpretations have argued that the fall of civic engagement and political 
participation is premature (Klingemann and Fuchs, 1995) and ‘critical citizens’ or 
‘monitorial citizens’ still remain committed to democratic governance but are simply 
choosing not to participate (Norris, 1999; Schudson, 1996; 1998). Theiss-Morse and 
Hibbing (2005) write that many people are not participating in politics because they 
are busy, and that they are rational in choosing not to participate.  
 
The demands of job and family, not to mention the appeal of sports, movies, TV, and a host of 
other things that compete with politics for the public’s attention, all tend to make politics a 
fairly low priority for the average voter (Donovan and Bowler, 2004: 35).  
 
Support for particular politicians or for specific parties and governments in office can 
be expected to ebb and flow as part of the normal process of democratic politics. It has 
even been pointed out that political inactivity ‘can be a sign of confidence as well as 
alienation. Or it may simply be a sign of irrelevance of politics and government for 
many people much of the time’ (Gamson, 1968: 48). 
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In addition, it has been argued that citizen disenchantment with the performance of 
democracy may catalyse activism and spark progressive reform movements, therefore 
serving ultimately to strengthen and adapt democratic institutions (Cain, Dalton and 
Scarrow, 2003; Dalton, 2004; Norris, 2005; Booth and Seligson, 2009). In Latin 
America, it has been observed that citizens who are dissatisfied with government 
performance do not drop out of politics or resort to protest politics, but participate at 
high rates in conventional and alternative political arenas (Booth and Seligson, 2009).  
 
Whether the consequences of the general trend of decline for political participation is 
negative or positive may vary upon the level (Easton, 1965). Also, perhaps more 
importantly, the consequences will depend on the causes of the decline of political 
participation. For instance, consequences will differ depending on whether, on the one 
hand, the causes of the decline in political participation are enduring cultural shifts and 
technological changes, or on the other hand, due to the deterioration of the quality of 
democratic performance of governments and democratic institutions. 
 
2.6 Explanations  
 
According to Norris (2011:7), there are broadly three types of explanations for the 
decline of political participation in democracies today: (1) demand-side theories; (2) 
intermediary theories; and (3) supply-side theories.  
 
Demand-side theories explain the increasing voter disaffection and decline of political 
participation with reference to enduring cultural shifts and socioeconomic changes. 
This explanation has its intellectual roots in the modernization theories of Lipset 
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(1959), Lerner (1958) and Moore (1966). It puts heavy emphasis on factors such as 
levels of socioeconomic development, literacy and education and post-materialism to 
explain rising democratic expectations and falling satisfaction with the actual 
workings of democracy. It is exemplified by the works of Dalton (2004, 2005) and 
Inglehart and Welzel (2005). After examining the social status and generational 
patterns of political support, Dalton (2005) concludes that trends of decreasing trust 
are linked to the process of modernization and that scepticism of the political process 
has grown more rapidly among the young and better-educated. From this analysis, he 
concludes that: ‘We have entered a new period when governments must confront a 
public sceptical of their motivations, doubtful about the institutions of representative 
democracy, and willing to challenge political elites’ (Dalton, 2005: 150).  
 
Intermediary theories focus on the role of political communications in how people 
learn about democracy and government performance. Negative coverage of politics 
and elections has been found to reduce political trust (Cappella and Jamieson, 1997) 
and political efficacy, leading to voter disaffection (Pinkleton, Austin and Forman, 
1998). It has also been argued that excessively negative news about sexual scandals 
and financial corruption are damaging to the reputation of the political actors and 
institutions, leading to broader disillusionment with the way democracy works 
(Germent, 1991; Orren, 1997).  
 
However, within the literature, intermediary explanations have been criticised on two 
issues. Firstly, the purported negative effects of intermediary theories lack empirical 
basis. Cross-national empirical studies have shown that there is not a systemic 
connection between media coverage of scandals and corruption and subsequent levels 
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of trust and confidence in government or satisfaction with democracy (Chanley, 
Rudolph and Rahn, 2000; Anderson and Tverdova, 2003; Moreno, 2002). In addition, 
frequent uses of some types of media, such as social networking sites, are associated 
with comparatively lower levels of political cynicism (Hanson et al., 2010). In fact, 
Norris (2011) concludes that exposure to the news media actually strengthens 
democratic orientations and encourages civic engagement.  
 
Perhaps the biggest problem with intermediary accounts is that it may not be the media 
coverage of corruption and scandals that lower political trust and efficacy but the 
corruption and scandals themselves that lead to voter disaffection. In other words, the 
problem may lie in the deterioration of the quality of democratic performance.  
 
Supply-side theories lay the blame for public dissatisfaction with the policy 
performance and institutional arrangements of democratic governments. Supply-side 
theories posit that public satisfaction with politics is strongly influenced by the way in 
which the government implements policy (Norris, 2011: 15). Yet, due to globalisation, 
internationalisation of capital markets, privatisation, deregulation and the increasing 
importance of supranational institutions like the EU, IMF and WTO, the traditional 
scope and autonomy of the modern state has diminished (Hay, 2007). In addition, the 
professionalization of legislatures and low levels of incumbency turnover have 
insulated politicians from electoral defeat (Norris, 1997) and the lack of influence of 
minor ‘protest parties’ have failed to provide a channel for disaffected voters (Miller 
and Listhaug, 1990). It has also been argued that intermediary institutions such as 
political parties, interest groups and parliament have weakened, making government 
less accountable and responsive to the citizenry (Hayward, 1996). Citizens may 
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become disillusioned with the political system if they perceive elected representatives 
to be corrupt and unresponsive (Gamson, 1968). All of these problems with the supply 
of politics are therefore more likely to be the ultimate cause of voter disaffection rather 
than the broadcasting of these issues. It is therefore hypothesised in this thesis that 
supply-side explanations would provide the most comprehensive account of the 
changes in the political culture of university students in South Korea. 
 
2.7 Study of the political culture of university students in South 
Korea 
 
The apparent decline of political participation and interest in politics amongst young 
people has also been observed in South Korea. University students played an 
important role in the democratic transition of South Korea in 1987. Historically, 
university students in South Korea have led protests against oppressive regimes since 
the beginning of the twentieth century. Student activism has a long history in Korea 
that began with the anti-colonial struggles against Japanese colonialism in 1919-1945 
and continued since then as a force opposing the successive authoritarian regimes that 
followed (Park, M., 2012: 125). However, many Korean academics today express 
concern at the apparent political apathy and lack of interest in politics among 
university students today (Noh, H. H., Song, J. M. and Kang, W. T., 2013; Lee, Y. M., 
2010; Jung, H. G., 2010).  Studies also find that young people in Korea have low 
levels of political efficacy and low levels of trust in political actors (Park, J. S., 2012; 
Lee, Y. M., 2010) and that student activism has become virtually non-existent (Kim, 
K. K., 2008). Meanwhile, there have been several sporadic instances of peaceful mass 
mobilisations of young people participating in candlelight vigils, which has been the 
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subject of much discussion in Korean academia (Han, M. R., 2011; Yoon, S. Y., 2009; 
Jeon, H. G., 2008).   
 
According to studies conducted before or contemporaneously with the democratic 
transition, the major characteristics of South Korean political culture included: 
authoritarianism, collectivism, alienation, factionalism, nationalism and anti-
communism (Han, B. H. and Auh, S. Y., 1987: 29; Shin, M. S., 1986: 272-275). Many 
of these traits could be attributed to the legacy of the pre-industrial traditional Korean 
society. Before the twentieth century, Korea was ruled by a series of dynasties, the last 
of which was the Chosun dynasty. In the Chosun dynasty, most citizens belonged to a 
largely agricultural class that had no opportunities of social mobility and no access to 
political participation. In particular, the Confucian ideology that permeated society 
emphasised such values as obedience, hierarchical order, collectivism and stability, 
effectively excluding the masses from having any political voice (Sohn, B. S., 1987: 
48).  
 
These traditional values have supported the authoritarianism that persisted for most of 
the twentieth century (Lee, S. G., 1984: 208). The presence of traditional values such 
as obedience, elitism and collectivism in the pre-democratic transition Korean culture 
was confirmed in a survey conducted by Han Bae-ho and Auh Soo-young in 1984. 
However, this study also found that a majority of Koreans at the time also subscribed to 
values such as equality, tolerance and respect for individual rights (Han, B. H. and 
Auh, S. Y., 1987: 58-69). Similarly, Pye observed that though there was a preference 
for a strong state, there was also a desire for the fulfilment of democratic ideals and 
responsiveness (Pye, 1985: 216).  
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In a study of the political culture of university students in Korea based on 2000 survey 
respondents in three rounds of surveys in 1986, it was found that university students in 
1986 were extremely dissatisfied with the political situation. An overwhelming 
majority of the survey respondents said that the interests of the public were not 
reflected in politics (79.4%) and that there was no stable sense of social justice (84.2%) 
(Lee, H. G., 1987: 37). The study also found that university students at the time were 
generally supportive of the student activist movement and recognized that the objective 
of the student activist movement was to achieve democracy (Lee, H. G., 1987: 38-41). 
 
After the democratic transition in 1987, there were several important studies on the 
political culture of Koreans in general. In 1995, a study by Lee Jeong-bok found that a 
majority of Koreans were aware of current political affairs and found politics to be 
relevant to their everyday lives. Electoral participation was high, but other areas of 
political participation such as joining political parties and participating in rallies, 
campaigns or lobbying were relatively low. A majority of respondents reported low 
levels of political efficacy and expressed the feeling that their opinions were not 
reflected in government policies. Yet, these feelings were to be expected in a country 
that had just undergone a transition from an authoritarian regime.  
 
Following up on their study in 1984, Auh Soo-young and Han Bae-ho published an 
article in 1996 identifying the changes and continuities in the political culture of South 
Korea since the democratic transition. They found that the traits of obedience and 
respect for authority had become much less significant since the democratic transition, 
especially in urban areas and amongst the highly educated citizens. A similar study 
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that sought to identify the changes in continuities in the political culture since the 
establishment of the Republic of Korea to the late 1990s found that authoritarian 
tendencies have declined. However, collectivism and factionalism were still found to 
be prominent features of Korean political culture (Kim, H. N., 1998: 109-110). 
Meanwhile, another study found that in the 1990s, a post-materialist generation which 
held socially tolerant values that respected diversity and emphasised personal freedom 
but distrusted political institutions was coming of age, particularly amongst the 
Koreans in their 20s (Auh S. Y., 1999: 129).  
 
A study in 2004 specifically examined the changes in the political participation of 
Koreans since the democratic transition. This study found that in 2002 compared to 
1987, there were many changes in the forms of political participation of Korean 
citizens. Voting became an important form of political participation and there has been 
a decrease in participation in violent protests. Citizens have adopted more diverse 
types of political participation including contacting public officials and engaging with 
civil society groups. Citizens have also become more interested in post-materialist 
issues such as human rights or environmentalism. However, the study found that there 
was still a generally low level of political participation (Lee, H. W., 2004: 192-194). 
In a further more recent study, Lee Hyun-woo found that though there was a general 
trend of decline in electoral participation, there was an increase in other forms of 
political participation, in particular signing petitions and contacting politicians (Lee, H. 
W., 2009: 12-14). However, this study noted that there was a very low level of trust in 
political institutions, in particular towards the National Assembly and political parties 
(Lee, H. W., 2009: 7).  
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This general trend of distrust of political actors has been widely observed particularly 
in studies of the political culture of young people today. In a 2012 study of Korean 
high school students, it was found that young people had a low level of both internal 
and external political efficacy (Park, J. S., 2012: 189). Internal political efficacy relates 
to the belief that the subject understands politics and can effectively participate in 
politics; external political efficacy relates to the belief that the government and the 
political system will be responsive to their political participation (Park, J. S., 2012: 
191). According to this study, external political efficacy was relatively lower than 
internal political efficacy and could be explained by the very low levels of trust. The 
study found that young people had a very low level of trust for politics in general, 
politicians and political institutions, with the lowest level of trust for politicians (Park, 
J. S., 2012: 208). In another study based on a survey of 754 university students in the 
Busan region, it was found that most university students did not have a political party 
they supported and that they exhibited a general lack of interest in politics and lack of 
knowledge of political issues (Jeon, Y. J., Cha, J. K. and Kim, E. M., 2007: 116, 126).   
 
Many political culture studies on Korean young people and university students in 
Korean academia frame the discussion in terms of the generational, period and age 
effects to explain the political culture of young people in Korea (Lee, Y. M., 2010: 13). 
Age effects, or life cycle effects, are the changes in political attitudes and values that 
people go through as they age. The traditional age effect that is observed is that people 
tend to become more conservative as they age (Coale, 1964; Berelson and Steiner, 
1964). It is also observed that citizens come to support political parties and participate 
in voting in higher numbers as they age (Crittenden, 1962; Barnes, 1989). In contrast, 
young people tend to be more rebellious against authority (Braungart, 1975) and have 
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greater protest potential (Watts, 1999). Generational effects relate to the lasting effect 
that the shared pre-adult socialization has on a particular cohort (Lambert, 1972; 
Abramson, 1975; Rintala, 1979). The underlying assumption of generational theory is 
that the shared experience of significant events such as war or social movement in the 
formative years has a lasting impact on the political views of a cohort. In contrast, 
period effects move away from assuming the importance of the formative years and 
instead posits that historically significant events affect every individual regardless of 
age or generation. For instance, Beck and Jennings (1979) find that there is a liberal 
bias among both younger and older respondents in the late 1960s and early 1970s in 
America in the context of the Vietnam War.  
 
In a study of the age and generational effects in Korea from 1997 to 2012, both age 
and generational effects were observed. This study examined six generations in six 
birth cohorts and found that the age effect of increasing conservatism was found in the 
‘Korean War generation’ (born before 1942), the ‘pre-industrial generation’ (born 
1942-1951) and the ‘Yushin generation’ (born 1952-1959). However, it was observed 
that the ‘386 generation’2 (born 1960-1969) had a distinctively consistent liberal 
political bias. This exhibited the generational effect of a cohort that had experienced 
the democratic transition of 1987 as young people in their 20s and early 30s (Noh, H. 
H., Song, J. M. and Kang, W. T., 2013: 133-134). Meanwhile, it was observed that the 
‘candlelight generation’ (born 1988-1993), who are currently in their 20s, exhibited 
the lowest level of support for any political party and the lowest level of electoral 
participation (Noh, H. H., Song, J. M. and Kang, W. T., 2013: 114, 133).  
 
                                            
2 The term ‘386 generation’ was coined in the 1990s to refer to the generation in their 30s, who were 
university students in the 1980s and born in the 1960s.  
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The reference to the ‘candlelight generation’ refers to the mass mobilization of young 
people in Korea in 2008 against the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. Over 60% of 
the initial participants were teenagers and the peaceful protests, which took the form of 
candlelight vigils, lasted for over two months. As a result of the protests, the 
government renegotiated the terms of the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement so that 
beef aged over 30 months or containing harmful materials that may cause Mad Cow 
Disease were banned from being imported to Korea (Han, M. R., 2011: 100). This 
event showed that young people could not be ignored in political decision-making and 
could be a potent political force. It has also been argued that the candlelight vigils 
showed that young people in Korea were not apathetic or uninterested in politics but 
are actually monitorial citizens (Yoon, S. Y., 2009: 317). Although there has been a 
decline of voting and support of political parties, Korean citizens, particularly young 
people, have been found to seek to engage with politics through online social media 
and unconventional forms of political participation such as the candlelight vigils 
(Yoon, S. Y., 2009: 329).  
 
The political culture of university students today can, to some extent, be explained by 
age, generational and period effects. Koreans in their 20s are in their formative years 
as young people in their life cycles. As such it can be expected that they would have 
lower levels of political participation. As a cohort, they experienced the IMF financial 
crisis of 1997-1998 as children and face entering the workforce in the wake of the 
global financial crisis of 2008. They are also affected by the period of economic 
instability that affects people of all generations today (Lee, Y. M., 2010: 17). These 
effects can, to some extent, explain the political culture of university students today. 
Lee Young-min argued that Koreans in their 20s today had lower levels of political 
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efficacy, political trust and political participation than other generations because of 
their experience of economic instability, which strengthened individualistic tendencies 
(Lee, Y. M., 2010: 38).  
 
However, in this thesis, age, generational and period effects are not considered in 
further detail for several reasons. For one thing, the political culture of university 
students today are not being compared to the political culture of other age groups. 
Age, generational and period effects are particularly significant when the political 
cultures of different age groups at a certain period of time are being compared. 
Instead, the political culture of university students today are compared to the political 
culture of university students in the 1980s, who were of the same age group at the 
time.  
 
Yet, the consequence of examining historical events in the context of the demand, 
intermediary and supply side theories without reference to generational and period 
effects are that the impact of individual significant events are not analysed in detail. 
The impact of having experienced a historically significant event while a university 
student would affect the general culture and inform the worldview of those who 
experienced it. Admittedly, some of the compelling narrative power of exploring 
certain significant events in detail is lost by not adopting to examine the data with the 
generational and period effects in mind. The explanatory power of the generational 
and period effects comes from the premise that underlying socioeconomic 
developments or historically significant events cause changes in the political culture. 
For instance, generational effects and period effects emphasise the impact of the 
experience of the Korean War, the 1987 democratic transition or the IMF financial 
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crisis on the political culture of a generation or particular demographic. Yet, the 
political culture of a society is not affected only by historically significant events but 
also underlying socioeconomic changes, changes in the role of political 
communications and the supply of governance. Significant historical events form part 
of the explanation of these overarching changes. For this reason, this thesis explains 
the changes in the political culture of university students by reference to demand-side, 
intermediary and supply-side theories. As will be discussed in the analysis of the 
findings, these explanations take into account the historically significant events that 
inform the attitudes and experiences of university students in the 1980s and today. In 
addition, this thesis does discuss several significant events and issues, such as the 
Gwangju Massacre, the 1987 democratic transition, the candlelight vigils against 
Korea-US Free Trade Agreement and the Sewol Ferry Incident, which were raised by 
the interviewees.   
 
2.8 Contribution of this thesis  
 
The main contribution of this thesis to the existing literature is that it provides an 
empirical case study on the changes in the political culture of university students in 
South Korea. In the current literature in Korean academia, there have been some 
studies focusing on student activist movements in the 1980s or the political apathy of 
university students today. However, there have not been many studies that compare 
the political culture of Korea before the democratic transition and after the democratic 
transition. By comparing the political culture of university students in the 1980s and 
that of university students today, this study presents a unique contribution to the 
existing literature.  
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Another contributions of this thesis will be to present a systematic study of the 
political culture of university students before the democratic transition. Most studies 
on the political culture of university students before the democratic transition adopt a 
historical narrative of major events. In contrast, this thesis undertakes systematic semi-
structured interviews of ordinary university students to uncover aspects of political 
culture that are usually not the focus of existing historical narratives, such as political 
socialization or the reasons for political participation.  
 
As for the political culture of university students today, existing studies have been 
focused on specific elements of the political culture, such as media use, political 
cleavages in recent elections or political orientations. Existing studies tend to focus on 
binary relationships between these elements. Such studies usually use survey data and 
statistical analysis to uncover correlative relationships from which causation may be 
inferred. Although these studies are valuable, such focused studies fail to capture the 
wider picture of political culture. One contribution of this study is that it uses not only 
survey methods but also qualitative interviews to present a more comprehensive and 
in-depth study of the political culture of university students today. 
 
In addition, this thesis adds to a currently small body of literature focused on the 
political culture of university students in Korea. Although there have been some 
studies on the political culture of university students in Korea, this has usually been 
part of a more general survey on values or part of a narrow study on a particular aspect 
of political culture like political trust or political communications. In contrast, this 
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thesis examines all elements of the political culture of university students in Korea to 
provide a comprehensive and in-depth analysis. 
 
The findings from this research also provides a framework for understanding how 
democratic transition and consolidation, in parallel with socioeconomic changes, 
technological advances, and other societal changes, affect the political culture of a 
newly democratised country. By examining the changes in the political culture of 
university students in South Korea and explaining these changes through the demand-
side, intermediary, and supply-side theories, this thesis presents a new theoretical 
perspective for analysing democratic transition and consolidation. The issues and 
problems in the democratic consolidation process that will be discussed in this thesis 
can also inform research and policy development for other newly democratized 
countries. 
 
This study also contributes to the wider debate on the rise of voter disaffection 
particularly among young people in Western democracies. The findings in this thesis 
raise the question of whether a similar phenomenon can be observed in other new 
democracies. In particular, this thesis applies the cartel party theory as part of the 
supply-side explanation for the changes in the political culture of university students in 
Korea. This demonstrates how changes in the political system, such as cartelisation, 
can affect political culture. The findings in this thesis about how the attitudes towards 
politics, political efficacy, and political participation of university students today are 
impacted by political developments may present further insights into the voter 
disaffection that many academics observe in young people and the wider public in 
established democracies. 
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3 Research design 
 
In this chapter, we will discuss the research design used to collect and analyse the 
empirical data presented in Parts II and III of the thesis. The purpose of this thesis is to 
discuss and compare the political culture of university students in South Korea in the 
1980s before the democratic transition and the political culture of university students 
today. The methodology employed to collect the data aims to obtain qualitative data 
through in-depth interviews supported by survey data and secondary sources where 
available.  
 
We first present the research questions and outlines the hypotheses of this thesis. 
Secondly, we discuss the primary data collection methods and sampling of the 
interview and survey respondents. Thirdly, we discuss the interview methods used to 
carry out the interviews through which the bulk of the primary empirical evidence was 
collected. Fourthly, we present the survey methodology used to collect data on the 
political culture of university students today. Finally, we discuss the analysis methods 
employed to analyse the empirical evidence. 
 
3.1 Research questions and hypotheses 
 
The research topic of this study is to compare and explain the political culture of 
university students in South Korea before and after the democratic transition in 1987. 
There are three main research questions that this thesis aims to answer: 
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(1) What was the political culture of university students in the 1980s before the 
1987 democratic transition? 
(2) What is the political culture of university students today? 
(3) What are the explanations for the changes in the political culture of university 
students between these two periods? 
 
The first two research questions aim to find out the political culture of university 
students in the 1980s before the democratic transition and the political culture of 
university students today. The third research question aims to find out why the 
political culture of university students in South Korea has changed since the 
democratic transition in 1987. 
 
The elements of political culture that we will focus on are: 
 
• the attitudes towards politics and government; 
• the attitudes towards media;  
• the political socialization process; 
• the experience of political participation; and 
• the reasons for political participation or non-participation.  
 
The hypotheses that will be tested in this thesis in relation to the research questions 
above are as follows.  
 
Firstly, it is hypothesised that university students in the 1980s held very negative 
attitudes towards the Chun administration. It is also hypothesised that university 
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students in the 1980s welcomed the 1987 democratic transition. This is because the 
Chun administration (1979-1987) implemented harsh and oppressive policies against 
any form of political opposition. In contrast, university students today live in a 
democracy that has been continuing since 1987 and have much greater personal and 
political freedom. It is hypothesised that university students today would have less 
intensely negative attitudes towards the presidential administration. However, based 
on the literature, it is hypothesised that university students today are generally 
dissatisfied in the current political situation. It is also hypothesised that university 
students today have low levels of trust for politicians and do not have a political party 
they support. These hypotheses are based on the study by Lee Young-min (2010).  
 
Secondly, it is also hypothesised that university students today would trust the media 
more than university students in the 1980s for objective and reliable information about 
politics. The media were strictly controlled by the Chun administration in the 1980s. It 
is therefore hypothesised that university students in the 1980s did not trust mainstream 
media. However, there are no longer these formal state controls on the media, and a 
diverse range of opinions can now be observed in Korean mainstream media. 
 
Thirdly, on political socialization, it is hypothesised that both university students today 
and university students in the 1980s would state that university is the environment that 
had the greatest effect on their political socialization process.  
 
Fourthly, on the experience of political participation, it is hypothesised that university 
students in the 1980s are likely to have had more covert experiences of latent political 
participation. This is because of the oppressive policies against political participation 
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enforced by the Chun administration. It is hypothesised that university students today 
would have low levels of latent political participation and a low level of interest in 
politics. It is also hypothesised that online social media would be an important method 
of latent political participation for university students today. 
 
On the experience of manifest political participation, it is hypothesised that protest 
activity would have been the primary method of manifest political participation for 
university students in the 1980s. It is also hypothesised that their experiences are likely 
to have been violent. In contrast, it is hypothesised that university students today 
would have access to diverse ways of participating in politics through voting and 
engaging with political parties and civil society groups. Yet, based on the literature it 
is hypothesised that university students today are likely to have low levels of political 
participation in general.  
 
Fifthly, on the reasons for and against political participation, it is hypothesised that the 
main reason for non-participation amongst university students in the 1980s was the 
fear of the oppressive methods used by the Chun administration. It is hypothesised that 
the main reason university students in the 1980s participated in politics despite the 
high personal costs of doing so was because of the injustices carried out by the 
dictatorial Chun administration. In contrast, it is hypothesised that university students 
today do not participate in politics because they do not feel the need to do so.  
 
Finally, it is hypothesised that the main reason for the changes in the political culture 
of university students is due to the changes in the structure of the political system from 
a dictatorship to a democracy.  
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3.2 Data collection and sampling 
 
To collect data on the political culture of university in South Korea in the 1980s and 
today, I have primarily utilised my own survey and interview data.  For this thesis, I 
have conducted in-depth interviews of 27 interviewees who were university students 
in the 1980s and 34 interviewees who are currently university students. The interviews 
were conducted in two rounds, in February to March 2013 and June to August 2014. 
The following table shows the numbers of the interviews conducted during these two 
periods: 
 
Table 2. Interview Rounds 
Round Periods 
University Students 
in the 1980s 
University 
Students Today 
1 February – March 2013 20 27 
2 June – August 2014 7 7 
 
The first round of interviews conducted in February to March 2013 were all face-to-
face interviews of approximately one hour each. The second round of interviews 
conducted in June to August 2014 were all telephone interviews of approximately one 
hour each. All interviews were semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions 
aimed at trying to allow as much freedom in the responses as possible. Although 
different sets of interview questions were used for the two groups, each interviewee in 
the same group were asked the same questions to allow for comparison. The interview 
guide outlining the questions that were asked is appended in Appendix I.   
 
After conducting the first round of interviews in February to March 2013 and 
reviewing the results, it became apparent that in order to have a more representative 
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set of data to determine the political culture of university students today, a survey 
would be needed. So in December 2013 to January 2014, an online survey was 
conducted with the questions formulated around the key findings through the 
interviews. There were a total of 199 respondents to the survey. The survey 
questionnaire is appended in Appendix II.  
 
A survey was not carried out on university students in the 1980s. There were several 
reasons for this decision. Firstly, the attitudes and experiences of the interviewees who 
were university students in the 1980s were much less diverse than the attitudes and 
experiences of the university students today, which were more varied and nuanced. 
Secondly, data collection on the political culture of university students in the 1980s is 
inherently difficult because respondents are forced to recollect past attitudes and 
experiences, nearly three decades after the relevant events. It was possible to collect 
data despite this problem through interviews by thoroughly explaining the questions 
and observing the context of the answers. However, in a survey format, this is much 
more difficult to do. Thirdly, though this thesis seeks to compare the political culture 
of university students in the two different time periods, the emphasis of study is 
necessarily on the university students today. This is because the findings on the 
university students today are likely to have greater policy and theoretical implications. 
It was therefore decided that a survey would not be necessary for analysing the 
political culture of university students in the 1980s. 
 
The target number of interviewees was 60 (30 university students in the 1980s and 30 
current university students) and the target survey respondents were 250. These targets 
were set so that I would be able to effectively collect and analyse the data without 
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being overly challenged while also being able to represent regional proportions 
discussed further below.  
 
I mainly used publicly available contact information and personal connections in 
South Korea to contact interview and survey respondents. When conducting the 
interviews, I focused on the following five major regional universities: Seoul National 
University, Yonsei University, Korea University, Pusan National University, Jeonnam 
University. Seoul National University, Yonsei University and Korea University are the 
three top universities in the Korean higher education system and are all based in Seoul. 
Students from these universities have historically been heavily involved in political 
demonstrations and rallies. Pusan National University and Jeonnam University are top 
regional universities in Yeongnam and Honam, respectively. Students from these 
universities have also historically been active in politics.  
 
In order to find interviewees from these targeted universities, I first contacted leaders 
of student councils and student unions who were easier to contact. By contacting 
student leaders, I was able to interview students who were more likely to be interested 
in politics. They were also useful for being introduced other potential interviewees and 
contacting alumni who had attended university in the 1980s. Although I wanted to 
interview students in leadership positions, I also wanted to interview ordinary students 
who are not in leadership positions and therefore may be less interested in politics or 
have political ambitions. For these interviewees, I used my personal connections of 
people I met when I was studying in Korea, attending church or serving in the 
military. This mix of sources meant that there were varying levels of interest in 
politics and political participation.  
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A key issue I had in mind when selecting interview and survey respondents was to 
have balanced regional representation. Regionalism is a very important social cleavage 
in South Korea with strong regional biases present in the party competiton structure 
(Kim, Y. H., 2002; Kwack, J. Y., 2006: 123; Choi, J. Y., 2007; Park, C. W., 2008). In 
order to ensure that the research results are not affected by regional biases, the 
composition of the interviewees and survey respondents were monitored to reflect 
actual university student numbers. As the figures below show, in South Korea, in both 
1990 and 2014, around 40% of university students attended universities in the Seoul, 
Incheon and Gyeonggi region. The Yeongnam region had the next largest portion of 
university students at just below 30%. There was less than half the number of 
university students in the Honam region than in the Yeongnam region.  
 
Table 3. Number of university students by region 
Region 
Number of 
university 
students in 
1990 
Percentage 
1990 
Number of 
university 
students in 
2014 
Percentage 
2014 
Seoul, Incheon, 
Gyeonggi 
561,000 39.2% 1,131,481 38.3% 
Yeongnam 424,000 29.6% 790,013 26.8% 
Honam 196,000 13.6% 331,434 11.2% 
Chungcheong 176,000 12.2% 525,824 17.8% 
Gangwon 60,000 4.1% 138,504 4.6% 
Jeju 14,000 0.9% 30,239 1.0% 
Total: 1,431,000 - 2,947,495 - 
(Source: Korea Higher Education Research Institute Statistics) 
 
Though the sampling was not precisely in these same proportions, I made an effort to 
ensure that sufficient numbers of students from the Seoul, Yeongnam and Honam 
regions were interviewed and surveyed. In fact, the sample sizes of this study were set 
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so that the rough proportions of the regions could be reflected. The following table 
shows the list of universities attended by interviewees who were university students in 
the 1980s and the region of each university.  
 
Table 4. List of universities attended by interview and survey responses 
University Region 
1980s Current 
 
 
 
Interview Survey 
Seoul National University Seoul 3 9 - 
Yonsei University Seoul - 4 - 
Korea University Seoul 2 3 - 
Hanyang University Seoul 2 1 - 
Kyeonghee University Seoul - 1 - 
Incheon University Incheon 1 - - 
Inha University  Incheon 2 - - 
 Gyeonggi Total 10 18 139 
Pusan National University  Yeongnam 5 6 - 
Busan University of Foreign 
Studies 
Yeongnam - 1 - 
Busan Women’s University Yeongnam 1 - - 
Busan Dongyi University Yeongnam 1 - - 
Gyeongbuk University Yeongnam 3 1 - 
Goshin University Yeongnam 2 - - 
Handong University Yeongnam - 1 - 
 Yeongnam Total 12 9 29 
Jeonnam University Honam 2 7 - 
Jeonbuk University Honam 1 - - 
Josun University Honam 2 - - 
 Honam Total 5 7 20 
 Chungcheong 
Total - - 5 
 Gangwon - - 1 
 Other - - 5 
Total  27 34 198 
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As for the gender of the interviewees and respondents, there were more male students 
who were interviewed in both the 1980s and current university student groups. The 
following table shows the proportions. 
Table 5. Gender of interviewees and respondents 
 1980s Current 
Interview Interview Survey 
Male 22 22 88 
Female 5 12 108 
Percentage of Female students 18.5% 35.2% 54.2% 
NA - - 3 
Total 27 34 199 
 
There are several explanations for this. For one thing, according to national statistics, 
there have been and still are a larger proportion of male students. In particular, in 
1979, the percentage of female university students in Seoul was only 28.5%. It was 
therefore difficult to contact female respondents who were university students in the 
1980s. The following table shows the percentages of female students in university in 
Seoul from 1979 to 2013.  
 
Table 6. Percentage of female students in university in Seoul 
Year Percentage of female students 
1979 28.5% 
1990 33.2% 
2000 41.6% 
2010 46.2% 
2013 46.8% 
(Source: Korea Higher Education Research Institute Statistics) 
 
However, these figures do not explain why for current university students, a much 
lower proportion of the interviewees were female but a higher proportion of the online 
survey respondents were female. Although I made an effort to contact female current 
university students for the interviews, this was harder to arrange. Although the exact 
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reason for this is unclear, I suspect that female students may have felt less comfortable 
meeting in person a male interviewer they do not know for hour-long face-to-face 
interviews. This explains why female students were more willing to participate on the 
online survey, where they could make their responses remotely. Yet, this difficulty in 
arranging interviews with female students may mean that the data collected for this 
research may lack gender representation. Given the resources, the reliability and 
representativeness of the data would have been improved if more female interviewees 
from both the 1980s and todays could have been interviewed.  
 
The main advantage of using student union networks and personal connections at the 
major universities in each region of South Korea to collect data was that it had a 
randomising effect and a wide variety of different interviewees participated in the 
interviews and surveys. However, since the interview and survey participation was 
voluntary and the size of the sample limited, there may be reflected in the data a bias 
for students more likely to be interested in politics. Students who are more interested 
in politics are more likely in general to respond to requests to participate in an 
interview or survey on politics. In fact, as will be discussed further in Section III, the 
percentage of interviewees and respondents who said they vote is higher than the 
average percentage of voter participation amongst people in their 20s according to 
official figures. This is an inherent issue of selection bias which would have occurred 
even had the data collection channels were through different means, such as official 
university networks or media based surveys. However I made an effort to interview 
even students who said they were not interested in politics at all or did not participate 
in politics to give different perspectives.  
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Another data collection problem was finding university students in the 1980s who 
were supportive of the dictatorial Chun regime. Although it can be reasonably 
assumed that there would have been some students in the 1980s in favour of the Chun 
regime, I was not able to contact anyone who would openly admit to this and talk 
about it. On the other hand, it was relatively easy to contact people who were 
university students in the 1980s who were very willing to share their experiences as a 
student activist. This issue means that one limitation of this study is that in the 
discussion of the political culture of university students in the 1980s, the perspective 
of those who supported the regime were not dealt with.  
 
One issue that became apparent only after the data analysis had been complete was 
that amongst the interviewees who are current university students, there were fewer 
student activists compared to that of interviewees who were university students in the 
1980s. Although most current university student interviewees said that they voted and 
some interviewees had participated in candelight vigils, none of the interviewees 
identified themselves as being a student activist. In fact, many interviewees held 
negative attitudes towards student activists. There was only one interviewee who 
participated in politics by engaging with civil society organisations. This student 
participated in a campaign for expanding proportional representation in the assembly. 
Due to this issue, the findings in this study on the political culture of university 
students today may be limited to university students whose political participation is 
passive. Yet, this issue may also illustrate the reality of the political culture of 
university students today that they are less likely to resort to student activism as a 
mode of political participation for the various reasons that will be further explored in 
this thesis. 
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Another difficulty with the data collection methods used for this study was that limited 
resources meant that a wider pool of university students could not be interviewed or 
surveyed from a practical perspective. This may affect the representativeness of the 
data. However, it is hoped that this limitation is mitigated by in-depth qualitative 
analysis, which reveals insights that may then be tested in larger-scale surveys in the 
future.  
 
Finally, an interesting issue I experienced was that some interviewees, both those who 
were university students in the 1980s and university students today, were quite 
reluctant to voice their attitudes about politics, particularly if those attitudes were 
negative. They would ask multiple times whether their answers would be anonymised, 
and were worried that they would be identified and disadvantaged in some way. Even 
though South Korea is a functioning democracy, it appeared that there was still a lack 
of confidence in the protection of civil rights. 
 
3.3 Interview methods 
 
The primary method of interviewing that I have chosen is the semi-structured 
interview. According to Bryman (2008), a semi-structured interview is one in which 
the researcher has a list of questions or fairly specific topics to be covered but the 
interviewee has a great deal of leeway in how to reply. Questions do not have to 
follow in exactly in the same way as outlined, and the researcher may ask questions 
that are not listed in the guide as the interview progresses. However, by and large, all 
the questions will be asked and similar wording will be used from interview to 
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interview. This type of semi-structured interview is to be distinguished from the 
structured interview, which aims for all interviewees to be given exactly the same 
context of questioning, so that each interviewee receives exactly the same interview 
stimulus as any other. The goal of the structured interviewing is to maximise the 
validity and reliability of the measurement of key concepts.  
 
In studying the changes in the political culture of university students in South Korea, 
semi-structured interviews were more appropriate for three reasons. Firstly, semi-
structured interviews allow for more flexibility. Secondly, semi-structured interviews 
allow for the interviewees to go off at different tangents, which may be relevant and 
important. Thirdly, semi-structured interviews allow for an interviewee to be 
interviewed on more than one and sometimes even several occasions if needed. The 
general flexibility of the semi-structured interview is helpful for studying political 
culture because political attitudes and behaviours differ greatly from person to person. 
Giving the interviewees greater leeway for going off at tangents may yield interesting 
and relevant insights. This is especially important because there may be components 
of political attitude and political behaviour that had not been initially accounted for 
when formulating the interview questions. 
 
In my interview guide, which is included in Appendix I, I have included introducing 
questions, specifying questions, interpreting questions, and indirect questions. During 
some of the interviews, I used follow-up questions and probing questions when 
necessary. I have tried not to use direct questions or vignette questions. Direct 
questions are questions like ‘Are you happy with your current lack of interest in 
politics’. These have an underlying assumption that may be leading and influence the 
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direction of the interview (Kvale, 1996). Vignette questions are questions that present 
a hypothetical situation. In the context of the current study, these may be questions 
like ‘If you were a university student today who was in a particular situation (e.g. low 
in funds, too busy with work, facing unemployment, etc.), would you participate in 
politics?’ Mason (2002) counsels against using such vignette questions, arguing that, 
when they are used, the interviewee usually asks the researcher to clarify the question 
and may lead to the interviewer’s bias being reflected. Though vignette questions can 
be employed to help ground interviewees’ views and accounts of behaviour in 
particular situations (Barter and Renold, 1999), this was unlikely to be necessary in the 
current study. 
 
The general focus of the interview process was to uncover the attitudes, feelings, 
values, experiences and reasons for actions related to politics of the interviewees. 
Therefore, although the interviews all followed the shared structure set out in the 
interview guide, each interview was unique and provided different accounts of the 
political culture in the relevant period. Yet, an inherent problem with interviewing to 
collect data about attitudes and experiences is that the data are only as accurate as the 
responses provided. Interviewees may express contradictory views and may lie, on 
purpose or not, to project a certain image that may not be true. For instance, some 
university students today said that they kept up-to-date about political affairs. 
However, when asked about their attitudes on political parties, they said that they did 
not know enough to comment. Similarly, many current university students said that 
regionalism does not affect their political preferences, but upon further discussion 
displayed clear regional biases. Other university students would identify themselves as 
liberal or conservative, but their views on specific policy topics revealed 
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contradictions. Although these contradictions present a challenge to a straightforward 
analysis of the findings, they reveal interesting insights into the gap between the ideals 
that the interviewees wish to project and the reality of their attitudes. Where these 
contradictions were apparent, I noted them in the analysis of the findings. 
 
3.4 Survey methods 
 
Surveys were conducted on university students today after the first round of interviews 
through an online survey website. The main objective of the survey on university 
students today was to corroborate and verify interview findings. The survey 
questionnaire distributed to the survey respondents is attached in Appendix II. The 
survey asks the respondents to rate on a scale of 0 to 5 various elements such as levels 
of satisfaction with politics, interest in politics, political participation, identification 
with a particular party and political efficacy. It also asks respondents to say whether 
they agree, partly agree, partly disagree or disagree with specific statements made by 
interviewees. The responses to these direct questions enabled analysis on whether a 
particular view expressed by the interviewees was shared by other current university 
students and how widespread these views were. The survey also made use of open-
ended questions that the interviewees had the option of answering to allow them to 
provide comments that had not been expressed in the other more restricted parts of the 
survey.  
 
The key advantage of the online survey was that it allowed the testing of the trends 
and statements made by the interviewees. Since only a limited pool of university 
students today was interviewed, the survey conducted on a much larger pool helped to 
validate the representativeness of the interview findings. The survey data was also 
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more easily analysed, through statistical methods that calculated the percentages and 
averages of specific responses. However, the key disadvantage of the online survey 
was that without face-to-face interaction and the direct questions with limited options, 
it was not possible to obtain the full range of in-depth data. Yet, the interview and 
survey methods were complementary when used together.  
 
3.5 Analysis methods 
 
The main method for analysing the data collected through the surveys and interviews 
was qualitative analysis. This is because in-depth interviews are more suited to a 
narrative presentation of the findings. However, where available and necessary, I used 
the survey findings and secondary sources to verify and further explain the interview 
findings.  
 
The starting point for the analysis was to prepare transcripts of all of the interviews 
and go through each transcript based on key themes to identify particular trends and 
insights. Where a majority of interviewees gave a similar response, this was noted 
along with the reasons for the attitude or experiences. Minority responses were also 
noted and unique anecdotes and opinions were also taken into account. Then, based on 
these findings, further research was done using official statistics, data from other 
studies and journal articles and books from both Korean and Western sources to 
explain or corroborate these findings. For university students today, the survey 
responses were used to identify whether a particular view was widespread. One 
limitation of the analysis methods used for this thesis was the issue of language. All of 
the interviews and surveys were conducted in Korean, but the results had to be 
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presented in English. I have translated from Korean to English and tried to reflect the 
closest meaning possible.  
 
The main benefit of using this predominantly qualitative method of analysis is that it 
facilitates an in-depth understanding of the reasons and motivations of individuals and 
allows the construction of a fuller picture of the political culture of university students 
in South Korea. It assists in discovering how and why university students hold certain 
views and attitudes towards politics and participate in politics. It also helps to identify 
unique perspectives that may be different from the general trend that may reveal 
particular aspects of political culture that quantitative analysis methods may overlook.  
 
Yet, the key disadvantage of using qualitative methods is that it is unsuitable for 
obtaining generalisations about the entire population based on a sample. However, for 
the purposes of this thesis, which aims to discover how and why the political culture of 
university students in South Korea have changed before and after the democratic 
transition, qualitative analysis was determined to be more suitable. It is hoped that the 
findings of this thesis will assist in identifying further potential variables and 
relationships between variables that may be the subject of further quantitative 
research.  
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 II    Political culture of university students in the 1980s  
 
1 Introduction 
 
The following chapters discuss the political culture of university students in South 
Korea before the 1987 democratic transition. It presents the empirical evidence 
gathered in the interviews of respondents who were university students in the 1980s. 
The political environment at the time inevitably shaped the political culture of 
university students in the 1980s. We begin with a brief overview of the political 
situation in the 1980s and the policies of the Chun Doo-hwan administration, which 
was in power from 1979 to 1987. We then proceed to discuss the findings from the 
interviews conducted on the 27 interviewees who were university students in the 
1980s. Surveys were not conducted on university students in the 1980s for the reasons 
discussed earlier in the research design.  
 
We then discuss the attitudes towards government and politics held by university 
students in the 1980s by focusing on the attitudes towards the presidential 
administration. This chapter discusses the attitudes towards the Chun administration 
(1979-1987) and the attitudes towards the 1987 democratic transition. We hypothesise 
that before the democratic transition in 1987, university students in the 1980s held 
very negative attitudes towards the Chun administration and greatly welcomed the 
1987 democratic transition.  
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Next, we discuss the attitudes of the university students in the 1980s towards the 
media. It is hypothesised that university students in the 1980s did not trust the 
mainstream media. This is because the mainstream media were under the control of 
the Chun administration in the 1980s. This chapter will also discuss the alternative 
forms of media that university students relied on in the absence of reliable sources of 
information about politics.  
 
We also discuss the political socialization process that interviewees who were 
university students in the 1980s experienced. It is hypothesised that the university 
setting would have had the greatest influence on their political socialization process. 
However, this section also discusses the influence, if any, of parents and primary and 
secondary education on the political socialization process of university students in the 
1980s.   
 
We then proceed to discuss the experiences of political participation. As discussed in 
the literature review, political participation can be categorised into three distinct types: 
latent participation, manifest participation and non-participation. It is hypothesised 
that university students in the 1980s would have had covert experiences of latent 
political participation because of the oppressive policies against political participation. 
This section on the experience of latent political participation discusses how university 
students in the 1980s became involved in latent forms of political participation and 
their experiences in covert student organisations.  
 
After a discussion of latent political participation in the 1980s, we proceed to examine 
the main forms of manifest political participation. There are three types of manifest 
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political participation that this study focuses on: voting, contacting politicians and 
protest activity. The discussion of voting and contacting politicians by university 
students in the 1980s is mainly based on secondary sources. This is because secondary 
sources reveal the role of voting in the 1980s and explain why many interviewees did 
not even discuss voting as an effective way of political participation at the time. In 
relation to contacting politicians, only a few interviewees were able to recount their 
experiences in contacting politicians in great detail. However, because the sample is so 
small, this is unlikely to be the full story. Secondary sources reveal in greater detail the 
relationship between university students in the 1980s and politicians at the time.  
 
As for protest activity, it is hypothesised that protest activity would have been the 
primary method of manifest political participation for university students in the 1980s. 
It is also hypothesised that the experiences of protest activity are likely to have been 
violent. This is because the Chun administration enforced oppressive tactics against 
democratic protestors and student activists alike. Finally, it is hypothesised that the 
main reason for non-participation amongst university students in the 1980s was the 
fear of the oppressive methods used by the Chun administration. 
 
We will then discuss the reasons that the interviewees gave for participating in 
politics. It is hypothesised that the main reason university students in the 1980s 
participated in politics despite the high personal costs of doing so was because of the 
injustices carried out by the dictatorial Chun administration.  
 
Finally, we will conclude with a brief summary of the key findings about the political 
culture of university students in the 1980s. This conclusion will serve as the 
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foundation for the comparison of the political culture of university students in the 
1980s and the political culture of university students today.   
 
1.1 The political environment of the 1980s 
 
Students have historically been a prominent and crucial force for change in South 
Korea since their role in the nationalist movements against the Japanese colonial rule 
in the early twentieth century. When the Rhee Syng-man administration rigged 
elections to stay in office, students led mass protests that culminated in the 19 April 
1960 revolution, which resulted in President Rhee’s resignation. Students formed an 
important opposition force protesting against the authoritarian Park Chung-hee 
administration’s oppressive policies, which included press censorship, the 
implementation of national curfews and harsh punishments for political dissenters 
(Park, M., 2012: 125). After the assassination of President Park in 1979 by the head of 
the security service, students once again led the public movement for democracy 
(Jeong H. G., 2011: 24).  
 
After the assassination of President Park, the then Prime Minister Choi Kyu-ha 
stepped in as the acting president. He announced on 10 November 1979 that after the 
next president was elected under the Yushin constitution,3 it would consult the public 
for amendments to the constitution (Korea Democracy Foundation Vol.1, 2007: 50). In 
response, the opposition political elite led by Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung4 
organised themselves in preparation for direct presidential elections and university 
                                            
3  The Yushin constitution was the authoritarian constitution introduced by the Park Chung-hee 
administration in 1972.  
4 Both would later become presidents in 1993-1998 and 1998-2003, respectively. 
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students led a series of mass protests in the so-called ‘Seoul Spring of 1980’ (Jung, H. 
G., 2011: 30-47; Korea Democracy Foundation Vol.1, 2007: 59-67).  
 
However, on 12 December 1979, Chun Doo-hwan had gained control of the military 
in an internal coup, and on 17 May 1980, Chun Doo-hwan effectively took control of 
the government by declaring emergency martial law citing threats by North Korea and 
social unrest. This sidelined major opposition forces and the political elite that had 
favoured greater liberalization, defeating hopes for democracy. Military troops were 
posted at major universities all over South Korea, with a particular focus on the 
Honam region. (Jung, H. G., 2011: 50-53). Clashes with military troops at the campus 
gates soon escalated into full-scale demonstrations. On 18 May 1980, the army and the 
Special Forces were sent in to control the demonstrations using all force necessary 
under operation code name ‘Fantastic Holiday’ (The May 18 Memorial Foundation, 
2008: 96). Events escalated when the army started firing live bullets into the crowds, 
causing deaths of several protestors, mostly students. Groups of angered students in 
Gwangju Province raided local armouries to fight the army. The Chun administration 
responded by sending in paratroopers and tanks, killing civilians indiscriminately. The 
movement lasted ten days and over one million citizens participated in the protests in 
Gwangju and the neighbouring cities. Later referred to as the Gwangju Massacre, the 
incident led to 154 deaths, 74 missing and 3,310 wounded (Korea Democracy 
Foundation Vol.1, 2007: 114). The events of the Gwangju Massacre would be a 
significant event informing the minds of the university students throughout the 1980s. 
It was against this backdrop that Chun Doo-hwan came into power. He was officially 
inaugurated to the presidency on 1 September 1980.  
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In 1983, the Chun administration announced appeasement policies towards political 
opponents and student protestors due to the pressure of the upcoming general elections 
in 1985, the upcoming presidential elections in 1987 and increasing international 
scrutiny in the run up to the Seoul Olympics in 1988 (Jung, H. G., 2011: 104-107). As 
a result, the political opposition leaders released from prison created a new opposition 
party, the New Democratic Party led by Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung. In need 
of support from the public, this newly created opposition party joined forces with 
university student organisations and was elected to be the largest opposition party in 
the National Assembly. Once in the National Assembly, the New Democratic Party 
held negotiations with the governing party to reform the constitution (Lee, Y. S., 2010: 
117-120).  
 
However, by 1986, the New Democratic Party grew apart from the popular student 
movement as the leaders of the party made public statements condemning student 
demonstrations despite the fact that the same student groups had helped to elect them 
in the previous year. This resulted in students crashing a New Democratic Party event 
in on 3 May 1986, rallying the party to remain faithful to the promises that the 
opinions of the youth be included in the negotiations. As constitutional reform 
remained in limbo in the negotiations between the dictatorial Chun regime and the 
New Democratic Party, public dissent spread from student movements to the wider 
civil society. In response, the Chun administration started to crack down on the 
political opposition. This culminated in a government announcement on 13 April 1987 
repealing the appeasement policy of 1983 and reinstating strict military control of all 
demonstrations. All negotiations between the government and the New Korea 
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Democratic Party were stopped and the nomination of Roh Tae-woo as the next 
president was announced (Lee, Y. S., 2010: 123-132).  
 
It was against this political backdrop that the death of Park Jong-chul, a Seoul 
National University student, was announced in January 1987. Following revelations 
that his death was due to the torture implemented by the police who were interrogating 
him to find out the names of the other student activists, the public took to the streets. It 
had been no secret that the Chun administration used torture on student protestors; 
many had lived to tell the tale. However, the general atmosphere of political discontent 
was fuelled by this incident and led to an explosion of public sentiment at yet another 
atrocity committed by the Chun administration (Korea Democracy Foundation Vol.3, 
2007: 64-70).  
 
The Chun administration responded to the 7 February memorial services held for Park 
Jong-chul with drastic measures. Policemen were ordered to conduct confiscatory 
investigations in university campuses and protest offices all over Seoul. From the 
morning of 6 February, access was prohibited near the Seoul Myungdong Cathedral. 
Major opposition leaders including Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam were put 
under house arrest. On 7 February, 50,000 policemen (i.e. 41.6% of the total police 
force) were deployed to take control of the streets. In the Myungdong area alone, 
8,000 riot policemen stood guard and prohibited public access. However, the public 
took to the streets in Seoul and other major cities. The protests on 7 February were 
notable in that students, citizens and politicians alike all protested peacefully in an 
organised manner (Seo, J. S., 2010: 286-290).  
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When the Park Jong-chul torture incident had relatively calmed down, another incident 
occurred in April. During the public presidential address on 13 April 1987, President 
Chun announced that constitutional reform would not occur during his term and that it 
would be delayed until after the 1988 Seoul Olympics and implemented by his 
successor. In response to this declaration, protests were started on the day of the 
speech and continued, gaining momentum. On 18 May 1987, over 22,000 students 
from 62 universities nationwide held mass demonstrations demanding the withdrawal 
of the 13 April declaration (Seo, J. S., 2010: 292-298).  
 
Betrayed by the government’s previous pledge for constitutional reform, the 
opposition political elites again rekindled their relationship with the student 
movement. Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam created a party under a new name: the 
Reunification Democratic Party. On 20 May 1987, fifteen representatives consisting of 
the opposition political elite, student activists, labour union leaders and religious 
figures established the ‘Protest Headquarters for a Democratic Constitution’, the 
organisation which would become the foundation for the June Democratic Movement. 
This consolidated opposition force weakened the regime, and most cabinet members 
of the Chun administration resigned on 26 May 1987 (Seo, J. S., 2010: 297-301).  
 
On 10 June 1987, President Chun announced his official successor to be Roh Tae-
woo. The Protest Headquarters for a Democratic Constitution planned nationwide 
rallies to coincide with the announcement day. These rallies escalated when the public 
learned of the injury of another university student, Lee Han-yeol. While participating 
in a protest on 9 June 1987, Lee Han-yeol was hit in the back of the head by a tear gas 
grenade and fell into a coma. The photograph of this Yonsei University student being 
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carried away by his friends, bloody, made headlines on the front page of the Joongang 
Ilbo and The New York Times, showing the violent and repressive tactics used by the 
Chun administration. Lee Han-yeol would later pass away on 9 July 1987. The Lee 
Han-yeol and Park Jong-chul incidents fuelled the public rage at the Chun 
administration even further (Korea Democracy Foundation Vol.3, 2007: 194-211).  
 
Mass demonstrations started on 10 June and lasted for more than 20 days, with major 
rallies such as the 18 June ‘Rally to abolish the tear gas grenade’ and the 26 June 
‘Peace March’ (Hwang, I. S., 1997: 51). Finally, on 29 June 1987, the Chun 
administration gave in to the demands for democracy and announced that direct 
presidential elections would be held. Yet, in the direct elections that followed, Roh 
Tae-woo, who had been previously appointed to be the successor of former President 
Chun, was elected to the presidency, allowing the remnants of the former dictatorial 
regime to remain in government. It was this political context in which university 
students found themselves in the 1980s. 
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2 Attitudes towards government and politics 
 
This chapter discusses the attitudes that interviewees who were university students in 
the 1980s held towards the Chun administration and the 1987 democratic transition. It 
is hypothesised that before the democratic transition in 1987, university students in the 
1980s held very negative attitudes towards the Chun administration and greatly 
welcomed the 1987 democratic transition.  
 
2.1 Attitudes towards the presidential administration 
 
Almost all interviewees who were university students in the 1980s held strongly 
negative attitudes towards the Chun administration. These attitudes were largely 
characterised by strong emotions of fear and anger.  
 
There were broadly two reasons for the strongly negative attitudes towards the Chun 
administration. For one thing, interviewees expressed fear and anger towards the Chun 
administration because of the violent oppression of democratic protestors as 
exemplified in significant events such as the Gwangju Democratic Movement of 1980. 
Secondly, interviewees expressed even stronger emotions of fear and anger based on 
the oppressive policies enforced on campus against university students and the 
treatment of student activists.  
 
In particular, the most significant event that informed the minds of university students 
in the 1980s was the Gwangju Democratic Movement of 1980. As discussed earlier, 
the Gwangju Democratic Movement, also called the Gwangju Massacre, was the 
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incident during which President Chun deployed the military to violently oppress mass 
protestors demanding democracy in the province of Gwangju. One interviewee who 
said he had been a high school student in Gwangju during the incident said:  
 
I saw the Gwangju Massacre with my own eyes. It was happening on the streets. They were 
arresting and beating up people in the streets for no reason at all. At the time we were so scared 
they would just kill us all. They shut down all the roads so no one could go in or out of 
Gwangju. We were sealed in. (A08)5  
 
Similarly, another interviewee who was also a high school student in Gwangju said:  
 
I saw Gwangju with my own eyes in 1980 when I was a high school student in Gwangju. The 
incident was the root cause of my hatred towards the dictatorship. (A03)6 
 
Another interviewee who was in Busan at the time, described how she learned about 
the Gwangju Democratic Movement and how she felt: 
 
I learned about it when I was in my last year of high school. I was in Busan at the time and I 
didn’t know anything abut Gwangju. But on that Wednesday, as I was coming down after the 
church service, I noticed that the door [to the common room] was shut tight. When I looked 
inside, I saw that all the older boys and girls were watching television. It showed how people 
were being beaten, and how bloody the streets were. I asked them what it was, and they said 
that it was Gwangju. I was so shocked it was happening in our country. (A10)7 
 
                                            
5 Male, Chosun University, 1984, Honam. For the first instance of an interview extract from a particular 
interviewee, socio-demographic information is provided in footnotes in the following format: [gender, 
university attended, year of entry to university, region of origin]. 
6 Male, Korea University, 1983, Honam 
7 Female, Busan Women’s College, 1981, Yeongnam 
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She went on to explain that this particular broadcast was on Japanese television and 
that it was possible to watch Japanese channels in Busan, which is the southernmost 
city in Korea and closest to Japan. At the time, Gwangju was completely shut down 
and all communications cut off. None of the Korean broadcasters or newspapers 
covered the incident and the government tried to carry on as if nothing significant had 
happened.  
 
However, people who had been there, people who had family there and people who 
had learned about the event through international media knew about it and spread the 
news through non-mainstream channels. Especially in universities, students shared 
information about the Gwangju Massacre in the form of booklets and presentations 
held in secret meetings. By the mid-1980s, the facts of the Gwangju Massacre were 
widely known and the major universities even held photograph exhibitions on the 
event. Many interviewees said that these photograph exhibitions shocked them and 
had a strong influence on their decision to participate in protests against the Chun 
administration.  
 
Another interviewee, who was very involved in the student activist movement 
throughout the 1980s, explained in further detail the impact that the Gwangju 
Massacre had on university students in the 1980s:  
 
In the beginning of the 1980s, we wanted to just remain blind to it all. We were scared. Back 
then, it was a certainty that participating in student activism would land you in jail. However, 
what forced us out of this coma was the Gwangju Massacre. The truth of what happened in 
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Gwangju was only revealed by 1985, 1986. In some ways, the root of the June Uprising in 
1987 was the Gwangju Massacre. (A04)8 
 
Aside from the violent oppression of the Gwangju Democratic Movement, the Chun 
administration’s oppressive policies against smaller scale protests and intervention 
into student affairs caused many students to feel threatened.  The oppressive policies 
of the Chun administration directly impacted the every day lives of university 
students. During most of the Chun administration, all student organizations were 
strictly banned and regularly disbanded. Many interviewees reported that there were 
security officers on campus to police any political activity. One interviewee said that 
he was always very cautious of saying anything critical about the government. He 
said:  
 
The times back then were very scary. It was hard to even imagine criticising the government. It 
was a time when I had to look around to see if anyone was watching if I wanted to say 
anything. (A02)9 
 
He also said that: 
 
There were always police around on campus. You know how university students today gather 
around the lawn to debate about issues? Well, back then we had to constantly look around for 
police officers in civilian clothing. (A02) 
 
According to the interviewees, tanks and security officers could often be found around 
the gates of campus and tear gas would be sprayed to disperse even the smallest 
                                            
8 Male, Hanyang University, 1989, Honam 
9 Male, Seoul National University, 1982, Yeongnam 
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protests. One interviewee who attended a women’s university in Busan close to Pusan 
National University, which had a regionally prominent student activism presence, said 
that: 
 
Student activism was a big thing at Pusan National University. Sometimes my friends and I 
would go around there to meet boys and other friends, but whenever we went there, the smell 
of tear gas just filled the place all the time. (A10)  
 
The consequences of being politically active on campus were also very severe. If 
students were caught protesting, distributing political flyers, debating about politics, in 
possession of illegal texts or even congregating in small numbers, they could be 
expelled, suspended, drafted into the military for ‘political education’ or imprisoned. 
Sometimes, the university itself would be suspended. One interviewee described the 
situation on campus at the time: 
 
We weren’t allowed to distribute flyers, and street protests might flash up for five minutes or 
so before everyone would be rounded up and arrested. (A08) 
 
Once imprisoned, the treatment of student activists was incredibly harsh. One 
interviewee, who had served two prison terms as a political criminal reported:  
 
Prison life at the time was terribly harsh. It was a different experience for everyone. Initially, if 
you were quiet, you’d be fine, but if you yelled in the prison or rebelled in any way, you would 
be severely punished. They would tie people up kneeling with their arms behind their backs, 
wrap them up in blankets and then trample on them. I went through that too. But worse was the 
water torture they put me through to get me to give the names of the other activists when I was 
  74 
locked up for breaking the Emergency Law after the Gwangju Movement. They would lay you 
down with your head back and pour water in your nose with a kettle. (A06)10 
 
In fact, the violence of the oppressive tactics used by the Chun administration was so 
severe that some interviewees reported to suffering from long-term effects such as 
post-traumatic stress syndrome. One interviewee observed of former activists: 
 
Those who were caught were beaten and their bodies severely scarred. Because of the trauma, 
the suicide rates are very high. Many suffer from mental illnesses. Even though there is now 
some support provided through various centres, back then, there was no such support. (A08) 
 
Indeed, one of the interviewees confirmed this statement that some student activists 
still suffered from the effects of the severe punishments. This interviewee had been 
politically active since the mid-1970s during the Park administration and had 
continued to participate in protests in the 1980s. He was arrested and imprisoned for 
two months after participating in the Buma Democratic Movement of 1979, which 
took place one week before the assassination of President Park Chung-hee. He 
recounted how he was arrested pre-emptively before the Gwangju Democratic 
Movement in 1980 even though he had not done anything. He said: 
 
I was arrested even though I hadn’t done anything. I was arrested because I had participated in 
the Buma protests several years earlier. They beat me up until I fainted for about two weeks 
before they let me out again. I still have difficulties because of the injuries. (A09)11 
 
                                            
10 Male, Korea University, 1975, Seoul and Gyeonggi 
11 Male, Kosin University, 1974, Yeongnam 
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Many interviewees related tales of how their friends and family would be brought into 
police stations and tortured to give information about their whereabouts. Some 
interviewees spoke about how even now, they would run into old classmates, and the 
acquaintance would say something along the lines of:  
 
Hey, do you know how much trouble I had to go through for you? The police took me in and 
beat me up to get me to tell them your name. I never told them your name though, and they had 
me for three days! Your name is [Kim Young-hee], right? (A06)  
 
Often though, the old acquaintance would not have known the correct name; many 
student activists would use fake names when joining in student protest activities.  
 
Although almost all of the interviewees who were university students in the 1980s 
reported having strongly negative feelings towards the Chun administration, there was 
one interviewee who did not agree that he felt that the Chun administration needed to 
be taken down. He said:  
 
I did not think that the Chun administration was a dictatorial regime at the time. Looking back, 
there are some perspectives that say that it was, but there are people who see it differently. 
(A17)12 
 
Yet, when I asked him to further clarify how he then perceived the Chun 
administration, he said: 
 
                                            
12 Male, Kosin University, 1983, Yeongnam 
  76 
The Chun administration was not a dictatorial regime but just the military regime before 
democratization. I thought it was wrong that it had been set up from a coup d’état, but I did not 
think that it needed to be taken down for that. (A17) 
 
This interviewee further expressed the thought that though the Chun administration 
was undemocratic and had illegitimately come into power, this was not enough to 
motivate him to participate in politics because he did not think that the Chun 
administration was oppressive enough to be a dictatorship. This interviewee was the 
only one that was interviewed for this study that expressed this view.  
 
2.2 Attitudes towards the 1987 democratic transition 
 
On 29 June 1987, after months of a series of mass protests, the Chun administration 
announced that direct elections would take place. In the direct elections that followed, 
Roh Tae-woo, who had previously been nominated to be President Chun’s successor 
was elected. The attitudes towards the democratic transition are important because it 
shows whether university students at the time were supportive of democracy, and also 
their attitudes on the way in which the democratic transition took place.  
 
All respondents said that they supported the democratic transition. Most respondents 
said that Korea became a better place to live after the democratic transition. One 
interviewee said:  
 
A better world had come…the world changed after the 29 June Declaration and the direct 
election of the president was a big milestone for our country’s democracy. (A02) 
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Similarly, another interviewee elaborated by saying that after the democratic 
transition, they were able to enjoy far more freedoms. He said: 
 
Of course, it depends on the standard, but the important thing for me was the range of 
freedoms we were able to enjoy. I think that I am able to enjoy almost all freedoms. I can say 
whatever I want to say, and I can write whatever I want to say in the press…it is incomparable 
to the past. (A09) 
 
Though all of the respondents welcomed the democratic transition, many were 
dissatisfied with the fact that Roh Tae-woo, who had been the right-hand man to 
President Chun Doo-hwan and had been the nominated successor, was elected to the 
presidency. For instance, one interviewee said that: 
 
We weren’t happy about Roh being elected at all. The democracy we had brought about was 
being tainted by the military and dictatorial mentality of Roh Tae-woo – who had been the 
named successor to Chun Doo-hwan. (A05)13 
 
Nevertheless, the respondents said that though they felt disappointed that President 
Roh was elected, it did not detract from their support for the democratic transition. 
One interviewee summed up this position by saying: 
 
The fact that there were direct elections was so much more historically significant. Though Roh 
Tae-woo becoming president was not ideal, the direct elections made the nation’s hope for 
democracy a reality and facilitated the election of the civilian government of Kim Young-sam 
just five years later. It had been a necessary incubatory period. (A10) 
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In sum, the interviewees who were university students in the 1980s welcomed the 
democratic transition. They especially welcomed the freedom that they were able to 
enjoy after the democratic transition, and many said that South Korea became a much 
better place. It was clear to see that all of the interviewees supported the concept of 
democratic governance and saw it as a preferable alternative to the military 
dictatorship of the Chun administration. Even though many interviewees were 
dissatisfied with the fact that Roh Tae-woo was elected to be the president, they 
recognised his legitimacy as a democratically elected leader and saw his election as a 
step towards democracy.  
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3 Attitudes towards the media in the 1980s 
 
The media play an important role in informing the minds of the public on political and 
current affairs. They are the main source through which people obtain information and 
form attitudes about politics. However, in the 1980s, the media in South Korea were 
not an independent source of information that provided comprehensive and unbiased 
coverage of events. In fact, the Chun administration had wide-ranging powers over all 
of the major broadcasters and newspapers. The government issued ‘broadcast 
guidelines’ for the mainstream media companies to follow when producing and 
broadcasting. The Chun administration also had a large role in the recruitment and 
promotion of individual journalists and managers in mainstream media companies and 
would sometimes personally instruct key personnel (Kang, J. M., 2007). 
 
All of the interviewees who were university students in the 1980s unanimously said 
that they did not trust mainstream media sources like television or newspapers to 
provide a reliable account of political affairs. The main reason for this distrust was 
because the media were censored and controlled by the Chun administration. One 
interviewee said: 
 
At the time all forms of media like broadcasts through radio or newspapers were controlled. 
Television broadcasters in particular were puppets of the administration, and publicised 
policies only to support the government. (A03) 
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The interviewee who had been present as a high school student in Gwangju during the 
Gwangju Democratic Movement confirmed that this was the case. He said that the full 
facts of the incident were not broadcast on Korean media. He said: 
 
The media completely distorted the facts. At the time, the media were strictly controlled by the 
government, and everything was censored and deleted. (A08) 
 
Since mainstream media sources were considered to be untrustworthy, I asked the 
interviewees what they relied on for information on current affairs. Many interviewees 
said that they were able to obtain information about current affairs through foreign 
media, particularly from Japan. This was especially the case for interviewees who 
lived in Busan. One interviewee who lived and studied in Busan, which is the 
southernmost city in Korea and close to Japan, said that many people relied on the 
Japanese television and radio broadcasts. She said:  
 
Busan is close to Japan, so we used to watch Japanese news broadcasts. Its news coverage of 
Korean affairs was more objective than the Korean broadcasts because back then all Korean 
media were strictly controlled. Many of the university students relied on the Japanese media 
for information. (A10) 
 
One interviewee described further how information was obtained through Japan and 
what effect it had. He said: 
 
Why did people in Busan have a large role in the democratic movement? I think the answer is 
because we were able to get information from abroad. Even when the government censored all 
of the media, ships from abroad came into the ports in Busan carrying news that other citizens 
did not have access to. Also in Busan, we were able to see Japanese broadcasts on our 
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television sets and listen to Japanese programmes on the radio. Older people who spoke 
Japanese14 would translate Japanese newspaper articles about Korean political affairs. These 
foreign news sources were very important to democratic movement. (A09)  
 
The information from Japanese media accessed through Busan was a significant 
source of information for student activists. Aside from the two interviewees who are 
quoted above, many other interviewees, particularly those who lived in Busan 
corroborated this finding. Although the information from foreign media was a valuable 
source of information, not all people had access to this source. Most interviewees said 
that the main source of their information was from fellow university students. Student 
activists distributed information in a variety of ways. A common method was through 
self-published booklets. One interviewee explained how this was done. She said:  
 
Sometimes after a church service, the university students would secretly hand out booklets and 
let us know what we really needed to know about the government and current affairs. Of 
course, they would then take the booklets back. You couldn’t have those things going around. 
(A10) 
 
There were also more public forms of disseminating information, through distributing 
flyers, posters and loudspeakers. Other sources included word of mouth and 
discussions in study groups where students would secretly gather to study and debate 
about current affairs. These methods of learning more about politics will be discussed 
further in the section on latent political participation.  
 
                                            
14 Since Korea had been a Japanese colony from 1910 to 1945, many of the older generation who had 
been educated during this period were taught Japanese in school.  
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When asked whether he trusted these alternative sources of information about politics 
more than mainstream media, one interviewee said: 
 
Yes, I believed that the underground sources of information were more reliable and that they 
gave a more accurate picture of what was happening. (A04) 
 
However, even these alternative sources of information had their limitations. For one 
thing, although students in Busan had access to foreign media sources, particularly 
from Japan, much of the information would have been incomplete, as the Japanese 
media had limited means of generating the content. It is also unlikely that students had 
full access to the information available. In addition, the bias of the student activist 
groups would affect the interpretation of the information from the foreign media 
sources and affect the content of the information included in booklets, flyers, posters 
or announcements. Even the interviewee above said: 
 
Although I felt that the underground information had more truth to it, some of it was 
undeniably biased and some of it was incorrect. (A04) 
 
Many interviewees said that these problems with obtaining reliable and comprehensive 
coverage of current affairs in Korea in the 1980s were very frustrating for them. They 
said that they could not fully trust information from both the mainstream media and 
alternative sources. One interviewee said: 
 
I could not trust the media. All of the information from mainstream media were contradictory, 
and we all suspected that the facts were fabricated. The government censored all of the news 
and we knew that all of the broadcasters and journalists were on the government’s side. The 
only way to obtain alternative information was through other university students. My friends 
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and I would discuss what information we could piece together and try to figure out what was 
true. It was very frustrating. We could not know what was true or false. (A12)15 
 
Similarly, another interviewee said that the only option available to him was to collect 
information from multiple sources and interpret the information the best he could. He 
said:  
 
There were not many ways for us to learn about what was really happening. So back then, I 
read the extremely polarised views of both sides and just thought about all of it on my own. 
(A13)16 
 
Some interviewees said that even now, it is hard to know what actually happened. One 
interviewee said: 
 
Because broadcasts were so controlled, we never knew what was true or not. We got some 
news from foreign media sources, but even then we could not know what was really going on. 
Only when many years have passed can we see everything from a historical perspective to see 
what happened. (A17) 
 
The dominant attitude that university students of the 1980s had towards the 
mainstream media was distrust. Instead of relying on mainstream media, they relied on 
foreign media and on flyers and pamphlets distributed on campus by students who 
participated in underground organisations. A more in-depth discussion of how 
university students in the 1980s kept informed about politics will follow in the section 
discussing latent political participation. Despite the alternative sources of information 
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available, the interviewees said that due to the incompleteness of the information and 
the bias inherent in the sources, it was difficult for them to feel fully informed about 
political affairs.  
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4 Political socialization 
 
The experience of political participation necessarily starts with political socialization. 
Political socialization is the process by which an individual’s attitudes towards politics 
and political participation are formed (Almond and Verba, 1963). In this chapter, we 
discuss the political socialization experienced by university students in the 1980s. We 
begin with a discussion of political socialization in the family setting. Then we 
proceed to discuss the impact of school and schoolteachers on the political 
socialization process. Finally, we briefly discuss political socialization in university. A 
more thorough discussion about how university students in the 1980s learned about 
and kept informed on political issues follows in the next chapter on latent political 
participation. This chapter concludes with a discussion of political socialization in the 
mandatory military service for young men. It is hypothesised that the university setting 
would have had the greatest effect on the political socialization process of university 
students in the 1980s. 
 
Most of the interviewees who were university students in the 1980s said that their 
parents were not influential in the formation of their political views. All of the 
interviewees reported that their parents had not been politically active or interested in 
politics. One interviewee commented that: 
 
Before 1970, it was a hungry time and back then, people were not sensitive about politics. In my 
parents’ generation, they were more concerned about putting food on the table than about 
politics. (A05) 
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Similarly, another interviewee said that: 
 
My parents were not very interested in politics. They were farmers in the countryside and they 
sent us to Seoul to study. Most parents in the countryside thought that even if they were not 
educated, their children should be sent to Seoul to be educated. Our parents were no exception. 
(A04) 
 
However, there were several interviewees who said that their parents influenced their 
political views, albeit indirectly. Although none of the interviewees said that their 
parents directly educated them about politics, one interviewee said that his father, who 
had been a veteran in the Korean War, had taught him the values of patriotism and 
courage. He said: 
 
My father used to take me on walks to the park in the early morning to hold silence in front of 
the statute of Yi Sun-sin.17 My father was a man of principle with a strong sense of justice. I 
learned the importance of patriotism and courage from him, and I think that these traits that I 
inherited and learned from him were part of why I chose to become involved in student 
activism. (A09) 
 
Most interviewees who were university students in the 1980s said that their parents 
were opposed to them being active in politics. This was the case for those who came 
from poorer backgrounds as well as wealthier backgrounds. One interviewee, whose 
parents had been labour workers, said that:  
 
At the time, if you were a student activist, you’d be sent to jail or prison. So obviously, my 
parents were against it. (A08) 
                                            
17 Yi Sun-sin was a Korean naval commander in the sixteenth century, famed for defeating the Japanese 
navy. He is commemorated as a national hero with great courage and integrity.  
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Similarly, another interviewee, whose father was an executive at a small company and 
came from a relatively affluent family, said that his parents were strongly opposed to 
his participation in student activism. This was especially so because of the 
government’s pressure on his family due to his student activism. He said: 
 
At the time, my father ran a small business, but as the police kept coming and going, the business 
failed. My father suffered a lot because of me. All parents of student activists suffered, especially 
after the emergency mandate to arrest everyone on the ‘blacklist’ was declared after the 1980 
Gwangju Movement…I was on the run for about three months…the police detectives would 
round up all of my family and even my primary school classmates to get information on my 
whereabouts. My brother and my parents were all beaten up. (A06) 
 
Others said that they did not even tell their parents of their activism, and that their 
parents did not find out about it until they were sent to prison. For the interviewees 
who were university students in the 1980s, it was clear that parental influence was not 
a big factor in the political socialization process.  
 
In addition, all of the interviewees who were university students in the 1980s said that 
their schoolteachers did not at all influence their political views. When asked if civil 
education was part of their pre-university education or if teachers would speak to them 
about politics, all of the interviewees answered ‘no’ to both questions.  
 
For instance, one interviewee said that even in the Gwangju area where he grew up, in 
which there was a greater sense of general political activism:  
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Teachers did not make any comments about the government. It was not possible for a school to 
have a political bias, and educational institutions were quite closely aligned with the government. 
(A05) 
 
Similarly, another interviewee said: 
 
It was not possible back then for schoolteachers to hold or express political views. The 
education sector itself was very close to the government, and the teachers never criticised the 
government or the military dictatorship. (A03)  
 
In fact, most of the interviewees said that they were not very interested in politics 
during their school years. One interviewee said that even if she had been interested in 
politics, there was no time or resources to learn more or become involved. She said: 
 
Even if I had been interested in politics, I was too busy to become involved in politics. I spent 
all of my time studying. It was only when I got into university and the pressure of admissions 
were off my shoulders that I had the free time and energy to look around and become 
interested in the world around me. (A15)18 
 
All of the interviewees who were university students in the 1980s said that their 
interest and knowledge of politics began in their university years. Those who actively 
participated in student activist movements said that the influence of upperclassmen 
and networks cultivated through various societies were particularly important. These 
societies were ‘under’ organizations (secret societies set up to avoid the government 
ban on student groups), churches, and study groups. For instance, one interviewee 
said: 
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The only way I learned about politics was through going to church and listening to what the 
older boys talked about. There was no other way for us to find out about politics because we 
only focused on our studies at school. However, when I went to university, I learned much 
more about politics through friends who became active in study groups that read the banned 
books and attended demonstrations. (A10)  
 
Many interviewees said there was a general atmosphere of political activism on 
university campuses in the 1980s. One interviewee said that though he was not 
initially interested in politics, he became more involved in politics due to the general 
atmosphere of political activism on campus. He said: 
 
When I first came to university, I chose to do a degree in chemical engineering and wanted to 
become a researcher. I wasn’t very outgoing, and I enjoyed mathematics and science. 
However, back then, there was a general atmosphere of joining the democratic movement. 
Everyone was participating, and so I did too. (A04) 
 
This interviewee would later become very active in student activism and was even 
elected to be the president in one of the largest student political organisations. Even 
interviewees who were not as actively involved in student activism said that there was 
a general political consciousness on campus. One interviewee who had not 
participated in any manifest forms of political participation but supported the 
democratic movement said:  
 
There was a general atmosphere that if you weren’t liberal-minded and anti-government, you 
weren’t cool, that you weren’t a real university student. Having that type of attitude brought 
students together, it was admired, and it was the life for many students who participated. (A12)  
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The observation that this general trend of political activism existed and motivated 
students to participate was shared even by an interviewee who did not participate in 
political participation and disagreed with the attitudes of those who did. This 
interviewee, who is quoted above as saying that he did not think that the Chun 
administration was a dictatorial government, said:  
 
There were many fellow students who became involved in student activism at university. There 
was just a general consensus that if you did not participate in the democratic movement, you 
were a coward and stupid. (A17) 
 
The political socialization process that university students in the 1980s experienced at 
university in their peer groups was closely connected to latent political participation 
because much of the socialization took place in the context of keeping informed of 
political issues and discussing political issues.  
 
For male university students, the military is also another important environment for 
political socialization. In South Korea, since 1951, all men over the age of 18 who are 
physically fit are drafted into military service to serve for around 2 years. One of the 
punishments for student activism in the 1980s was to draft activists into mandatory 
military service at very short notice and assign them to particularly difficult posts. The 
interviewees who were university students in the 1980s said that the government made 
an effort to politically socialize young men during the mandatory military service. One 
interviewee described how this was done: 
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Of course there were videos and such to teach us about how we needed to obey the 
government. But the worst of all was how difficult and gruelling military service was back 
then. There were a lot of people who committed suicide because it was so tough. Training was 
particularly harsh. There were many beatings. You could never speak your own opinions on 
anything. They emphasised in the training that we were not civilians and that we had to be 
patriotic and always loyal to our orders and command without question, and if we ever 
disobeyed orders, we would be killed. They taught us that the threats posed by North Korea 
were real and imminent, and that was why the government policies were so tough. (A12) 
 
Yet, despite these methods, the interviewee said that this did not necessarily affect the 
political views of the young men subjected to it as the government intended. Although 
some were discouraged from political participation after their experience in the 
military service, others strengthened their resolve. Another interviewee who did not go 
to military service because he had served a prison term but observed many others who 
did described the influence of military service on political socialization:  
 
Some students were sent to their mandatory military service with only several days notice. 
Those that went suffered greatly and some even died. I heard that in the military service, they 
all had to undergo some sort of political socialization programme. The effect that military 
service had was different for people. For some, it made their resolve to protest the oppressive 
regime even stronger. Others just went back to ordinary life and distanced themselves from 
politics. However, I think those who became politically active would have done so even had 
they not gone through military service, and the same for those who were not politically active. 
I don’t think that type of propaganda in the military service made a big impact. (A06) 
 
For university students in the 1980s, the university setting was by far the most 
influential in their political socialization process. Part of the reason for this was that in 
the 1980s, there was a general atmosphere that university students should be interested 
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and involved in politics. For the most part, parents and school did not play a large role 
in the political socialization process of university students in the 1980s. The interviews 
also reveal that though the government made an effort to influence the political 
socialization of young men in the mandatory military service, the interviewees thought 
that this was largely ineffective.  
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5 The experience of political participation 
 
5.1 Latent political participation 
 
Latent political participation involves citizens being interested in political issues, 
keeping informed of political issues and discussing these issues with others. It is 
different from manifest political participation, which has as its aim to effect change in 
the external political situation; latent political participation focuses on an internal 
understanding of the political situation (Ekman and Amna, 2012).  
 
In this section, we discuss the latent political participation experienced by university 
students in the 1980s. It is hypothesised that university students in the 1980s would 
have had covert experiences of latent political participation because of the oppressive 
policies against political participation. We begin with a discussion about the various 
forms of latent political participation experienced by university students in the 1980s. 
These include reading political texts, discussing politics with peers and learning from 
upperclassmen. We also examine the role of ideology in the student democratic 
movement. We then conclude with a discussion of the blurred boundary between 
latent and manifest forms of political participation for university students in the 1980s.  
 
The first step for learning more about politics for most university students was through 
the information that student activists distributed on campus. All interviewees, even 
those who did not join student organisations or participated in protests said that they 
were interested in politics and obtained information about politics through the 
information distributed on campus about politics by the other students. One 
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interviewee described how ordinary university students were able to learn about 
political affairs. He said: 
 
There would be daily announcements on the walls posted by the university students. It would 
set out any news broadcasted by the government media and then analyse the news to describe 
how the coverage was wrong and misleading. We would be able to confirm from the posters 
how oppressive the dictatorial government was and why we needed to act to bring about 
democracy. Also, some student political organisations would distribute flyers and booklets. 
(A03) 
 
Once university students learned about politics on their own through the information 
available, the next step was to join a student organisation. Many interviewees said that 
they joined a student organisation despite the costs of doing so to learn more about 
politics. Most interviewees who chose to become involved in a student organisation 
said that they started by joining book clubs or study groups. One interviewee described 
what went on in these underground student organisations and how he came to join one:  
 
I joined what was called an ‘under’ organization. It’s where small groups of students get 
together to read books and discuss them. An upperclassman said that there were these weekly 
book-reading meetings, and that we should try it once, so that’s how I started going…we still 
used pseudonyms though. (A07)19 
 
A key activity for these student organisations was to study and discuss political theory 
and ideological issues based on books about political ideology. In the 1980s, there was 
a list of books that were banned by the government.  On 3 May 1985, the government 
issued a list of 50 ‘unwholesome books’ and 298 ‘illegal periodicals’. Immediately 
                                            
19 Male, Hanyang University, 1989, Seoul and Gyeonggi 
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afterwards, the government cracked down on publishers, bookstores, political and 
student organisations and universities to confiscate and destroy the publications. The 
official reason for doing so was that the books were deemed to be serving as the 
academic and ideological basis for the social unrest caused by student activists. When 
university students and the publishing industry protested these measures, the 
government released a further statement stating that publishers were supporting and 
encouraging communism, criticising capitalism and inciting violent revolutionary 
forces. Although the government made an effort to destroy the banned books, copies 
of the books and periodicals were made, hidden and distributed through university 
student networks (Kang, J. M., 2007). One interviewee described what he read: 
 
There were banned books that the government designated as being ‘unwholesome’. Works by 
Karl Marx or Kim Il-sung were on the list, but there were also some autobiographies and 
editorial works by opposition political leaders. I read several of these books and many students 
who wanted to find out more about politics read them too. (A09) 
 
Many interviewees said that they read some of the banned books to learn more about 
politics, mostly through the recommendation of their peers. One interviewee said: 
 
I read books that the university upperclassmen recommended to me. I listened to the 
discussions that my peers had about the books we read together. And I thought hard about 
whether I agreed with what they said and what I had read. (A16)20  
 
Interviewees who had been senior members of student organisations said that they 
used book reading and study sessions to teach recruits about politics and orient them 
for political participation. One interviewee described the process:  
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Upperclassmen would recruit and teach lowerclassmen, particularly those with strong critical 
thinking skills. Most of the books we used were history, economics and political theory books 
with a leftist ideology. The lowerclassmen would be taken to camps where they could eat and 
sleep with the upperclassmen and learn about these things in intensive sessions. I guess looking 
back, this was a form of brainwashing. However, back then, as university students learning 
about all of these things was completely new as we had not been taught anything about 
political or economic theory in school. We learned about different perspectives to look at 
modern Korean history and how we should view Japan and the U.S. We spent a lot of time 
discussing our role as the educated elite of society and what we should aspire to in order to 
make Korea a better society. (A06) 
 
Since a lot of these organisations were rooted in an intellectual understanding of 
political issues, there was naturally a theoretical exploration of governance and 
societal problems, leading to a focus on ideology. During the 1980s, there were two 
main streams of ideological thought in the Korean student protest movement. One 
school of thought, known as National Liberation, or ‘NL’, focused on nationalism, 
independence and freedom. On the other hand, People’s Democratic Liberation, ‘PD’, 
focused on class conflict and labour rights (Kang, J. M., 2003). 
 
There was a widely varying evaluation amongst the interviewees of their perception of 
ideology. Some interviewees held negative attitudes towards the liberal ideology 
associated with the student activist movement and said that it turned them off from 
getting involved. One interviewee said: 
 
The student democratic movement in the 1980s was dominated by Marxism, socialism and 
communism and I did not agree with these ideas. I think a lot of students became involved just 
because they were emotionally swept up by it all. (A15) 
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Another interviewee who had initially been compelled into getting involved in student 
activism because of ideology said that it later caused him to be disillusioned with 
student activism. He said that: 
 
In the beginning, I started out with a yearning to fight for social justice. But as you know, 
student activism became so ideological, especially with the outgrowth of [the North Korean 
brand of] communism…as time went by, we became increasingly fragmented, and activists 
would fight one another, saying that one was good and the other evil, one was right and the 
other wrong…Seeing all of these divisions made me realize that it wasn’t society or its 
institutions that cause suffering as I previously believed, but that it was the human condition. I 
became quite disillusioned when I realised this. I now believe that instead of seeking radical 
change, we must live our lives the best we can, and each in our positions work to make the 
world a better place, however incrementally. (A04) 
 
Although ideological division was clearly a turn-off for some, other interviewees said 
that ideological divisions were not detrimental to the democratization movement. One 
interviewee specifically said that ideological conflicts within student activists did not 
detract from the student movement. He said: 
 
At the time, the large ideological groupings that came about were the NL and PD. NL 
emphasized nationalism and PD focused on class conflict. But these were not necessarily 
conflicting but rather complementary for the development of the movement. It was through the 
competitive ideological debates that we were able to consolidate our resolve. (A05) 
 
Similarly, another interviewee said of the ideological differences between NL and PD:  
 
There wasn’t really a sense of tension or conflict between the two sides. (A10) 
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As we discussed in the chapter on political socialization above, part of the reason why 
university students in the 1980s became interested in politics at university was because 
there was a general atmosphere on campus of student activism and political 
participation. However, this does not explain why certain students became more 
interested in politics than others. Interviewees who were more heavily involved in 
political participation said that a large part of why they became interested in politics 
was because of a desire to make sense of events happening around them. Since the 
media were not perceived to be a reliable source of information, as discussed above, 
the only way for ordinary students to access information about politics was through 
other students. For instance, one interviewee said that he joined the student activist 
scene by signing up to a book club that discussed political issues because he could not 
understand what was going on around him:  
 
While I was attending [my first year at university] in 1986, I was frustrated. The world was so 
chaotic, but I felt isolated as if I was alone on an island. (A04) 
 
Once he joined the secret society, he reported that the things he read and studied with 
the upperclassmen made it easier for him to interpret what was going on in the world 
around him, which compelled him to join the student movement to secure class 
equality and bring down the oppressive government. Because learning about and 
keeping informed about politics often required joining banned secret student 
organisations, the personal costs of latent political participation were very high. If 
caught, even membership in an organisation or simply association with a known 
student activist could result in serious punishments. However, once informed about 
political issues and once relationships had been formed with student activists, it was 
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then only a short step to participate in protests and become involved in manifest forms 
of political participation as well. One interviewee described how the initially passive 
learning-oriented form of participation soon evolved into a full-fledged participation in 
protests and demonstrations: 
 
In the beginning, I was very confused because the upperclassman demanded so much. I didn’t 
join in the protests at first. I was scared, and I thought I’d do it after I learned a bit more. But 
the upperclassman told me, that knowledge is like a bowl that gets bigger and bigger so you 
can’t ever fill it completely. The more you know, the larger the bowl becomes, and if you keep 
waiting for it to be filled, you’ll never do anything. You need to act on what you know. So I 
did. I acted on what I knew. (A08) 
 
The survey and interview results show that for university students in the 1980s, latent 
political participation was more than simply learning about current affairs or having an 
academic understanding of politics. Because many forms of latent political 
participation were outlawed by the Chun administration, even seemingly innocuous 
university student activities such as participating in student groups or gathering for 
discussions and presentations carried considerable personal risk. Therefore, the line 
between latent political participation and manifest political participation was blurred 
for university students in the 1980s. 
 
One interviewee who was quite active on the student activist scene described how he 
came to be involved in a university student association and how it was organised: 
 
Because of personal security you were recruited by one upperclassman. You can’t just walk in 
to find it. You don’t know its real identity. As for me, one upperclassman recommended it to 
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me, so I joined. I only knew that upperclassman, and I didn’t know many of the others. This 
was so that even if I was tortured, I couldn’t give much away. (A05) 
 
In sum, since there were not many reliable sources of information about political 
affairs in the 1980s through mainstream media, many university students in the 1980s 
learned about politics through information from other university students. Even 
university students who did not actively join in the protests or student organisations 
were able to keep informed through wall posters and booklets and flyers distributed by 
the other students. Many interviewees in this study chose to join student organisations 
despite the high personal costs to learn more about politics. In these secret 
organisations, university students would read banned books about politics, economics 
and history and debate amongst themselves. Though ideology featured heavily in 
student organisations, the interviewees were divided on the impact and significance of 
ideological differences. Senior members of these organisations used intensive teaching 
and discussion sessions as a way for politically socializing lowerclassmen and 
preparing them for more manifest forms of political participation. In fact, the boundary 
between latent and manifest forms of political participation was blurred in the 1980s, 
and being involved in the former often led to the latter.  
 
5.2 Manifest political participation 
 
In this section, we will discuss the experience of manifest political participation 
experienced by university students in the 1980s. Manifest political participation is 
different from latent political participation in that manifest political participation goes 
beyond keeping informed on political issues and discussing issues with others. As 
discussed in the literature review, there are three forms of manifest political 
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participation: voting, contacting politicians and participating in campaign activity. 
Each of these types of manifest political participation is discussed in detail in the 
following sections.  
 
In this thesis, the discussion of voting and contacting politicians by university students 
in the 1980s is mainly based on secondary sources. This is because secondary sources 
explain why many interviewees did not even mention voting as an effective way of 
political participation at the time. In relation to contacting politicians, only a few 
interviewees were able to recount their experiences in contacting politicians in great 
detail. However, because the sample is so small, this is unlikely to be the full story. 
Secondary sources reveal in greater detail the relationship between university students 
in the 1980s and politicians at the time.  
 
It is hypothesised that protest activity would have been the primary method of 
manifest political participation for university students in the 1980s. It is also 
hypothesised that their experiences are likely to have been violent. We conclude with a 
discussion on whether these hypotheses were true for university students in the 1980s.  
 
5.2.1 Voting  
 
Although the 1987 presidential election marked the first truly democratic elections, the 
history of the Korean electoral system goes back to 1948. After the US Military 
Government declared that South Korea to be an independent nation, the National 
Assembly was directly elected in May 1948. The National Assembly elected Rhee 
Syng-man as the first president of South Korea. Since 1948, there have been six 
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republics and nine constitutional reforms. The following table details the six republics, 
presidents and constitutions in South Korea since 1948.  
 
Table 6. Republics, Presidents, and Constitutions (1948 – present) 
Republic Presidents Constitution 
1st Republic 
(1948-1960) 
Rhee Syng-man Enacted Constitution 
1st Amended Constitution 
2nd Amended Constitution 
2nd Republic 
(1960-1963) 
Yoon Bo-sun (interim) 3rd Amended Constitution 
4th Amended Constitution 
3rd Republic 
(1963-1972) 
Park Chung-hee 5th Amended Constitution 
6th Amended Constitution 
4th Republic 
(1972-1980) 
Park Chung-hee 
Choi Kyu-ha (Interim) 
7th Amended Constitution 
5th Republic 
(1981-1988) 
Chun Doo-hwan 8th Amended Constitution 
6th Republic 
(1988-present) 
Roh Tae-woo 
Kim Young-sam 
Kim Dae-jung 
Roh Moo-hyun 
Lee Myung-bak 
Park Geun-hye 
9th Amended Constitution 
 
Since 1948 until the democratic transition in 1987, almost all presidential elections 
were indirect except for the three elections of President Rhee Syng-man in the years 
1952-1960 and the three elections of President Park Chung-hee in the years 1963-
1971, which were direct. However, these direct elections were little more than efforts 
to legitimise the presidential office for the authoritarian leader while simultaneously 
maintaining a façade of democracy. Yet, if maintaining even that façade risked losing 
office, the authoritarian leaders did not hesitate to resort to vote manipulation or to 
change electoral rules to their favour. It was only after 1987 that direct presidential 
elections were permanently established (Croissant, 2002: 236-237). The following 
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table details the dates, methods of election, the winning candidate and runner-up 
candidates in the presidential elections in Korea from 1948 to 1981.  
 
Table 7. Presidential Elections in Korea (1948-1981) 
No Date Method of Election Winning 
Candidate 
Runner-up 
Candidate 
1  20 Jul 1948 
 
National Assembly Rhee Syng-man 
92.3% 
Kim Gu 
6.7% 
2  5 Aug 1952 
 
Direct popular vote Rhee Syng-man 
74.6% 
Cho Bong-am 
11.4% 
3  15 May 1956 
 
Direct popular vote Rhee Syng-man 
70.0% 
Cho Bong-am 
30.0% 
4  15 Mar 1960* 
 
Direct popular vote Rhee Syng-man 
100.0% 
Cho Byeong-ok 
(Died) 
5  12 Aug 1960 
 
National Assembly Yun Bo-sun 
82.2 % 
- 
6  15 Oct 1963 
 
Direct popular vote Park Chung-hee 
46.6% 
Yun Bo-sun 
45.1% 
7  3 May 1967 
 
Direct popular vote Park Chung-hee 
51.4% 
Yun Bo-sun 
45.1% 
8  27 Apr 1971 
 
Direct popular vote Park Chung-hee 
53.2% 
Kim Dae-jung 
45.3% 
9  23 Dec 1972 
 
Electoral College Park Chung-hee 
100% 
- 
10  6 Jul 1978 
 
Electoral College Park Chung-hee 
100% 
- 
11  6 Dec 1979 
 
Electoral College Choi Kyu-ha 
100% 
- 
12  27 Aug 1980 
 
Electoral College Chun Doo-hwan 
100% 
- 
13  25 Feb 1981 
 
Electoral College Chun Doo-hwan 
100% 
- 
* Election was declared null and void.  
(Source: Choi, J. J., 2010; Croissant, 2002) 
 
Unlike in other countries in the region, South Korea has held direct parliamentary 
elections under authoritarian regimes as well as democratic ones (Croissant, 2002). 
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The National Assembly was directly elected, and universal, equal and secret suffrage 
was granted to all citizens. 
 
During the authoritarian period between the years 1948-1987, there were 12 
parliamentary elections and five republics. In the First Republic (1948-1960), the 
National Assembly was elected by a plurality system in single member constituencies 
(SMC). In the Second Republic (1960-1963), when the bicameral legislature was 
temporarily instituted, the House of Representatives was elected by a plurality system 
in single member constituencies; the House of Councillors was elected by proportional 
representation in one nation-wide constituency.  
 
In the Third Republic (1963-1972), two-thirds of the seats were allocated by plurality 
system in single member constituencies; and one-third proportional representation. 
The party with the most votes received half of the proportional representation seats if 
it received less than 50% of the votes in the single national district; and it received 2/3 
of the proportional representation seats if it received more than 50% of the votes in the 
single national district. The party with the second most votes received two-thirds of 
the remaining seats. All other parties received the proportion of the then remaining 
seats corresponding to the votes they won in the single national district. Parties that 
did not receive 5% or 3 seats (5 seats for the 8th National Assembly) did not get 
allocated proportional representation seats (Chung, T. I. and Kim, I. S., 2010: 218). 
 
In the Fourth Republic under the Yushin Constitution, President Park Chung-hee 
appointed 1/3 of the seats. In the Fifth Republic, two-thirds of the National Assembly 
was elected by a binomial system in which two representatives were selected in 
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medium-sized districts. One-third of the National Assembly was selected by 
proportional representation. Here, the party with the most votes in the single national 
district was allocated two-thirds of the seats in the National Assembly; the remaining 
one-third of the seats were allocated to the remaining parties in accordance with the 
proportion of votes won in the single national district. Parties that won less than five 
seats in the plurality single member constituencies did not get any seats allocated by 
proportional representation (Chung, T. I. and Kim, I. S., 2010: 218). The following 
table summarises the electoral system for parliamentary elections by republic before 
the democratic transition in 1987.  
 
Table 8. Electoral system for parliamentary elections by Republic (1948 – 1988) 
Republic National 
Assemblies  
Electoral System 
1st Republic 
(1948-1960) 
1st - 4th  - Plurality system in Single Member Constituencies (SMC) 
2nd Republic 
(1960-1963) 
5th  
(bicameral) 
- House of Representatives: Plurality system in SMCs 
- House of Councillors: Proportional representation (PR) 
3rd Republic 
(1963-1972) 
6th - 8th  - 2/3 of seats by plurality system in SMCs 
- 1/3 by PR 
4th Republic 
(1972-1980) 
9th - 10th  - 2/3 of seats by binomial system 
- 1/3 appointed by president 
5th Republic 
(1981-1988) 
11th - 12th  - 2/3 of seats by binomial system 
- 1/3 PR 
(Source: Chung, T. I. and Kim, I. S., 2010: 218; Croissant, 2002: 238) 
 
The parliamentary electoral laws in the First to the Fifth Republics were constantly 
changed to ensure that the ruling parties dominated the parliament. The 
disproportional effects of this system is evident in the difference in the percentage of 
the vote earned by the governing party and the percentage of seats earned by the 
governing party.  
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Table 9. Difference in the Percentage of Votes and Seats received by the 
Governing Party (1954-1987) 
 Percentage of Votes 
received by 
Governing Party 
Percentage of Seats 
received by 
Governing Party 
Bonus 
Rate21 
First Republic (1948-1960) 
3rd National Assembly 36.8 56.2 19.4 
4th National Assembly 42.1 54.1 12.0 
Second Republic (1960-1963) 
5th National Assembly 41.7 75.1 33.4 
Third Republic (1963-1972) 
6th National Assembly 33.5 62.9 29.4 
7th National Assembly 50.6 73.7 23.1 
8th National Assembly 48.8 55.4 6.6 
Fourth Republic (1972-1980) 
9th National Assembly 38.7 66.7 28.0 
10th National Assembly 31.7 62.7 31.0 
Fifth Republic (1981-1988) 
11th National Assembly 35.6 54.7 19.1 
12th National Assembly 35.2 53.6 18.4 
(Source: Extracted from Croissant, 2002: 240) 
 
As can be seen, the electoral system in the authoritarian First to Fifth Republic had 
been extremely distortionary and heavily favoured the governing party. The governing 
party had been able to earn a much larger proportion of the seats than the proportion of 
votes under this system; on average the bonus rate was 22.04%. It was only in the 
Sixth Republic that changes to the parliamentary electoral system were made.  
 
Despite elections taking place, most of the time, elections held before 1987 were 
neither free nor fair. Abuse of the National Security Law, unfair party laws, the 
manipulation of the electoral system, censorship and control of the media and vote-
                                            
21 The ‘Bonus Rate’ is the difference between the percentage of seats received by the governing party 
with the percentage of votes received by the governing party.  
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buying ensured that the regime was in no danger of losing the elections to the 
opposition. However, they were politically relevant. The popular vote granted 
legitimacy to the ruling coalition and allowed the government to present to the Korea 
public and the international community that South Korea was a functioning democracy 
and part of the ‘free’ world. In effect, elections and the electoral system were not 
means of representation or competition, but a means to securing the regime’s power 
base (Croissant, 2002: 239).  
 
Despite the fact that university students in the 1980s were able to vote in the 
parliamentary elections, due to the distortionary effects of the electoral system and the 
vote manipulation tactics of the governing party, voting was not perceived to be an 
effective means of political participation. In addition, even when opposition parties 
like the New Korea Democratic party gained seats in the National Assembly, they 
were unable to implement constitutional reform or meaningfully influence policy-
making.  
 
Given this background, most interviewees did not even mention voting when asked 
about political participation in the 1980s. One interviewee described the view towards 
voting that many other interviewees also expressed: 
 
Voting was meaningless. The Electoral College elected the president. Anyone with money 
could be elected to be a member of the Electoral College or a member of the National 
Assembly. (A09)  
 
Although voting was available as a form of political participation, university students 
in the 1980s did not perceive it as a meaningful form of political participation due to 
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the circumstances that made elections neither free nor fair. This was why free, fair and 
direct presidential elections was one of the key demands of the student activists in the 
lead up to the 1987 democratic transition.  
 
5.2.2 Contacting politicians 
 
Although university students in the 1980s did not perceive voting as an effective 
means of political participation, they had contact with and often cooperated with 
opposition politicians. Sometimes, university students and opposition political elite 
cooperated to obtain common goals. 
 
For instance, university students supported the New Democratic Party22 by forming 
working groups that included the ‘Special Committee on the General Election’, ‘Union 
for the Prevention of the Re-election of the Governing Party’, and the ‘Union for the 
Democratic Takeover of the General Election’. During January 1985, the students 
conducted street demonstrations and disseminated material on democracy in the 
campaign rallies for the General Election. This cooperation of the students and the 
opposition party resulted in an astounding electoral success. In the 1985 General 
Election, the New Democratic Party won 42.7% of the votes, beating the governing 
Democratic Justice Party that only won 27% of the votes (Lee, Y. S., 2000). This 
electoral success was a direct result of the cooperation between the student protestors 
and the opposition political elite. 
University students and opposition politicians also cooperated on the ‘One Million 
Signatures for Constitutional Reform’ project, initially launched by Kim Young-sam 
                                            
22 The New Democratic Party was created by Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung. 
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and Kim Dae-jung. On 4 February 1986, over 1,000 students from 14 universities in 
Seoul gathered at Seoul National University to create a working group to launch the 
signature rally. Among their demands for constitutional reform included autonomous 
local governing bodies; freedom of speech, publication, expression, and assembly; 
liberalisation of the university and freedom of political activity for students; the 
independence of the judiciary; and the guarantee of the basic rights of labour (Jung, H. 
G., 2011: 124-125).  
 
However, the cooperation between university students and the opposition political 
elite was not enduring. On 30 April 1986, President Chun announced that 
constitutional reform might be implemented if a compromise could be made between 
the government and the opposition parties. When this was finally announced, the New 
Democratic Party devoted itself to making compromises with the government party. In 
the process, it abandoned its ties with the student organisation and labour 
organisations. The then leader of the New Democratic Party Lee Min-woo announced 
that the New Democratic Party would split with the radical student organisations. The 
student organisations and labour organisations saw this as an opportunistic betrayal 
and strongly criticised the New Democratic Party (Jung, H. G., 2011: 125-127). 
However, the cooperative relationship between the students and the political elite 
would be renewed in 1987 in the lead up to the June Democratic Movement.  
 
Although the relationship between university students and the opposition political elite 
were not always cooperative, contacting politicians and participating in campaign 
activity was an important form of manifest political participation for university 
students in the 1980s. Many interviewees who were university students in the 1980s 
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said that they attended seminars and talks by opposition political leaders, and 
participated in rallies to support them. One interviewee said that such events hosted by 
the student council gave him the opportunity to learn more about politics. He said: 
 
During one of the university festivals, the student council invited one of the democratic 
movement speakers to speak about democracy and politics. He told us about the self-
immolation of Jeon Tae-il,23 what happened in Gwangju. He told us that we needed to 
participate to change politics. (A12) 
 
Similarly, another interviewee said that he attended similar talks by opposition 
political elite and that it influenced his political views. He said: 
 
I attended a talk by Baek Gi-wan,24 and I was really impressed. Even without any notes, he 
gave such a great speech, and I remember feeling really motivated to learn more about politics 
afterwards. (A16) 
 
Other interviewees who had been more actively involved in student councils and 
organisations said that some of the activities of student organisations involved 
cooperating with the opposition politicians to assist in the campaigns and rallies and 
raise awareness of political issues.  
 
5.2.3 Protest activity 
 
                                            
23 Jeon Tae-il was a labour worker and labour rights protestor who set himself on fire and ran across the 
Pyong-hwa Market in Seoul and later died of his burns in November 1970. His death led to the 
expansion of the labour rights movement.  
24 Baek Gi-wan was a pro-democracy protestor and orator who gave many talks on democratic reform in 
the 1980s. He was a candidate in the 14th presidential elections.  
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Most interviewees identified protests as the only method of political participation 
available to them. When asked if there was anything else the university students in the 
1980s could have done to participate in politics besides protesting, all of the 
interviewees said that there was none. One interviewee said: 
 
There was absolutely no way for us to participate in politics legally. Back then there were no 
direct elections. You could write something, but there was no way the newspapers would print 
it. The only thing that could be done was to take to the streets and protest, but then you would 
be immediately arrested. There was really nothing we could do. It was bleak. (A02) 
 
Many interviewees reported that there was a general atmosphere of participating in 
protests. One interviewee who had been in his final year at high school in 1987 said: 
 
Everyone back then had a strong aversion to the government. I participated in the protests in 
1987 just like everyone else. Even if I didn’t throw rocks or Molotov cocktails, I was there, and 
the times were such that everyone else was there too. (A01)25 
 
Although, protests were sometimes meticulously planned and executed by student 
activists, some were more spontaneous. One interviewee related how he came to lead a 
protest without planning to do so: 
 
I came out of the American Council library in Busan where I went often to read English books 
and saw these students sitting in the streets and drinking. I asked them why they were not 
demonstrating, and they said that someone would start it soon. So I watched a while longer, but 
nothing was happening, so I said we should all stand up and sing the national anthem. Then 
thousands of students started singing along, and that’s how it all started. (A09) 
                                            
25 Male, Chonnam National University, 1988, Honam 
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He continued to explain how the demonstration escalated through the evening and into 
the night. He described how the police buses were knocked over and set on fire and 
how in the end, the police rounded up all of the student activists. He spent two months 
in prison after the incident.  
 
Other interviewees related similar accounts of participating in violent protests. One 
interviewee, who was a leading member of the student union, described the situation 
when protesting against the military dictatorship: 
 
During the protests, all of us – friends, upperclassmen and lowerclassmen – would fight with 
shields and throw Molotov cocktails. Our comrades would fall, and it was also heart-breaking 
that some among the riot police getting hit by our Molotov cocktails were actually our friends 
and classmates. Later, some of my friends would get caught and then go to court to be tried and 
sentenced to prison. It was terribly painful. (A01) 
 
Riot police forces were often made up of young men serving in the mandatory military 
service. This meant that sometimes, riot policemen were peers of the student activists. 
One interviewee who had not participated in the student activist movements but had 
been sympathetic to the democratic movement said that he had been deployed to 
control student riots during his military service and found it incredibly difficult to 
carry out his duties. As the democratic movement gained momentum leading up to the 
June 1987 Democratic Uprising, groups of mothers would go up to the riot police lines 
and put flowers in the young men’s button-holes, telling them not to shoot.  
Among the students that actually participated in the activist movements, some reported 
that continued participation and the oppressive government policies strengthened their 
  113 
resolve. When asked whether serving his one-year prison sentence had changed his 
political views, one interviewee answered confidently: ‘Yes, I became stronger’ (A06). 
 
Similarly, when asked whether he observed any effects of de-politicization in the 
student activists around him who had undergone the ‘socialization process’ during the 
mandatory military service another interviewee answered: 
 
Do you know the saying that the dawn will come even if you strangle the rooster? I believe that 
even if you people undergo severe physical suffering or are cut off from all information, the 
process will only deepen their desire for and understanding of democracy gained by 
introspection. (A05) 
 
In sum, as hypothesised, protesting was the main form of political participation for 
university students in the 1980s. The experience of protest activity was often violent 
and involved high personal costs. However, contributing to the campaigns of 
opposition politicians and cooperating with them was another important form of 
political participation, albeit not always effective. Voting was not an effective form of 
political participation for university students in the 1980s. 
 
5.3 Non-participation 
 
Not all university students were at the forefront of the student activist movement. The 
hypothesis that the main reason for non-participation amongst university students in 
the 1980s was the fear of the oppressive methods used by the Chun administration was 
largely confirmed by the interviews. Most interviewees who did not participate said 
that though they were interested in politics, they were fearful of the consequences and 
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only later joined in the protests during the peak times in 1987. One interviewee said 
that he did not dare participate before then because: 
 
When only the minority were doing it, I could only do so with my heart because if it’s the 
minority and I stand out, it would be too dangerous. (A02) 
 
He continued: 
 
Back then, if you were caught, you could be drafted into the military within a matter of days. 
Or worse, you could be imprisoned, and that would affect your family, your studies and your 
career. (A02) 
 
For many interviewees, this fear of the personal consequences of participation was a 
strong deterrent against getting involved. Another interviewee went into further detail 
about the personal consequences of being involved in student activism: 
 
The main issue was financial. In Korean society the most difficult educational status to have is 
to be a university drop-out. If you are a high school graduate, you can get a job in any factory. 
If you are a university graduate, you can take an entrance exam and interview for jobs. 
However, if you are a university drop-out, you can’t work in a factory because the employers 
would be suspicious; they wouldn’t want to recruit an activist who could cause trouble. Yet, at 
the same time, if you were not a university graduate, you wouldn’t be qualified for the office 
jobs. (A07) 
 
Because of the personal risks involved in being a student activist, those who did 
become involved said that it took a great deal of self-determination and commitment 
to be fully involved. One interviewee said: 
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Because you could be imprisoned and beaten up, it took a lot of self-determination to be a 
student activist. You couldn’t be a student activist without really committing yourself to it. 
Even though we were all young, we all knew right away the great dangers we faced. (A05)  
 
Although there were many interviewees who said they did not choose to participate in 
student activism before the peak periods in June 1987, almost all interviewees 
expressed a sense of respect for those who did. One interviewee, who was not 
involved in any demonstrations or student activism at all said:  
 
I was very much a bystander. However, every day, there would be posters on the campus walls 
with information about issues of the day. It would tell us what the government has kept from us 
through its control of the media and the atrocities committed by the dictatorial government. So 
even people like me who were quieter and just focused on our studies shared the desire for 
democracy and change. (A03) 
 
However, there was one interviewee who said that he did not participate in politics 
because he disagreed with some of the violent methods used by the student activists. 
He said: 
 
I was of course very angry and sad when I saw some of my peers arrested. However, I could 
not fully agree with some of the violent methods that were used by the student activists. I 
sympathised with what they stood for, but I could not agree with the way they carried out their 
objectives. So I did not participate (A16)    
 
Similarly, another interviewee said that he did not participate because he did not agree 
with the reasons for the student democratic movement. He said that he thought that the 
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Chun administration was not a dictatorial regime, and did think that it should be 
toppled (A17). Though this interviewee was the only interviewee to argue this, it 
indicates that some university students in the 1980s were not wholly convinced that 
the Chun administration was a dictatorship.  
 
Some interviewees said that some university students in the 1980s were just not very 
interested in politics. One female interviewee who said that though she had been very 
interested and moderately involved in the student activist movements, many of her 
friends were not. She said: 
 
For people who were interested in politics, politics was their life. However, there were others 
who were not interested at all in politics and just focused on studying. I think amongst the 
female students only about a quarter were really interested in politics. There were more girls 
who just wanted to dress nicely and study. (A15) 
 
In sum, as hypothesised, fear of the consequences of participation was one of the key 
reasons for non-participation amongst university students in the 1980s. However, other 
reasons for non-participation included disagreement with the methods used by the 
student activists, disagreement with the assumption that the Chun administration was a 
dictatorial government and a lack of interest. Yet, even amongst university students 
who did not participate in the student democratic movement, most expressed sympathy 
and support for those who did.  
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6 Reasons for political participation  
 
This chapter discusses the reasons for political participation by university students in 
the 1980s. It was hypothesised that the main reason university students in the 1980s 
did participate despite the high personal costs of doing so was because of the direct 
effects of the oppressive policies of the dictatorial Chun administration. Although this 
was part of the reason, the interviews revealed more complex motivations for the 
decision to participate in politics despite the high personal costs of doing so.  
 
6.1 Social injustice 
 
For some interviewees, social injustice, economic hardship and inequality motivated 
them to become involved in the student activist movement. For instance, one 
interviewee said:  
 
My parents were labour workers. I had no choice but to become a student activist after reading 
the banners because of the fact that even though my parents left for work at the crack of dawn 
and returned very late at night, we were always so poor. I knew that there was something 
wrong with society, and because what was said on the banners was so close to my life, I 
naturally participated in student activism. (A05) 
 
Similarly, another interviewee said that he began participating in the student activism 
because of an interest in labour rights. He said: 
 
In the beginning, I did not have political aspirations, but I observed the lives of people in the 
industrial quarters. There were no protection of labour rights back then, and I began to 
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participate because of a sense of injustice for the exploitation of the labour workers who lead 
such harsh lives. (A06)  
 
Other interviewees said that they became involved after studying political ideology 
and realising the deep social injustices apparent in Korean society. One interviewee 
said: 
 
As I studied politics and learned more about current affairs, I realised that there were 
fundamental problems in Korean society: the problem of reunification and the problem of class 
conflict. I was more interested in class conflict and labour rights, and that’s what drove me 
further into activism. (A07) 
 
However, for some interviewees, coming from a lower socioeconomic class restricted 
their ability to become involved in student activist movements. One interviewee said 
that the economic hardship faced by his family was the greatest barrier to his getting 
involved in student activism. He said: 
 
I was the eldest son in my family and because things were so tough for my family, it would 
have caused serious problems if I was sent to prison. I thought I really needed to get involved 
in student activism, but it was hard to do so knowing the consequences. (A12) 
 
Yet, many university students in the 1980s, even more so than now, came from middle 
or upper class households. For this majority of students, social injustice, economic 
hardship and inequality were not the key reasons for their negative attitudes towards 
the dictatorial regime. 
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6.2 Injustice against protestors 
 
The most common reason for participating in politics was the injustice carried out by 
the Chun regime against protestors. The interviewee who experienced the Gwangju 
Democratic Movement as a high school student said that the experience directly 
caused him to participate in the student movement. He said: 
 
Before the incident, I disliked the military dictatorship, but I never felt motivated enough to 
express it. However, after seeing what I saw, I had no choice but to participate. The soldiers 
who were supposed to protect us came and started beating up and indiscriminately shooting the 
civilians. It was wrong. We had to fight against injustice. Even a worm twists when stepped on. 
We had to do something. (A08) 
 
A major source of the fear and anger at the government expressed by the interviewees 
who were university students in the 1980s were caused by the continued violent 
oppression of protestors and their fellow student activists. One interviewee said:  
 
The reason university students participated was because there was just so much injustice. All 
they did was speak freely about politics, but the police would arrest them and torture them. Even 
if there were only a few who disagreed with the government, they would oppress them and make 
them out to be traitors. University students were enraged to see their close friends harmed in this 
way. (A10)  
 
Even interviewees who did not participate very much in student activism recognised 
that the violent oppression of protestors was a strong motivator for his peers. He said: 
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Do you know the Park Jong-chul incident? He was a Seoul National University student who died 
from water boarding torture methods. I was in the same class with him during high school. He 
got into Seoul National University and became involved in student activism. My friends who 
went to study in Seoul said that when they saw their friends like him get tortured, hit with tear 
gas canisters and beaten up, they became so angry, they had no choice but to participate. (A17)  
 
It was clear from the responses that the direct injustice on the democratic protestors 
played a role in motivating university students in the 1980s to participate despite the 
high personal risks posed by doing so.  
 
6.3 Duty  
 
In addition to the injustice in the society and injustice against democratic protestors, it 
was clear from the interviews that many university students in the 1980s who 
participated felt a strong sense of duty to do so because they were university students. 
One female interviewee said: 
 
Most of my friends were from above average backgrounds, and we felt that as part of the 
educated elite, we had a duty to society to participate and make a difference. Of course, there 
were some people in my class who did not participate and focused on their studies. They said 
that they were preparing for their future to enter society. However, I did not want to just sit in 
the library and study like I did in school. I thought that at university, I should look for the truth 
and make a difference. (A15) 
 
Another interviewee who had been very active in the student democratic movement 
explained further that he felt duty-bound to do so as the privileged elite of society and 
the tradition of student activism in Korean modern history. He said:  
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Usually in the democratic movements of other countries, class conflict plays a large role and it 
is the labour movement that leads the democratization process. However, why is it that 
university students played such a large role in the democratization process in Korea? Why did 
they participate with such energy for such a long time despite the drawbacks? At the end of the 
day, I think it comes down to tradition. University students are the privileged elite. In Korean 
society, there has been a tradition of student activism since the independence movement 
against Japanese colonial rule. This tradition of student activism helped to bring independence, 
the fall of the Yushin constitution and finally democracy. (A04) 
 
When speaking about his role as the president in a national university student 
association, he explained further that duty compelled him to continue in the role 
despite the difficulties he faced. He said: 
 
I was surprised when I was elected to lead the national student association. It was not a coveted 
role, and it was burdensome. However, in the end the sense of duty led me to pull through. 
(A04) 
 
Similarly, another interviewee said:  
 
In the 1980s, there was the sense that university students had the responsibility to participate in 
politics. There was a sense that as the privileged elite, we had a duty to society. (A13) 
 
An interviewee who did not participate but observed his peers and now works as a 
professor at a university made an observation about the difference between the duty 
felt by university students in the 1980s and university students today. He said: 
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It is not as if in the 1980s, the educational system was such that it raised more creative and 
critical thinkers than now. Back then, we didn’t study philosophy or modern Korean history, 
and the educational environment was worse than it is now. However, back then university 
students used to think and debate about politics, more so than university students do today. 
This isn’t because of the educational system or the individual students themselves. I think this 
difference is due to the general culture in the university student body. In the 1980s, there was 
the general consensus that university students had the duty to contribute to the nation and 
society, and that action had to be taken against injustice. There were values that everyone 
agreed with, and that it was worth the sacrifice and hardship. However, there are no longer 
such values today. Today, it is about a cost-benefit analysis, and individualism. (A16) 
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7 Conclusion 
 
Finally, we will discuss the main elements of the political culture of university 
students in the 1980s by summarising the key empirical findings. Each of the 
following elements of political culture were examined: 
 
• the attitudes towards politics and government; 
• the attitudes towards media;  
• the political socialization process; 
• the experience of political participation; and 
• the reasons for political participation or non-participation.  
 
Firstly, it was hypothesised that university students in the 1980s held very negative 
attitudes towards the Chun administration and welcomed the 1987 democratic 
transition. The empirical findings indeed revealed that the general attitude towards the 
Chun administration was very negative, characterised by fear and anger. Much of this 
fear and anger was caused by the violent and oppressive practices of the Chun 
administration towards university students and democratic protestors. Events such as 
the Gwangju Democratic Movement particularly affected the interviewees’ attitudes 
towards the Chun administration. The violent and oppressive policies used against 
university student activists were also a significant factor in causing the negative 
attitudes towards the Chun administration. Many interviewees recounted their own 
experience of the harsh treatment of student activists.  
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It was also hypothesised that university students in the 1980s would have welcomed 
the 1987 democratic transition. The empirical findings confirmed this. However, the 
interviews revealed that some university students in the 1980s were disappointed with 
the outcome that Roh Tae-woo, who was President Chun’s right-hand man, was 
elected in the direct elections. However all respondents said that they welcomed the 
announcement to allow direct elections and that the democratic transition was a 
historical achievement. All interviewees who were university students in the 1980s 
said that the political situation improved dramatically after the democratic transition in 
1987. The responses showed that university students in the 1980s were supportive of 
the concept of democratic governance.  
 
Secondly, it was hypothesised that university students in the 1980s did not trust the 
mainstream media. This was confirmed in the interviews. All interviewees said that 
mainstream media at the time was untrustworthy because it was under the complete 
control of the government. Instead of relying on mainstream media, interviewees 
reported that the main sources of information were through foreign news broadcasts, 
word of mouth and information distributed by student activists. Many respondents said 
that they felt that they were not fully informed about current affairs at the time, and the 
desire to learn more about what was going on motivated some of them to join clubs 
and societies at university.  
 
Thirdly, it was hypothesised that the university setting would have had the greatest 
effect on the political socialization process of university students in the 1980s. As 
hypothesised, all interviewees said that their interest and participation in politics 
increased dramatically at university. Their upperclassmen and peers primarily 
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influenced their political views. Many interviewees said that there was a general 
atmosphere of student activism on campus, which influenced them to learn about and 
become involved in politics. For the most part, interviewees said that parents and 
school education did not influence the formation of their political views. 
 
Fourthly, the hypothesis that university students in the 1980s would have had covert 
experiences of latent political participation because of the oppressive policies against 
political participation was largely confirmed. Many interviewees said that they learned 
about political affairs through books and booklets and other material distributed by the 
student activists on campus, and some said that they joined secret reading clubs and 
debating societies to learn more. However, in the 1980s, the boundary between latent 
political participation and manifest political participation was blurred because the 
government had banned any organisations with the potential of organising political 
opposition, even university reading clubs and debating societies. Therefore, it was 
risky to participate even in these latent forms of political participation and often latent 
political participation led to more manifest forms of political participation such as 
participation in rallies, demonstrations, and even violent protests. 
 
After a discussion of latent political participation in the 1980s, we proceeded to 
examine the main forms of manifest political participation. The three types of manifest 
political participation that were discussed were: voting, contacting politicians and 
protest activity. With respect to voting, close examination of the presidential elections 
and parliamentary elections before the 1987 democratic transition revealed that 
electoral rules were heavily skewed to favour the governing party. This explained why 
most interviewees did not even mention voting as a method of political participation. 
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In the discussion of contacting politicians, the relationship between university student 
organisations in the 1980s and opposition politicians were examined in more detail. 
This revealed that though university student organisations and opposition politicians 
often cooperated, they had different interests. Nevertheless, contacting politicians was 
part of the experience of political participation for university students in the 1980s.  
 
As for protest activity, it was hypothesised that protest activity would have been the 
primary method of manifest political participation for university students in the 1980s. 
This was confirmed in the interviews. Many interviewees said that they participated in 
peaceful protests and some said that they participated in violent protests. It was also 
hypothesised that their experiences are likely to have been violent. This was also 
confirmed by the interviews. Most interviewees who said they participated in politics 
in any form said that they faced severe consequences ranging from suspension or 
expulsion from university to mandatory drafting into military service or imprisonment. 
During police interrogations or in the military barracks or in prison, the interviewees 
said that they were subject to beatings and torture. For some interviewees, these 
consequences discouraged them from further political participation, but for others, 
experiencing and seeing peers being subject to these injustices strengthened their 
resolve. 
 
It was hypothesised that the main reason for non-participation amongst university 
students in the 1980s was the fear of the oppressive methods used by the Chun 
administration. The interviews confirmed this hypothesis. The dominant reason for 
non-participation was that many university students were afraid of the consequences. 
Other reasons included simply not being interested in politics and disagreeing with the 
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methods or the purpose of the student activist movement. Yet, even interviewees who 
said they did not participate themselves expressed respect and sympathy for those who 
did. 
 
Finally, it was hypothesised that the main reason university students in the 1980s did 
participate despite the high personal costs of doing so was because of the direct effects 
of the oppressive policies of the dictatorial Chun administration. As hypothesised, the 
most significant reason for political participation that most interviewees gave was the 
perceived injustice of the Chun administration in its treatment of citizens and 
democratic protestors. Closely related was the fear and anger that many interviewees 
felt when their peers were subject to violent oppression. Many interviewees said that 
before the democratic transition in 1987, the desire to bring down the Chun 
administration gave a focus for the political activists and allowed them to cooperate 
despite differences in interests or ideology. Another significant reason for political 
participation was that university students in the 1980s felt a sense of duty arising from 
their perceived position of the intellectual elite and the historical tradition of student 
activism.  
 
For the most part, the hypotheses were confirmed through the empirical evidence. 
However, the interviews revealed that there were often more dimensions to the 
specific aspects to political culture than initially hypothesised. The interviews also 
revealed more complex reasons for political participation. 
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 III    Political culture of university students today 
 
1 Introduction 
 
In the following chapters, we discuss the political culture of university students today 
based on the interview and survey results conducted for this study. Since the 
democratic transition in 1987, South Korea has had a democratic political system with 
direct presidential elections and single five-year terms for the presidency. The next 
section in this introductory chapter discusses the political developments since the 
democratic transition to introduce the issues and events that university students today 
discussed in the interviews.  
 
We then proceed to discuss the findings from 34 interviews and 199 survey responses 
from current university students. The purpose of the survey was to verify some of the 
trends that were identified in the interviews.  The main source of the empirical 
evidence is therefore the information collected through the interviews.  
 
We then proceed to discuss the attitudes that university students today hold towards 
government and politics. One key difference between the political system in the 1980s 
and today is that whereas the Chun administration was the single-most significant 
political actor before the democratic transition, there are now more political actors in 
the democratic political system. Therefore, this chapter examines the attitudes that 
university students hold towards three elements of government and politics: the 
presidential administration, politicians and political parties.  
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It is hypothesised that university students today would have less intensely negative 
attitudes towards the presidential administration than university students in the 1980s. 
However, based on the literature, it is hypothesised that university students today are 
not interested in politics. It is also hypothesised that university students today have 
low levels of trust for politicians and do not have a political party they support.  
 
Next, we discuss the attitudes that university students today hold towards the media. It 
is hypothesised that university students today would have higher levels of trust for the 
media as a source of information about politics than their counterparts in the 1980s.  
 
This is then followed by a discussion of the political socialization process of university 
students today. It is hypothesised that like university students in the 1980s, university 
students today would say that the university setting had the most significant impact on 
the development of their political views. 
 
We then proceed to discuss the experience of political participation by university 
students today by examining their experience of latent political participation and 
manifest political participation. Latent political participation includes being interested 
in politics, learning about politics and discussing politics with others (Ekman and 
Amna, 2012). It is hypothesised that university students today would show low levels 
of latent political participation. It is also hypothesised that online social media would 
be an important method of latent political participation for university students today. 
As discussed in the literature review, there are three forms of manifest political 
participation that this study focuses on: voting, contacting politicians and protest 
activity. It is hypothesised that university students today would have access to diverse 
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ways of participating in politics through voting and engaging with political parties and 
civil society groups. Yet, based on the literature it is hypothesised that university 
students today are likely to have low levels of manifest political participation in 
general. 
 
Next, we examine the reasons for non-participation amongst university students today. 
It is hypothesised that university students today do not participate in politics because 
they do not feel the need to do so.  
 
Finally, we conclude with a summary of the findings on the political culture of 
university students today. This final chapter will serve as the basis for the comparison 
of the political culture of university students in the 1980s and the political culture of 
university students today.   
 
1.1 The political environment since the democratic transition in 1987 
 
In the direct elections that followed the 29 June Declaration, Roh Tae-woo, who was 
President Chun’s right-hand man, was elected to the presidency, allowing remnants of 
the former dictatorial regime to remain in power. Nevertheless, since 1987, South 
Korea has been a democratic state. Since the election of Roh Tae-woo in 1987, there 
have been four more democratically elected presidents: Kim Young-sam (1993-1998), 
Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003), Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008), Lee Myung-bak (2008-2013) 
and Park Geun-hye (2013-current).  
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President Kim Young-sam was the first civilian president to be elected after the 
military-based administrations led by Park Chung-hee, Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-
woo. Kim Young-sam, along with Kim Dae-jung, had been a prominent opposition 
leader in the anti-authoritarian opposition since the mid-twentieth century (Bailey, 
2010: 37). The election of Kim Young-sam in 1992 seemed to signal the end of the era 
of military dictatorial rule for South Korea.  Yet, the political background in which 
President Kim Young-sam was elected revealed a less than triumphant win for 
democracy. In preparation for the 1992 elections, Kim Young-sam distanced himself 
from Kim Dae-jung, with whom he had cooperated in the pro-democracy opposition, 
and instead aligned himself with Roh Tae-woo and Kim Jong-pil. This so-called 
‘Three Party Merger’ saw the merging of an unlikely trio: Roh Tae-woo had been the 
right-hand man during the Chun regime; Kim Jong-pil had been the right-hand man 
during the Park Chung-hee regime; and Kim Young-sam had been a vocal pro-
democracy opposition leader against the authoritarian regimes (Kang, W. T., 2012). 
Yet, during his presidency, Kim Young-sam put on trial and convicted the former 
Presidents Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo and depoliticised the military. He 
stimulated the growth of the middle class and implemented policies to support the 
expansion of civil society though he suppressed activist groups (Heo and Roehrig, 
2010: 45-50). 
 
After the presidency of Kim Young-sam, Kim Dae-jung was elected in 1998, 
signalling the first turnover in Korean politics. He led a liberal administration that saw 
an easing of tensions between South Korea and North Korea. His liberal conciliatory 
policies toward North Korea won him the Nobel Peace Prize. His relationship with 
civil society was also much more relaxed and his policies sought to establish a 
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democratic relationship between the government and the citizens (Kim, Y. B., 2003). 
However, issues such as wiretapping, corruption and passing laws in secret without 
informing the opposition beleaguered his administration (Heo and Roehrig, 2010: 57) 
 
Following President Kim Dae-jung, President Roh Moo-hyun was elected in 2003. He 
came from a new generation of politicians, not associated with the ‘3-Kim Generation’ 
(Kim Young-sam, Kim Dae-jung, Kim Jong-pil) and was genuinely popular among 
the younger generation (Heo and Roehrig, 2010: 61-65).  Yet, economic growth was 
low during his term and his lack of support among the existing political elite meant 
that he did not have the political capacity to implement meaningful policies during his 
term (Heo and Roehrig, 2010: 66).  
 
In March 2004, President Roh Moo-hyun became the first Korean president to be 
impeached. He was impeached on the grounds that his vocal support of one of the 
parties, the Opened Our Party, in the run-up to the parliamentary elections violated his 
duty to remain neutral; that his presidential aides had accepted bribes and that his 
campaign was funded by illegal funds; and that he had failed to implement proper 
economic policy as evidenced by the financial crisis (Kim, J. C., 2004: 2-3). However, 
in response to President Roh’s impeachment, some 50,000 to 100,000 citizens held 
candlelight vigils for two weeks to protest the impeachment. In the 17th parliamentary 
elections that followed, the Opened Our Party won the most votes, becoming the 
majority party, and the Korean Constitutional Court dismissed the impeachment case 
against President Roh (Choi, H. S., 2006: 114). Though President Roh used much of 
his political capital during the presidency to combat corruption, it was later revealed in 
2008 that his wife and children had accepted bribes during his presidential term (The 
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Hankyoreh, 2 December 2008). At the height of the investigations, President Roh 
committed suicide in May 2009 (Chosun Ilbo, 24 May 2009).  
 
The election of President Lee Myung-bak in 2008 represented the second turnover in 
Korean politics as a conservative president following two liberal presidents. President 
Lee was heavily criticised for passing laws allowing the censorship of the media and 
the internet (Jeong, Y. W., 2008). The overly submissive attitude of the government to 
the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement coupled with greater infringements on civil 
rights and a considerably more hostile relationship with North Korea lead to public 
dissatisfaction. This was demonstrated in the two-month-long 2008 candlelight vigils 
against the import of sub-standard beef from the U.S. As a result of the protests, the 
government renegotiated the terms of the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement so that 
beef aged over 30 months or containing harmful materials that may cause Mad Cow 
Disease were banned from being imported to Korea (Han, M. R., 2011: 100).  
 
One of the most controversial issues during the President Lee administration was the 
Four Rivers Project. The Four Rivers Project was a large-scale infrastructure project in 
which 14 trillion won (approximately US$ 12.5 billion) was invested with the initial 
objective of restoring natural habitats, building small and medium-sized dams, the 
construction of flood protection systems, creation of riverside cycle routes, 
construction of reservoirs, and job creation (Chosun Ilbo, 11 July 2013). The Four 
Rivers Project was planned to lay the groundwork for the Grand Korean Waterway 
Project, which had been a major campaign promise by Lee Myung-bak when he ran 
for the presidency in 2007. However, both projects were heavily criticised by the 
public. The public dissent against the project was due to the possibility of the 
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contamination of two major rivers that serve as drinking water sources, the 
mountainous geology of Korea that would make such a system very costly to build, 
environmental degradation, lack of clear benefits, and the ineffective and inefficient 
use of public funds (Kwon, K. J., 2 April 2011, Kyunghyang Shinmun).  
 
In the 2012 presidential elections, the major conservative candidate was Park Geun-
hye; the main liberal candidate was Moon Jae-in. However, just months before the 
election, a dark horse candidate joined the race: Ahn Chul-soo.  Ahn Chul-soo was an 
independent candidate that ran for president in the 2012 presidential elections. A 
former medical doctor who studied vaccination, he became a self-taught computer 
programmer and created the V3 computer vaccination programme that he distributed 
for free while still working as a medical doctor. After quitting his job as a doctor, he 
founded Ahn Labs, which focused on computer vaccination, and in 2011 led the 
Advanced Institute of Convergence Technology at the Seoul National University. 
From mid-2011, Ahn Chul-soo showed an interest in politics as he ran the so-called 
‘Youth Concert’, which was a ten-day long seminar on political affairs that invited 
leading liberal-leaning politicians to speak on issues relevant to young people today. 
Ahn Chul-soo announced his decision to run for the presidency on 19 September 2012, 
and gained wide popular support but pulled out of the running on 23 November 2012 
after prolonged discussions about consolidating the opposition with candidate Moon 
Jae-in. In the 2012 elections, Park Geun-hye was ultimately elected, and Ahn Chul-soo 
won the 2013 congressional vacancy election as an independent candidate (Kim, H. G., 
2014).  
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Ahn Chul-soo was wildly popular as someone who represented a non-career politician 
accomplished in other fields, unaffiliated with any pre-existing political organizations, 
and seen to be responsive and communicative with young people. This led journalists 
to coin the term ‘Ahn Chul-soo Syndrome’ and the ‘Ahn Chul-soo Phenomenon’ to 
describe his widespread support. Ultimately, Ahn was not considered to be a viable 
presidential candidate by many people who thought his inexperience in politics was 
problematic. However, the surge in interest in his candidacy, especially among young 
people could be construed as a signal of the public disillusionment with the existing 
generation of politicians and the major political parties (Kim, H. G., 2014). 
 
Park Geun-hye, the main conservative candidate, won the 2012 election and came into 
office in February 2013. Park Geun-hye was the eldest daughter of President Park 
Chung-hee, the military dictator who had ruled from 1963 to 1979. The interviews and 
surveys for the empirical findings in this thesis were mostly conducted in the 
beginning of President Park Geun-hye’s administration.  
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2 Attitudes towards government and politics 
 
In this chapter we will discuss the attitudes of university students today towards 
government and politics. The hypotheses that are relevant to this chapter are as 
follows: 
 
• that university students today would have less intensely negative attitudes 
towards the presidential administration than university students in the 1980s; 
• that university students today would be generally dissatisfied with politics; 
• that university students today have low levels of trust for politicians; and 
• that university students today do not have a political party they support.  
 
The first section of this chapter examines some general attitudes that university 
students today hold towards politics. We examine the overall level of satisfaction with 
the government as well as the interest in politics and the perceived relevance of 
politics to everyday life. 
 
The second section of this chapter then proceeds to examine the attitudes towards the 
presidential administration. We discuss the attitudes that university students today 
hold towards the Lee administration (2008-2013) and the expectations they have 
towards the Park administration (2013- present).  
 
The third section of this chapter discusses the attitudes towards politicians. We discuss 
the attitudes that university students today hold towards politicians in general. 
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The fourth section of this chapter examines the attitudes towards political parties. We 
will discuss the level of support that university students have for political parties. It 
will also discuss whether university students today perceive ideological and policy 
differences between the major political parties and their attitudes towards regionalism.  
 
We then conclude with a short summary of the key findings on the attitudes of 
university students today towards government and politics.  
 
2.1 Overall level of satisfaction with the political situation 
 
Survey respondents and interviewees who are university students today expressed a 
generally low overall level of satisfaction with the current political situation. On a 
scale of 0 to 5, 0 being low and 5 being high, the mean level of satisfaction was 1.43 
(standard deviation = 1.044). The following table shows the results.  
 
Table 10. Overall level of satisfaction with the current political situation of 
university students today (%) 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Satisfaction with the current 
situation (N = 191) 
19.4 36.6 28.3 13.1 2.1 0.5 
5 High; 0 Low 
 
These results showed that despite the fact that the Korean political system is currently 
a democracy, the general level of satisfaction with the current political situation 
amongst university students today was quite low. An overwhelming majority (84.3%) 
of the survey respondents gave a score of 2 or below on their overall level of 
satisfaction with the current political situation. The following sections of this chapter 
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will examine the attitudes of university students today towards different aspects of the 
political system to investigate what constitutes this low level of satisfaction.  
 
2.2 Attitudes towards the presidential administration 
 
This section discusses the attitudes that university students today hold towards the 
presidential administration based on the interview and survey responses. The online 
survey was collected approximately one year after the inauguration of the Park 
administration and so reflects the views that current university students held about the 
Park administration at the time. However, since the interviews took place in March 
2013, less than a month into the Park administration, not much interview data was 
collected about the Park administration.  
 
The level of satisfaction with the current political situation was strongly and 
significantly correlated with the level of satisfaction with the previous Lee 
administration and the current Park administration. University students who gave 
higher ratings for the overall level of satisfaction with the current political situation 
were more likely to report higher levels of satisfaction with the presidential 
administration. Yet, just as the level of satisfaction with the current political situation 
was generally quite low, the levels of satisfaction with the Lee and the Park 
administrations were also generally quite low. The mean level of satisfaction with the 
Lee administration was 1.59 (standard deviation = 1.236) and the mean level of 
satisfaction with the Park administration was also 1.59 (standard deviation = 1.302). 
The following table shows the results.  
 
  139 
Table 11. Satisfaction with the Lee and the Park administrations (%) 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Satisfaction with the Lee 
administration (2008-2013) 
(N = 191) 
 
22.0 29.8 22.5 19.9 4.2 1.6 
Satisfaction with the Park 
administration (2013-present) 
(N = 191) 
24.1 29.3 18.8 21.5 3.7 2.6 
5High; 0 Low 
 
Like the overall level of satisfaction with the current political situation, a cleary 
majority (74.3% for the Lee administraton; 72.2% for the Park administration) of the 
online survey respondents gave a score of 2 or below on their satisfaction with the 
presidential administrations. The generally low level of satisfaction was reflected in 
the interview responses. On the previous administration led by Lee Myung-bak (2008-
2013), many university students today expressed generally negative attitudes, although 
most were unable to present cogent explanations for why they felt this way. The only 
policy issue that the interviewees consistently mentioned in criticism of the Lee 
administration was the Four Rivers Project. One interviewee said that the Four Rivers 
Project was the biggest mistake of the Lee administration. He said:  
 
I cannot remember anything the Lee administration did well, but the biggest mistake was the 
Four Rivers Project. I felt so strongly about it that I wanted to participate in a petition. (B22)26  
 
Many interviewees were concerned with the environmental impact of the Four Rivers 
Project. One student studying geology at university said:  
 
                                            
26 Female, Chonnam National University, 2011, Honam 
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I am quite interested in the environment. I think that the Four Rivers Project or large-scale 
construction projects of that type need to be evaluated to take into account the long-term 
impact. We need to be really careful and consider all possibilities when changing the 
environment, but because the presidential term is so short, they just built it all, and didn’t take 
the necessary amount of time to conduct proper research. (B12)27 
 
Other interviewees were concerned with the financial implications of the Four Rivers 
Project. One interviewee said: 
 
The Four Rivers Project was such a large-scale project and it is unclear who it really benefits. I 
really could not comprehend why the government poured trillions of won into the project when 
it could have been used for other more necessary and widely beneficial policies. (B14)28 
 
However, aside from the Four Rivers Project, interviewees could not come up with 
other more specific criticisms of the Lee administration despite the fact that they 
expressed a low level of satisfaction. Many expressed a sense of mistrust and a vague 
sense of disapproval with the way things were done. One interviewee said the main 
problem was with a lack of communication. He said: 
 
There was a general lack of communication. There was also a bit of a problem with democratic 
rights. As for the economy, it’s not something I can feel and I don’t really know what they are 
talking about nowadays. (B02)29 
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Another interviewee specifically criticized the government management of the budget, 
but used only generalized terms and did not support his views with any established 
facts or figures. He said: 
 
It’s about the budget. They don’t reduce their expenditure, but collect way too little in taxes. 
So now, what happens is that as the situation progresses, ultimately there is a hole in the 
budget, so they reduce other aspects, but now they need to keep their popularity, so they 
increase welfare and continue to dig the land up for the Four Rivers Project. He said he would 
be an ‘economic president’ but what does he think economics is? He used to be the CEO, but 
instead of being sensible about finances, he seems to think that because it is not his money, he 
can just spend it all. (B14) 
 
In fact, one respondent noted that many of his peers were critical of the Lee 
administration without providing much evidence. He said: 
 
I heard a lot that the Lee administration was not very good. So I just thought so too. However, I 
think in truth, I don’t really know enough to judge. I think many of my peers also do not know 
enough to judge objectively. (B04)30 
 
Another interviewee even said that it was a good thing that he did not know very much 
about what the Lee administration actually had done. He said: 
 
I think the most important thing for politicians is that we don’t actually know what they do. 
When people really know what’s going on, that means there is something that has gone 
horribly wrong. There’s even a saying that in times of peace, the people do not know who the 
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king is. I think the same about the Lee administration. Aside from a few issues, it was a quiet 
administration, and that was good. (B07)31 
 
However, it was contradictory that this interviewee went on to say that he was not 
satisfied with the quality of democracy in Korea currently and the main reason for this 
was a lack of communication. He said: 
 
I think that the best form of democracy is where there is transparency so we can be fully 
informed about what is going on and rationally judge what’s going on. In that respect, I was 
disappointed with the Lee administration because of the lack of communication and issues with 
information availability. (B07) 
 
In sum, the interviews revealed that university students today had low levels of 
satisfaction with the Lee administration and in particular disapproved of the Four 
Rivers Project. Many interviewees expressed the perception that the administration 
lacked communication. However, aside from these issues, they were largely unable to 
give a more comprehensive criticism of the regime, and some even admitted that they 
did not know enough. This suggests that at least some part of the distrust in the 
administration is due to a lack of reliable sources of information about politics. This 
problem will be discussed further in the section about attitudes towards the media.  
 
Not much interview data was collected about the Park administration because the 
interviews were conducted only one month into the administration. However, 
interviewees were asked about their hopes for the Park administration.  
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Some respondents, in particular female students, said that they supported President 
Park Geun-hye because she was a woman and they hoped that the election of the first 
female president would be a step forward for women’s rights and gender equality. One 
interviewee said: 
 
The only reason I voted for Park Geun-hye was because she was a woman. I am hoping that it 
will be a better society for women by the time I enter the workforce. (B05)32 
 
Some male interviewees also expressed a similar view. He said: 
 
I think it is significant that a female president was elected. I hope the Park administration 
implements some policies that helps women in the workplace, although I hope it doesn’t cause 
reverse discrimination. (B04) 
 
Other respondents hoped for policies that would help university students specifically. 
In particular, many respondents said that they wanted lower tuition rates and more 
scholarship opportunities, both of which were promised by the Park Geun-hye 
campaign in the lead up to the 2012 elections. However, most respondents did not 
have very high expectations. One interviewee who said she hoped for lower tuition 
rates said: 
 
I don’t expect much. They say that the tuition rates will be halved but I’m sceptical that it will 
happen. (B22) 
 
Yet, an interesting finding from the interviews on the Park administration was that 
none of the interviewees who are university students today commented on the fact that 
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President Park Geun-hye was the daughter of the authoritarian President Park Chung-
hee or commented on the implications of this on the state of Korea’s democracy. This 
was in direct contrast to some of the interviewees who were university students in the 
1980s who specifically pointed out the election of President Park Geun-hye as a 
reason for having a low level of satisfaction with the current political situation. For 
instance, when asked how he would rate the state of Korean politics today from a scale 
of 0 to 10, one interviewee answered:  
 
For me, it would be below zero. This last presidential election is a good example of why. I 
mean, I have nothing personal against Park Geun-hye, but the foreign press refer to her as the 
daughter of a dictator, and Park Geun-hye still refuses to say that the 16 May was wrong. She 
said it was a necessary decision, but she didn’t say that it was wrong even though we now say 
that 16 May was a military coup d’état. When I was in prison, a big issue was direct elections. I 
went to prison demanding constitutional reform to include direct elections. But do you know 
what Park Geun-hye says? That with the Yushin constitution of the 70s, that there were direct 
elections. But in fact, Park Chung-hee had gotten rid of the direct elections with the Yushin 
constitution, and Chun Doo-hwan did the same. And here comes the daughter of the dictator 
that had taken away the political rights to direct elections, and instead of thinking that this was 
a mistake on her father’s part, she says that it was a necessary decision. And the public votes 
for her as a reincarnation of Park Chung-hee. It’s like being returned to the 1970s. (A08)33 
 
For interviewees like A08, the current state of affairs in which the daughter of a 
dictator whose regime he had fought against came to be elected the president of Korea 
was clearly unsatisfactory. 
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Returning to the attitudes that university students today have towards the presidential 
administration, it is clear from the survey responses that university students today are 
generally dissatisfied with the current and previous presidential administrations. 
However, the interviews revealed that university students were actually not very well 
informed about policies and could not provide comprehensive explanations for their 
dissatisfaction and distrust. Interviewees generally held the view that the Lee 
administration had been uncommunicative and disapproved of the Four Rivers Project. 
Of the Park administration, university students today felt that the election of the first 
female president was significant, but largely did not express high expectations and 
were silent on the connection between the current President Park Geun-hye and the 
authoritarian President Park Chung-hee. However, in general, the negative attitudes 
that university students today held towards the presidential administrations were much 
less intense than the attitudes held by their counterparts in the 1980s towards the Chun 
administration. This confirmed the hypothesis that university students today would 
have less intensely negative attitudes towards the presidential administration than 
university students in the 1980s. 
 
2.3 Attitudes towards politicians 
 
This section discusses the attitudes that university students today have towards 
politicians. The attitudes towards politicians are significant because politicians are the 
representatives in a democracy. In an ideal democratic system, the democratically 
elected representatives would be trusted to act for the good of the whole society and 
have good communication with the citizens. However, interview and survey responses 
revealed that in Korea, perceptions of university students today towards politicians 
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were the opposite of this ideal. Politicians were perceived to act only for their own 
personal interests and not for the good of the citizens. They were also perceived to 
lack communication with the citizens and untrustworthy.  
 
In the survey responses, there were significant correlations between the level of 
satisfaction with the current political situation and the views towards politicians. 
Respondents who reported a high level of satisfaction with the current political 
situation were also more likely to think that politicians act for the good of the public 
and disagree with the statement that politicians act for their own interests. Two 
questions were asked in the survey to assess the attitudes towards politicians. 
Respondents were asked to indicate whether they agreed with the following statements: 
‘I think politicians work for the good of the citizens’ and ‘politicians act for their own 
interests’. The following chart shows the results for these questions. 
 
Figure 2. Trust of politicians (%) 
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As shown in the results, a clear majority (79.8%) of the respondents disagreed with the 
statement that politicians work for the good of the citizens. A clear majority (90.8%) 
agreed with the statement that politicians act for their own interests. This general 
attitude of distrust of politicians was confirmed in the interviews. Many interviewees 
said that they thought politicians acted only for their personal interests instead of for 
the good of the citizens. One interviewee said: 
 
I think politicians should have concrete values and act by them. However, most politicians in 
Korea today are only interested in taking care of themselves and dividing themselves into 
groups to get the most power. That’s the crux of the problem. I really hope people with correct 
worldviews lead the country, but would those people want to be involved in politics? I think 
not. At the end of the day, they are motivated by money. For politicians, politics is a way to 
make a living, and I guess that’s more important than political ideology or integrity. (B11)34 
 
Similarly, another interviewee said that she thought politicians did not make rational 
decisions based on what was good for the general public but only focused on their own 
interests. She said: 
 
All politicians should try to make the right decisions for the whole country. However, they 
don’t do that and instead look after their own interests. They should make rational decisions 
based on serious reasoning and investigation, but instead, they are only self-interested. (B22) 
 
Another interviewee elaborated on this point on politicians: 
 
I wish they would be more realistic and practical but they aren’t like that. In some sense, in a 
country, the congressmen are elected to represent the country. But if you look at the National 
                                            
34 Female, Yonsei University, 2010, Chungcheong 
  148 
Assembly, instead of vouching for our country’s interests, these politicians are just advocating 
their own interests. They only speak for themselves or their party. (B13)35 
 
In fact, the survey results revealed that a majority (69.4%) of respondents agreed with 
the statement that even if politicians are in different parties they ultimately act like a 
cartel, as shown in the table below.  
 
Table 12. Perceived cartelisation of political parties (%) 
 Agree Partially 
Agree 
Partially 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Even if politicians are in different 
parties they ultimately act like a 
cartel. (N = 170) 
23.5 45.9 21.2 9.4 
 
One interviewee also expressed the same view. He said: 
 
My father works in a weapons manufacturing company and he goes to the National Assembly 
from time to time. But he told me that the congressmen don’t actually work and just put on a 
show. They only pretend to be arguing when the camera is on, and when the camera is off, they 
are all in the same boat. (B11) 
 
In a follow-up interview in 2014 after the Sewol Ferry Incident36, one interviewee 
discussed the incident as an example in which the self-interested nature of politicians 
was revealed. He said: 
 
Do politicians act for the citizens? No. Just look at the way they dealt with this incident. All 
they did was try to somehow shift responsibility away from themselves and take care of each 
                                            
35 Male, Seoul National University, 2009, Chungcheong 
36 On 16 April 2014, the Sewol Ferry carrying 476 people sank and 276 people were confirmed dead 
and 23 missing. Most of the deaths were high school students on a field trip and the incident was one of 
the worst maritime disasters in South Korea (BBC, 16 May 2014). 
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other. They should have set up proper regulatory bodies and enforced the regulations. Instead, 
they didn’t do anything properly, and caused accidents like this to happen. And when accidents 
like this happen, they don’t deal with it competently and don’t investigate it properly. (B27)37 
 
Similarly, another interviewee said during a follow-up interview: 
 
In the recent Sewol Ferry Incident, it really struck me that there was a dire need for political 
reform. However, all of the politicians were just laying low, doing nothing and busy covering 
their own backs. (B19)38 
 
In addition to being perceived as self-serving, politicians were viewed as being 
untrustworthy because they do not keep their campaign promises. For instance, one 
respondent said: 
 
There seems to be a problem with the political structure itself. Politicians say they will do 
things before they are elected and then when they are elected, they don’t do anything. Lack of 
trust is the main issue… For instance, they always say they are going to get university students 
to participate more. But instead of just saying so, they should really pay more attention to 
educational programmes. (B27) 
 
More specifically, one respondent cited President Park’s ‘half-tuition’ campaign 
promise as an example of politicians reneging on their promises. One respondent said:  
 
The half-tuition reform promises were not fulfilled. I knew at the outset it wouldn’t 
happen…They must have done it just to get our interest. Politicians don’t care about the long-
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term. They are only interested in winning the election and do not care about the interests of the 
country or the citizens. (B21)39 
 
These perceptions that politicians were untrustworthy and self-interested had a direct 
impact on the interviewee’s motivation to participate in politics. One interviewee said: 
 
The politicians that we’ve elected to represent us in the National Assembly should represent 
our views and interests, but they only use their position for their personal gain or the gain of 
their political party. They are simply full of empty rhetoric, and after watching them do that 
year after year, it feels like it isn’t worth it to be interested in politics. Being too busy to 
participate in politics is one reason, but feeling disillusioned because of politicians is definitely 
another key reason for not participating further. (B13) 
 
Another related complaint that interviewees expressed was that politicians today 
lacked communication. One view that some interviewees expressed was that 
politicians did not communicate effectively amongst themselves. One interviewee said: 
 
I think there is a lack of communication amongst the politicians themselves. Even those that 
were highly educated don’t seem to actually talk to each other. Instead, they just try to overrule 
the ideas of others through a majority or physically fight to take over the chairman’s seat. They 
do say they will negotiate, but it is hard to see whether it is actually working. (B06)40 
 
Similarly, another interviewee said that instead of communicating effectively, 
politicians were overly emotional and lacked rational discussions on policy. She said:  
 
There is just a lack of communication. Both sides are just really emotionally driven. I wish 
they would engage in rational conversation, accept their own mistakes, recognise what the 
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other side has done correctly and negotiate on policies. However, they always say that their 
own side is right and the other is always wrong, which is not true. (B01)41 
 
For other interviewees, the perceived lack of communication was not limited to 
interactions between politicians, but extended to the communication between 
politicians and society. One interviewee said: 
 
I am campaigning for proportional representation to be expanded in the electoral system 
because I don’t think that the opinions of a diverse range of people are communicated to the 
National Assembly. I think it is the lack of diversity of opinions that really turns young people 
off from politics. (B08)42 
 
Many interviewees also said that there was a lack of communication between 
politicians and university students. Many interviewees said that they did not think 
politicians made an effort to connect with university students. One interviewee said:  
 
I think there is a lack of effort to connect with university students. They only try to 
communicate to the public using old methods that work on older generations. I think 
politicians could make more of an effort to communicate with us. If they did, I think university 
students would be more interested in politics. (B04) 
 
Many interviewees said that they did not perceive politicians to be approachable, 
which made politics much less interesting. Some interviewees said that the general 
lack of humour in Korean politics made politics less interesting. One interviewee said:  
 
I think Korean politicians take themselves much too seriously and feel like they need to be 
really authoritative and serious. For instance, when I watch clips on YouTube, President 
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Obama makes a lot of jokes in his speeches and acknowledges the parodies that people make 
of him, which makes him seem so much more approachable. However, Korean politicians just 
don’t have that sense of wit or humour. In the presidential debates between Park Geun-hye and 
Moon Jae-in, for instance, the closest thing they had to humour was say ‘Let’s have a fight 
today’ which was really not funny at all. I think using humour can be a way for politicians to 
connect with young people. (B14)  
 
Similarly, another interviewee who said she was not very interested in Korean politics 
but was interested in U.S. politics explained why this was the case. She said: 
 
A lot of my friends and I actually follow U.S. presidential elections much more closely, 
reading dozens of newspapers and watching the debates over and over again. It’s simply 
because there is a lot of interesting information that is easily accessible. All the major news 
websites make the information easily accessible with chronologies and questions and answers 
pages and videos. It’s like watching a sporting event and all of the candidates make really 
convincing and sometimes humorous speeches. I would definitely follow Korean politics more 
closely if it was fun and accessible in the same way. (B15)43 
 
Another interviewee said that he became more interested in a political issue after he 
watched a comedy programme that parodied a politician. She said: 
 
I think university students are not really interested in politics because it’s not fun. When things 
are funny or become an issue, we look it up to find out more. For instance, there was a 
candidate who said, ‘I’m sorry, daughter!’ in a really exaggerated way and was parodied in 
comedy programmes. I didn’t know it was a political reference at first, but after seeing the 
comedy, I became interested in searched for it online and found out more. If politics was more 
fun and accessible, I think I would be more interested in it. (B19) 
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In sum, the surveys and the interviews confirmed the hypothesis that university 
students today do not trust politicians. Most respondents thought that politicians were 
self-interested and did not act for the public good. Interviewees also said that they did 
not trust politicians because they broke promises. These perceptions that politicians 
were self-interested and did not keep promises had a direct impact on the interviewee’s 
motivation to participate in politics. In addition to these perceptions, university 
students today perceived Korean politicians to lack effective communication skills 
amongst themselves, with the wider society and with university students. An 
interesting finding in the interviews was that university students today felt that politics 
would be more fun and interesting if politicians were more humorous and 
approachable.  
 
2.4 Attitudes towards political parties 
 
In a representative democracy, political parties perform the function of forming and 
controlling government as well as the function of representing the interests and values 
of the citizens (Ware, 1987). Despite its central role in democracy, in the case of South 
Korea, parties are viewed with deep-seated distrust by the public due to the lack of 
representativeness and responsibility, the display of overt power games, the continuing 
revelations of corruption, and the unending series of arbitrary realignments (Kim, Y. 
T., 2009: 198). In particular, the lack of ideological and policy differences between the 
parties poses a significant barrier for the development of a genuinely representative 
and competitive party system (Choi, J. J., Park, C. P. and Park, S. H., 2007).  
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Unlike in Western European democracies where party competition closely resembles 
underlying social cleavage structures such as class (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967), party 
competition in South Korea is based on regionalism (Kim, Y. H., 2002; Kwack, J. Y., 
2006: 123; Choi, J. Y., 2007; Park, C. W., 2008). In addition, Korean political parties 
have often been used as instruments for the personal ambition of certain key political 
leaders, further making it difficult for parties to develop their own ideological and 
policy identity (Kim, Y. H., 2001).  
 
This section examines the attitudes that university students today hold towards 
political parties. It begins with a discussion of whether university students today have 
a political party they support. It then examines the perception that there is a lack of 
ideological and policy differences between the political parties. Finally, we discuss the 
attitudes towards regionalism, which plays a key role in the political party system of 
South Korea.   
 
2.4.1 Support for political parties 
 
Even though 89.1% of the survey respondents said that they vote, over half said that 
they do not have a political party they actively support. In fact, 81.6% of the 
respondents disagreed or partially disagreed with the statement that they feel a strong 
connection with the political party they support. In addition, only 2.8% fully agreed 
that they feel a strong connection with the political party they support. These findings 
confirm the hypothesis that university students today do not have a political party they 
support.  
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Figure 3. Support for political parties (%) 
 
 
From these findings, current university students do not feel a high level of engagement 
with politics as evidenced by the lack of connectedness with existing political parties. 
In fact, there has been increasing support for anti-party-system candidates in recent 
years. In the 26 October 2011 Seoul Mayor by-elections, an independent candidate 
Park Won-soon won the office after winning the opposition primaries (Park, M. H., 
2012). As a former human rights lawyer, Park Won-soon proved to be more popular 
than any of the other established party candidates.  
 
A similar phenomenon was observed in the presidential elections in what has 
subsequently been dubbed the ‘Ahn Chul-soo phenomenon’ discussed earlier. In the 
six democratic direct presidential elections that have taken place from 1987 to 2012, 
all of the presidents elected have been from the two major parties. Though the party 
names have often changed, the two major parties were all descendants from either the 
Yeongnam-based ‘Roh Tae-woo / Kim Young-sam’ party or the Honam-based ‘Kim 
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Dae-jung / Roh Moo-hyun’ party (Choi, J. S., 2013: 89). But in the 2012 elections, it 
was the first time that a third candidate, Ahn Chul-soo, had become a serious 
contender for office polling 47.2% of the votes in August 2012, just months before the 
election (Kim, D. H., 26 August 2012, Views&news; Lim, J. Y., 26 August 2012, 
Asiatoday). Although he later pulled out of the presidential election, Ahn Chul-soo 
was elected to the National Assembly in the 2013 by-elections, signalling his 
continued popularity. 
 
According to American theorists Rosenstone, Behr and Lazarus (1996: 126-139), there 
are three reasons for independent candidates becoming popular: first, the tendency of 
more voters feeling a lack of party identification; second, dissatisfaction with the 
existing political elite; and third, the emergence of an attractive independent candidate. 
Ahn himself stated that his number one purpose of participating in politics was 
‘political reform’, and this matched the hopes of the public as well. As a former doctor 
made computer software programmer and entrepreneur, Ahn Chul-soo was an already 
well-known and highly-respected independent candidate. His success story made him 
especially popular with university students and the highly educated middle-class 
demographic (Choi, J. S., 2013). According to the polling data conducted in March 
2012, these were the demographics supporting Ahn Chul-soo, in comparison to the 
demographics supporting New World Party’s Park Guen-hye and Democratic Party’s 
Moon Jae-in. 
 
Table 13. Demographics of the public supporting the candidates in the 18th 
Presidential Election in March 2012 (%) 
 Park Moon Ahn 
Age 20s 25.1 27.7 47.1 
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30s 24.5 29.7 45.8 
40s 33.6 27.9 38.4 
50s 51.6 20.2 28.2 
Over 60s 66.5 13.1 20.4 
Education Middle School or 
lower 
63.0 14.1 23.0 
High School 50.0 18.2 31.8 
University or higher 30.9 28.4 40.7 
Income 
per month 
2 Million KRW or 
lower 
43.8 22.1 34.1 
2 Million – 4 Million 
KRW 
36.4 24.8 38.9 
4 Million KRW or 
over 
42.1 24.0 38.9 
Total 40.1 23.9 36.1 
(Source: Choi, J. S., 2013: 100) 
 
As can be seen, 40.7% of the respondents who were university level educated or 
higher supported Ahn Chul-soo, and 47.1% of people in their 20s, 45.8% of people in 
their 30s, and 38.4% of people in their 40s supported Ahn. This shows clearly the 
desire for new political leaders amongst young people and university students. In fact, 
many interviewees expressed this view. One interviewee said that he did not fully 
agree with the views of any of the existing parties or politicians. He said: 
 
None of the existing political parties or politicians hold views I can fully support. I don’t like 
any of the existing politicians. Even if one comes out that I like initially, it always turns out 
that he’s just like all the others. (B18)44 
 
Similarly, another interviewee recognised that the rise of the independent candidate 
Ahn Chul-soo signalled that there was a problem with the representativeness of the 
current political party system. He said: 
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The Ahn Chul-soo phenomenon really showed that the current political party system does not 
effectively represent the views of everyone. I believe the same type of thing will happen again. 
(B14) 
 
In sum, an overwhelming majority of university students did not have a particular 
political party they supported. The rise of independent candidate Ahn Chul-soo in the 
2012 presidential elections amongst young people signalled that university students 
today did not feel that their views were adequately represented through existing 
political parties or politicians.  
 
2.4.2 Ideological and policy differences between political parties 
 
The survey also asked current university students several questions about their 
perception of political parties. A slight majority (54.1%) of the respondents indicated 
that they did not perceive a clear difference between the major political parties. On 
whether they thought it would make a difference if another political party were in 
power, the respondents were evenly divided. The following table shows the results.  
 
Table 14. Attitudes about political parties (%) 
 
Agree 
Partially 
Agree 
Partially 
Disagree 
Disagree 
There is a clear difference between the 
major political parties (N = 183) 
 
14.2 39.9 26.2 19.7 
Even if another political party were in 
power, it wouldn’t make a big 
difference (N = 183) 
15.3 33.3 33.9 17.5 
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The interviews largely confirmed these findings. Though some interviewees said that 
they observed a difference between the major political parties, over half of the 
interviewees said that they did not. One respondent said that one of the key problems 
with Korean politics was the lack of differentiation between the policies of the major 
parties. He said:  
 
The big issue is that our political parties are not very different from one another. All of them 
try to occupy the middle on policy. At the end of the day, instead of focusing on policy, they 
focus on who’s prettier, who’s cleaner, who’s corrupt, and who has personal issues. It all turns 
into a mudslinging match and it just turns people off. (B14)  
 
Similarly, another interviewee said that things would not have been very different 
even if another candidate had been elected in the 2012 presidential elections. She said: 
 
Things would not have been different even if Moon Jae-in was elected to the presidency in 
2012. People think it will be different, but it isn’t as if all the campaign promises will be kept. 
(B05) 
 
A student studying political science alluded specifically to the cartelization of political 
parties as he discussed his interest in policies and electoral campaign practice: 
I don’t know how it is in other countries, but in Korea, no matter which party gets elected, no 
matter who gets elected, it will all be the same, at least in terms of policy…It shouldn’t be this 
way, but you know in public choice models, the median is the direction to go? Well, Korean 
parties seem to really like that. They never position themselves this way or that with a firm 
ideological foundation but rather just do whatever people like. With the rise of Ahn Chul-soo 
before the last elections, they say that our party system had failed. (B04) 
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2.4.3 Attitudes towards regionalism  
 
Some interviewees who are university students held the view that regionalism was a 
serious problem in Korean politics. One interviewee said:  
 
I think regionalism is the biggest problem with Korean politics. However, politicians would 
prefer to entrench regionalism. They use it to their advantage, and do not do much to change it. 
(B23)45 
 
Yet, many interviewees who are university students today had the view that 
regionalism did not have a big impact on their political views and was becoming less 
relevant to their generation. One interviewee said: 
 
Regionalism may affect politics at large, but it is becoming less salient in the younger 
generations. I think perhaps it may be a problem that could be fixed in our generation. (B20)46 
 
The survey responses of university students today largely confirm this finding. The 
majority of survey responses said that their region of origin or residence had no or low 
effect on their political preferences. The table below shows the percentages of the 
survey responses on the effect of region on political preferences.  
 
Table 15. Effect of region on political preferences (%)  
 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Effect of region of origin on 
political preferences 
(N = 191) 
34 15 18 15 14 4 
5 High; 0 Low 
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46 Male, Pusan National University, 2013, Yeongnam 
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Yet, this does not mean that regionalism is irrelevant to university students today. An 
interesting finding in the interviews was that although respondents may initially say 
that regionalism does not have a big impact on their political views, their responses to 
further questioning sometimes suggest otherwise. For instance, one interviewee from 
the Chungcheong region said that her region of origin did not influence her political 
views. However, in giving the reason for this, she said: 
 
I’m from Chungcheong Province. People from Chungcheong are generally not interested in 
politics. It’s not like people from Honam or Yeongnam who have clear biases for or against the 
governing party. Chungcheong does not have a particular political bias. (B11) 
 
Although she said her region of origin did not influence her political views, it was 
clear that she observed clear regional biases. Similarly, an interviewee from Daegu 
(Yeongnam region) who supported the Green Party said that his region of origin did 
not have a big influence on his political views. However when asked how he came to 
hold these views, he specifically started with a reference to regionalism. He said: 
 
I was interested in politics because I’m from Daegu. You know how people from Daegu are. I 
remember when I was in primary school, there was a presidential election. When you are in 
primary school, you don’t know anything about politics. But even then, I remember one of my 
classmates saying that his parents supported the liberal candidate, Kim Dae-jung, and all of the 
kids made fun of him. When I was young, I thought that was correct; that if you’re from 
Daegu, you have to support the conservative party. (B08) 
 
This interviewee said that he later came to form his own views about politics when he 
came to university and studied further about political issues. However, he admitted 
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that as he learned more about politics, he began to feel a strong aversion to everything 
he had taken for granted about the conservative party and even felt guilty because his 
views were different from that of his parents and grandparents. It was clear that though 
his region of origin did not directly dictate his political views, he was heavily 
influenced by regionalism.  
 
The interviews also revealed that many students perceived clear regional biases 
amongst their peers. For instance, one interviewee said: 
 
All of my friends from Jeolla definitely support the liberal Democratic party. It must be 
because of their upbringing. (B18) 
 
Similarly, another interviewee said: 
 
It is absolutely clear that there is a Honam-Yeongnam divide in politics. Especially during 
elections, its clear to see. (B19) 
 
One interviewee who admitted that regionalism has an impact on his political views 
gave an explanation for why this was so. He said: 
 
I don’t think I should say this, but I think when candidates from my region are elected, it really 
makes a difference in the development of the region. I’m from Pohang, like the last President,47 
and when he was elected, all of the development projects that had been on hold or delayed 
suddenly came through very quickly. When officials from my region are elected, I think it will 
be much better for me to find jobs and the regional economy will be much better. This issue of 
regional development is why it is such a big consideration for me. (B27) 
                                            
47 President Lee Myung-bak was originally from Pohang, a city near Busan in the Yeongnam region.  
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Regionalism is a significant element of the Korean political system. It becomes 
particularly apparent in elections, and is reinforced by the policies and rhetoric of the 
politicians. It is perceived even amongst university students today, and though many 
interviewees were reluctant to admit it, continues to have a strong influence in the 
formation of their political views.  
 
2.5 Key Findings  
 
In this chapter we discussed the attitudes of university students today towards 
government and politics. It was hypothesised that university students today are not 
interested in politics. The survey responses showed that this was incorrect. In addition, 
it was hypothesised that university students today would have less intensely negative 
attitudes towards the presidential administration than university students in the 1980s. 
The survey and interview responses confirmed this hypothesis, but showed that 
university students today had a low level of satisfaction in the current political 
situation and of the Lee administration and the Park administration. Many 
interviewees criticised the Four Rivers Project, which was implemented by the Lee 
administration. However, other than that, the interviewees were unable to give 
comprehensive explanations backed up by evidence for their dissatisfaction with the 
Lee administration. In fact, some interviewees said that they did not feel confident that 
they knew enough to comment.  
 
It was also hypothesised that university students today have low levels of trust for 
politicians. This hypothesis was confirmed by the survey and interview data. 
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University students today perceived politicians to be self-serving and acting in their 
own interests rather than for the public good. University students today also perceived 
politicians to lack communication with themselves, with the public, and with 
university students.  
 
Finally, it was hypothesised that university students today do not have a political party 
they support. This was shown to be correct. A majority of the survey respondents said 
that they did not have a political party they supported. The Ahn Chul-soo phenomenon 
among young people also indicated that current political parties were failing to 
adequately represent the interests of university students today. Survey and interview 
results revealed that university students today perceived a lack of ideological and 
policy differences between the parties. University students also perceived that party 
competition was mainly based on regionalism and image. This lack of trust in political 
parties and politicians lowered the perceived political efficacy of university students 
today, and was a cause of their non-participation in politics.  
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3 Attitudes towards the media 
 
This chapter discusses the attitudes that university students today hold towards the 
media based on survey and interview findings. It was hypothesised that university 
students today would have higher levels of trust for the media as a source of 
information about politics than their counterparts in the 1980s. However, a significant 
majority (84.1%) of the respondents disagreed or partially disagreed with the 
statement that they trust the public information available on politics. The following 
table shows the results. 
 
Table 16. Trustworthiness of publicly available information about politics (%) 
 
Agree 
Partially 
Agree 
Partially 
Disagree 
Disagree 
I trust publicly available information 
about politics.  
(N = 182) 
 
1.6 14.3 42.9 41.2 
 
The interview responses largely mirrored this finding. Most interviewees said that they 
did not trust the media to provide an objective and even-handed coverage of political 
affairs. One of the key reasons that the interviewees gave for the lack of trust in the 
media as a source of information about politics was the disparity in the coverage of 
current events by the major media sources. One interviewee said: 
 
Political bias is so strong in many media sources. Even on the same event, different 
newspapers and broadcasters report very different accounts. I’m sometimes shocked by the 
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differences, and think that unless people are reading all of these different sources, they may 
really get it wrong. Also it makes it very hard for me to know what to believe. (B16)48 
 
Other interviewees identified the lack of independence of the media as a cause for not 
trusting the publicly available information on politics. One interviewee said: 
 
How can I trust publicly available information about politics when the government has such a 
large role in the media companies? Journalists who say the truth are fired and the government 
appoints its supporters in the top positions of media companies. (B27) 
 
For many interviewees, the lack of trust in the media directly affected their motivation 
to participate in politics. One interviewee said that he did not feel confident enough to 
discuss politics with his peers because he did not know if he could trust the facts he 
learned through the media. He said: 
 
I sometimes talk about politics with my brother. We have different views about politics. 
However, I find it really difficult to persuade him about my views because I don’t know if I 
can fully trust what I have learned through the media. All of the newspapers and news 
broadcasts are biased and I can’t trust that what they say is actually true. So I end up saying 
nothing when my family and friends discuss politics. (B01) 
 
Another interviewee said that he does not trust the media and instead look to primary 
sources to learn about political affairs. He said: 
 
I don’t trust the media at all. When I want to learn about politics or write up a report, I don’t 
use media sources. Instead I watch the live television broadcasts of what is actually happening 
                                            
48 Female, Hanyang University, 2010, Seoul and Gyeonggi 
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or read the full transcripts of speeches. When journalists write articles using these primary 
sources, there is inevitably their personal bias and the bias of the media company shaping the 
interpretation of the facts. (B14) 
 
Because of these differences of perspective between different sources of media, many 
respondents said that they tried to develop a balanced view by reading different 
newspapers. One interviewee said:  
 
I make an effort to find the differences between the rightist newspapers like Chosun, Joong-
Ang and Dong-A and leftist newspapers like Hankyoreh. However, it is hard to do this every 
day for every event, and I still don’t feel satisfied that I am getting the full picture. (B20) 
 
Other interviewees said that the hassle of having to read from multiple sources to find 
out the truth of what was happening discouraged him from learning more. He said: 
 
I have both Joong-Ang and Hankyoreh newspapers on my phone so I try to read the coverage 
of both newspapers on a certain incident. However, in the end I just end up reading one and 
losing interest. I don’t read the news very often because of that. (B01) 
 
Despite the general mistrust of the media, for most respondents, it was the main source 
of information about politics, and many said that they trusted the media more than 
politicians. One respondent said: 
 
I trust the media more than the politicians. Although the media are not completely trustworthy, 
I think journalists can be more objective than politicians and the variety of sources means that I 
can read from a lot of different sources and decide for myself what I think is right. (B03)49 
                                            
49 Female, Korea University, 2012, Seoul and Gyeonggi 
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University students today reported low levels of trust on the media coverage of 
political news even though there are no overt controls on the media as was the case in 
the 1980s before the democratic transition. The interviews revealed that university 
students today perceived the media to lack independence. University students also 
perceived political bias in mainstream media sources, which led to the attitude that the 
media were not an objective and reliable source of information on politics. Some 
university students made an effort to gain a more objective understanding of political 
affairs by reading several different sources and accessing primary or secondary 
sources of information. However, the lack of a reliable source of information about 
politics caused university students to be less motivated to participate in politics.  
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4 Political socialization 
 
On political socialization, it was hypothesised that like university students in the 
1980s, university students today would say that the university setting had the most 
significant impact on the development of their political views. However, the survey 
and interview findings revealed that the political socialization process that university 
students today experienced differed in many key respects from that of university 
students in the 1980s. Current university students were more likely to have been 
influenced by their parents’ political views and also more likely to be influenced by 
their schoolteachers. Yet, they were less likely to have been influenced by their 
university peers. The following table shows the results of the survey conducted on 
current university students. 
 
Table 17. Political socialization of current university students (%)  
 
Agree 
Partially 
Agree 
Partially 
Disagree 
Disagree 
My parents had a big influence on 
my political views. (N = 164) 
 
17.1 43.3 12.8 26.8 
My schoolteachers did not have a 
big impact on the formation of my 
political views. (N = 180) 
 
32.2 28.9 20.6 18.3 
My university peers had a big 
impact on the formation of my 
political views. (N = 164) 
 
8.5 42.1 20.7 28.7 
 
As the data suggests, a clear majority (60.4%) of the respondents either agreed or 
partially agreed with the statement that their parents had a big impact on the formation 
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of their political views. In comparison, a clear majority (61.1%) of the respondents 
reported that their primary and secondary education schoolteachers did not have a big 
impact on the formation of their political views. About half of the respondents (50.6%) 
of the respondents agreed or partially agreed with the statement that their university 
peers had a big impact on the formation of their political views. A greater percentage 
of survey respondents said that their parents had a big influence on their political 
views than those that said that their university peers had a big impact on the formation 
of their political views.  
 
On the other hand, a clear majority of the survey respondents who were university 
students today reported that their parents had a big influence in their political 
socialization process. Amongst the interviewees, there was a wide spectrum of how 
parents influenced the political socialization process of current university students.  
 
Some interviewees said that their parents tried to foster in them a neutral yet informed 
view of politics. One interviewee said that his parents encouraged him to read about 
politics from a broad range of sources, and this has helped him form a neutral 
perspective on politics. He said:  
 
When I was in high school, most of my peers were always reading Dong-A Ilbo, so I asked my 
parents why people always read Dong-A Ilbo. My father told me that we shouldn’t read only 
Dong-A Ilbo and he gave me advice on how to be more politically neutral. Because of hearing 
these things, I was able to learn that reading only one newspaper can present a certain bias. From 
this influence of my parents, I myself am quite neutral when it comes to politics. (B02) 
 
Similarly, another interviewee said: 
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I was greatly influenced by my father, who was a police officer and majored in Labour Law…He 
dealt with a lot of people who were socially marginalized and so he always advised me to look 
widely and gave me books on different views… He said that even if it was not economical, the 
minimum wage should be high and taxes should be low…and I agree with him. (B04) 
 
There were also some students who reported having completely different views from 
their parents. One interviewee said that: 
 
I feel kind of guilty when I say this. My parents and especially my grandmother don’t really 
seem to understand democracy. They say that we have to vote for Park Geun-hye or else the 
country wouldn’t be saved because of all the selfish young people making the wrong 
decisions…so I just lied about who I really voted for to keep the peace in the family. (B19) 
 
It was interesting to see that some interviewees who were university students in the 
1980s revealed the same, but reversed, frustrations with their own university student 
children. One interviewee who was a university student in the 1980s and now has a 
son in university said: 
 
My son is extremely conservative. For instance, his views on North Korea and the [liberal] 
Democratic Party and the nationwide teacher’s union are strictly conservative. He is emotionally 
against anyone with progressive attitudes. I do try to influence him. I mean it wasn’t easy for me 
to make money as a pastor, and it was very difficult for our family to get by. It’s not like my son 
is from an affluent family. I am very much for liberalism. Of course I do not judge and I detest 
attempts to oppress people based on their ideologies. But I would like to persuade my son to try 
to understand why other people may have different perspectives. (A04)50 
 
                                            
50 Male, Hanyang University, 1989, Honam 
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In general, university students today exhibit a greater diversity in their experience of 
the family environment as a setting for political socialization. However, an interesting 
finding was that many interviewees said that their parents discouraged them from 
participating in politics. For instance, one interviewee said that:  
 
I don’t participate in political groups or societies because my mother tells me its wrong to do 
so…she used to support congressmen and did lots of campaigning and was active in a political 
party, but she said that it was all useless in the end. (B21) 
 
An interesting thing about this interviewee was that her mother had been very active in 
student activism and political participation. However, she told her daughter that it was 
futile to participate in politics, and this interviewee consequently reported a very low 
level of political efficacy. Part of this may be caused by the fact that people who were 
university students in the 1980s, who are now the parents of university students today, 
are not satisfied with the current political situation. In fact, when interviewees who 
were university students in the 1980s were asked to rate the level of satisfaction with 
the current political situation on a scale of 0 to 5, 5 being high and 0 being low, the 
mean level of satisfaction was only 1.704 (standard deviation = 0.9533). The 
following table shows the results.  
 
Table 18. Satisfaction with the current political situation evaluated by 
interviewees who were university students in the 1980s 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Satisfaction with the current 
political situation (N = 27) 
 
7.4 40.7 25.9 25.9 0 0 
5 High; 0 Low 
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Parents of university students today may therefore discourage university students 
today from participating in politics because even though they had actively participated 
in student activism, they are now disillusioned with the workings of democracy.  
 
Primary and secondary education was not perceived to have been an important part of 
the political socialization process of university students today or in the 1980s. 
However, the findings suggest that primary and secondary education was a greater 
influencing factor for university students today.  
 
A clear majority (61.1%) of the survey respondents who are current university 
students reported that their primary or secondary education schoolteachers did not 
have a big impact on the formation of their political views. Yet, this was a lesser 
proportion than all the interviewees who were university students in the 1980s who 
said that their primary or secondary education had no impact on their political views. 
Among university students today, there were some interviewees who said that their 
teachers in school sometimes spoke about politics. One interviewee reported that one 
of her teachers had tried to educate her class about the political system and encouraged 
civic mindedness. Yet, she said that she did not take much interest in what was said. 
She said: 
 
When the National Assembly was talking about impeachment, our Korean Language teacher 
turned on the television saying that we needed to be interested in this sort of stuff…She told us 
what happens when impeachment occurs and the procedure for what happens when a top 
government official leaves office suddenly…At the time, I just thought, well, I guess the 
president is important. (B10)51 
                                            
51 Male, Seoul National University, 2008, Seoul and Gyeonggi 
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Other respondents said that teachers would sometimes make biased comments about 
politics in class. He said: 
 
There were quite a few teachers who discussed politics in school…but they either unilaterally 
criticized the presidential administration or just made personal comments about politics…I don’t 
think I was really affected by it. I just listened. (B02) 
 
In sum, a larger proportion of current university students felt that their primary and 
secondary education had an influence on the formation of their political views than 
their 1980s counterparts. However, our findings suggest that the influence of primary 
and secondary education on the formation of political attitudes is not very significant 
even for university students today.  
 
Like university students of the 1980s, almost all interviewees who are currently 
university students said that their interest in and knowledge of politics increased 
dramatically after entering university. For instance, one respondent said:  
 
After coming to university, my political views have been affected quite a bit by those around 
me. At university, there are definitely more conversations about politics, and there are some 
professors who have very different political views from myself. After listening to them, I 
sometimes feel a bit rebellious. Also, when I was starting university, there was an atmosphere 
of opposition to the government, and there were quite a few candlelight vigils, so there was an 
element of peer pressure. (B03) 
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Aside from learning about politics at university through peer groups and studying, 
another factor that affects the political socialization process at university for current 
university students was the experience of student government. He said:  
 
When I came to university and started participating in groups, I began to think about whether the 
things I learn from others are really the truth. Sometimes it could be the case that someone’s 
biased opinion was just coming through to me…I would think about how to get things done in 
groups and I came to realise that leading people to do things is really what politics is about. 
(B29)52 
 
Although university students today did not observe a pervasive atmosphere of student 
activism as was the case for university students in the 1980s, the university setting was 
still an important part of the political socialization process. 
 
4.1 Political socialization in the military 
 
Military service is mandatory for all men in South Korea. Most men do their two-year 
service during their university years. Not many respondents who were university 
students in the 1980s were able to report on their experiences in the military because 
many of them had been exempt due to personal reasons or because they had served 
prison terms as student activists.  
 
As for current male university students, the perception of how their time in the 
military changed their political views was diverse. Some said that there was not a great 
impact. One interviewee said of his experiences in the mandatory military service:  
                                            
52 Male, Chonnam National University, 2007, Honam 
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It did not really affect my political views, but I sort of learned that politics was closely related 
to my life. I guess it heightened my sensitivity to politics. (B02) 
 
When asked whether he thinks the military’s security education affected him, he 
answered: 
 
It was the military, so I already knew that this was in the military setting…I did not of course 
accept everything that they said as being all true though there was some truth to it…But in the 
military, the troop information and education sessions were really nothing more than for gossip. 
(B02)  
 
Yet, this lack of perceived influence of political socialization in the military was not 
due to the lack of effort by the institution. One student reported that a change in the 
promotion policies within the military at the end of 2011 in the run-up to the 2012 
presidential elections reflected an effort to indoctrinate more conservative political 
views in the servicemen. He said: 
 
These days, promotion is not about seniority. In order to be promoted, we need to pass the 
physical and mental exams…As part of the mental exam, we needed to complete a written 
exam with about thirty questions, and you need to score above 70 to be promoted. (B08) 
 
He continued: 
 
Aside from the exams, every week on Wednesday, if there was nothing special, we would just 
sit in the common room to watch videos for our ‘mental education’… This would be all 
morning for about three hours. We then had to write reviews about it, and if you presented it 
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well, you would get permits to go out… The content of course had a very conservative bias. 
(B08) 
 
When asked whether he thought this had an effect on the political views of the 
servicemen, he answered that though he himself was not very much affected because 
he was based in the situation room and did not have much time to participate in the 
activities, he could understand how others may be more susceptible. 
 
Not many people go into military service knowing that the military is indoctrinating them to 
have a more conservative bias. So they just go without thinking and just do as they are told… 
It is easy to become influenced. (B08) 
 
In fact, some respondents exhibited the signs of having been affected by the national 
security education of the military: 
 
When I was in the military, there were a lot of incidents such as the ROKS Cheonan sinking 
and the Yeon-pyeong island incident. I entered the army in 2009 and came out in July 2011, 
and so there were these orders for more security education, and when Yeon-pyeong island was 
hit, I really thought there would be a war…But my views didn’t change due to military service. 
To get into the air force, you need to do an interview, and there’s always the question: ‘who do 
you think is the main enemy of the state?’ Recently, many people say that it is the US or Japan, 
but I never liked North Korea, so…I always liked history as a child, and in the books it says 
that North Korea started the war and sent a bunch of spies over to kill people, and on the news 
North Korea acts aggressively and shoots missiles, so in the end, I came to have a very bad 
view of North Korea. In the Kim Dae-jung or the Roh Moo-hyun administration, there were 
the appeasement policies, and I never approved of that. (B12) 
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Even female students reported observing some trends in fellow male students who had 
served in the military. One respondent said: 
 
When I was watching this election, I felt that the guys who’d gone through military considered 
national security as the number one issue. I’ve heard lots of guys say that if the national 
security policies of a given politician or political party is solid, then that politician or party is 
wrong even if everything else is perfect; however, if their policies on national security are solid, 
then they are fine even if they get everything else wrong. (B17)53 
 
The fact that the military is educating young men to believe that national security is 
the one and only important political issue is troubling. But aside from that issue, it 
seems that serving in some departments of the military can heighten aversion to 
politics. One respondent who served as a riot control officer during his mandatory 
military service said that his experience increased his negative perception towards 
politics in general: 
 
Before, I merely thought of politics as something that had no influence on me. But after my 
term as a riot control officer, I began to think that politics is bad… politics is only about self-
interest. (B10) 
 
In sum, the Korean military is an influential institution for the political socialization of 
young male university students. However, whether the effect of this political 
socialization is positive is debatable.  
 
  
                                            
53 Female, Busan University of Foreign Studies, 2011, Seoul and Gyeonggi 
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5 The experience of political participation 
 
This chapter discusses the experiences of political participation amongst university 
students today. The first section examines the experience of latent political 
participation. Latent political participation includes activities such as discussing 
politics with others and learning about political affairs (Ekman and Amna, 2012). We 
examine the interview and survey responses by university students today on the 
experience of discussing politics and studying about politics. It is hypothesised that 
university students today would have low levels of latent political participation based 
on the existing literature. It is also hypothesised that online social media would be an 
important method of latent political participation for university students today. The 
section on latent political participation also includes a discussion of online social 
media as a method of latent political participation.  
 
The second section of this chapter examines the experience of manifest political 
participation. There are three types of manifest political participation this thesis 
examines: voting, contacting politicians and participating in protest activity. We 
examine the survey and interview findings relevant to each of the three types of 
manifest political participation. It is hypothesised that university students today would 
have access to diverse ways of participating in politics through voting and engaging 
with political parties and civil society groups. Yet, based on the literature it is 
hypothesised that university students today are likely to have low levels of manifest 
political participation in general.  
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5.1 Latent political participation 
 
It was hypothesised that university students today are not interested in politics. 
However, the survey results showed that this was not correct. The following table 
shows the reported level of interest in politics and the perceived relevance of politics 
to everyday life among the survey respondents who are currently university students 
with 5 being high and 0 being low.  
 
Figure 4. Level of interest in politics and the perceived relevance of politics to 
everyday life of current university students (%) 
 
5 High; 0 Low 
 
The survey results suggest that university students today generally have high levels of 
interest in politics, and that many perceive politics to be relevant to their everyday 
lives. The mean of the level of interest in politics was 3.17 with the standard deviation 
of 1.245; the mean of the level of perceived relevance of politics to everyday life was 
3.24 with the standard deviation of 1.453. Of those surveyed, 72.2% said that they had 
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a 3 or higher level of interest in politics. Nearly half (46%) said that they had a 4 or 
higher level of interest in politics. According to these self-assessment values, 
university students today are interested in politics and perceive politics to be relevant 
to their everyday lives. 
 
5.1.1 Discussing politics  
 
One element of latent political participation is discussing politics with others. In the 
survey, the respondents were asked whether they discuss politics regularly and with 
whom they discuss politics. A majority of the respondents said that they discussed 
politics regularly, and most of them discussed politics with friends. Over half said that 
they discussed politics with classmates and other colleagues; less than half said that 
they discussed politics with family members. The following table shows the results. 
 
Table 19. Discussing politics  
Discuss politics regularly with (N=197) Count 
Family 90 
Friends 127 
Classmates and colleagues 106 
Do not discuss politics regularly 33 
 
In the interviews, I tried to find out more about what types of discussions university 
students today had with their peers and family about politics. Most interviewees said 
that they discussed politics with their peers about two or three times a week, but there 
was a wide variety of experiences. Some students said that they would listen and join 
in on the discussions about politics because there was a general culture of being 
interested in politics. One student at Seoul National University said: 
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I think Seoul National University students are particularly interested in politics. Everyone 
around me is interested, and we talk a lot about the different candidates and different 
campaigns. Even though some people are not actually very interested or well informed, they all 
have something to say. (B18) 
 
One respondent said that she would try to play the devil’s advocate in discussions 
about politics with her peers to gauge how well they actually knew about the things 
they were saying. She said: 
 
Even though we are in medical school, medical issues are not the only things we discuss. We 
usually discuss what’s been on the news recently. Whenever we discuss politics, I tell them 
what I’ve read on the opposite side of what they are saying to try to see how they respond. As 
university students, the best way for us to be involved in politics is to study it and be fully 
informed about what’s going on, so I try to do that in my discussions with my friends. (B01) 
 
Yet other respondents said that they rarely discussed substantial issues like policy but 
focused on the image of the different politicians and superficial issues. One respondent 
said: 
 
I discuss politics with my friends and classmates about three times a week. However, I think in 
reality we usually talk about image and superficial issues and not about policy. I guess we 
should really be talking about the visions and ideologies of the political parties and the 
politicians, but in reality we hardly ever talk about those things. (B02) 
 
Other respondents said that their experience of discussing politics with their peers was 
not always positive. One respondent said: 
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My classmates discussed politics often in the lead up to the presidential elections. However, 
things could get rather heated in some of the discussions and it would sometimes get ugly. I 
don’t get why they get so involved. It’s not like fighting is going to make a difference. They 
should just vote for who they want to vote for and let others do what they want. (B03) 
 
Similarly another respondent said: 
I tried to talk to a lot of people about political issues particularly before the elections. However, 
I ended up talking the most with the same group of people, and at the end of the day, I’m not 
sure if it was worth the effort. A lot of people had the view that it is quite useless to get too 
deeply engaged and most just didn’t care or know enough. (B08) 
 
In sum, though university students today often discuss politics with family, friends, 
colleagues and classmates, the experience was not necessarily a positive one. Many 
interviewees said that their discussions were often superficial or led to conflicts with 
peers.  
 
5.1.2 Studying about politics 
 
Another form of latent political participation is learning about politics and keeping up 
to date about political affairs. Yet, in the survey, a majority (62.8%) of the respondents 
agreed or partially agreed with the statement that they actually did not know much 
about the policies of the major political parties. The following table shows the 
responses.  
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Table 20. Information about politics (%) 
 
Agree 
Partially 
Agree 
Partially 
Disagree 
Disagree 
I actually don’t know much about 
the policies of the major political 
parties (N = 183) 
 
20.2 42.6 25.1 12 
 
Although current university students said that they had a high interest in politics, a 
majority said that they do not actually know much about the policies of the major 
political parties. The interviews revealed a similar trend. One respondent said that 
although he studies current events in preparation for civil service exams, he does not 
try to develop independent views about what is going on or learn about the different 
political parties. He said: 
 
I need to know current affairs to prepare for the civil service exams, so I read the news and 
learn about political affairs. However, I just focus on the facts so I know what is going on, but I 
don’t actually develop my own views about it. It is how it is and I don’t want to waste time 
thinking too much about it. (B18) 
 
Yet, a lack of interest in politics was not the most common reason for why current 
university students thought they did not know much about the policies of the political 
parties. In fact, many respondents said that they watched televised debates between 
politicians and listened to podcasts about politics. In particular, many interviewees 
mentioned a podcast named ‘Naneun Ggomsuda’54, which means ‘I am a petty-minded 
creep’. According to a survey conducted by Hankook Ilbo (20 April 2012) on the first 
anniversary of the podcast, of the 1,328 people surveyed, 85.1% said that they listened 
                                            
54 The podcast, which ran from 27 April 2011 to 18 December 2012 was well known for the sarcastic 
yet incisive and often caustic coverage of the events and people surrounding the Lee administration. It 
focuses on the various ploys used by the government to control the media and was widely popular 
amongst young people. 
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to the podcast because it deals with issues that are not addressed by other existing 
forms of media. One respondent said that: 
 
When listening to the podcast ‘I am a petty-minded creep’ was a trend, I thought I should get 
more involved in politics. I also attended a seminar on the 18 May [Gwangju Democratic 
Movement]. From that I thought, democracy is a hard thing to attain. (B24)55 
 
The main cause of why university students today thought they were not fully informed 
about politics was the quality of the available information about politics beyond this 
one podcast. One respondent said: 
 
I just don’t trust what is being said about politics. Everyone has a specific bias and no one is 
ever telling the whole truth. (B01) 
 
Another respondent who said that she spends a lot of time learning about politics and 
trying to read different sources to get a fuller picture of political affairs elaborated 
further: 
 
I think being interested in politics is in itself a form of political participation. Taking the time 
to learn about political issues and being interested and discussing politics with others is an 
important form of political participation. Adults say that you should never talk about religion 
or politics because it will always lead to a fight. However, I think we need to talk about 
politics. People fight because they do not know how to debate; it is not because of the content 
of the debate. I heard that in developed democracies like the US or UK people debate about 
politics and encourage students to do so too at a young age. But I think in Korea, everyone tries 
to avoid talking about politics and the media does not provide sufficiently balanced and 
                                            
55 Female, Chonnam National University, 2010, Honam 
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comprehensive information to allow for meaningful discussion. I think that needs to change. 
(B11) 
 
 Another student who had spent most of her childhood in the US before returning to 
attend high school and university in Korea compared the quality of the media coverage 
of politics in the US and Korea. She said: 
 
I find myself being much more interested in the US elections than the Korean elections even 
though I live in Korea and I can only vote in the Korean elections. I spend much more time 
watching the US political debates and reading the news that deals with US politics. The main 
reason for this is that there is much more good quality information about US politics. The 
media coverage of the main issues are much more comprehensive and balanced and the 
different sides do not write off the opposition as simply being ‘communist’ or being a ‘traitor’ 
just because one side is campaigning for more social funding. There is a real debate, and the 
media companies package this really well with interesting videos and chronologies. I think if 
they did something similar for Korean politics, I would be much more interested. But I guess 
the media companies just do not invest in it because there is a lack of interest; and there is a 
lack of interest because there is this lack of good quality coverage. It is a vicious circle. (B15)  
 
Though many university students made an effort to learn more about politics, a 
majority of the survey respondents said that they did not know the policies of the 
major political parties. From the survey and interview responses, it was clear that the 
quality of publicly available information about politics was negatively affecting the 
experience of latent political participation amongst university students today.  
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5.1.3 Online social media 
 
The percentage of the South Korean population using the Internet is at 82.1% as of 
2013 (Korea Internet & Security Agency) with 65.4% of the population using the 
Internet for current affairs news coverage. There is a strong generational difference in 
the use of the Internet for current affairs news coverage. While 93.5% of the 
respondents in the age 19-29 group reported using the Internet for current affairs news 
coverage, this percentage falls to 52.9% for the respondents in their 50s. The following 
chart shows these differences (Korea Press Foundation, 2013: 30). 
 
Figure 5. SNS usage rates by age group (%) 
 
(Source: Korea Information Society Development Institute, 2013: 2) 
 
Since the 1980s, there have been significant developments in the media used by 
Koreans. The most notable development has been the increase in the use of the 
Internet, and for young people, the use of social media. As of 2013, 31.3% of the 
respondents in the national survey conducted by the Korea Information Society 
Development Institute reported using social network service (SNS). There are clear 
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generational differences in the usage of social networking sites, with respondents in 
their 20s reporting a 69.3% usage rate compared to 28.8% of respondents in their 40s 
and 12.1% for those over the age of 50 as shown in the chart below.  
Figure 6. Internet news usage rates by age group (%) 
 
(Source: Korea Press Foundation, 2013: 31)  
 
Online social media did not exist in the 1980s. Instead, the main method of 
communication was through banners, notice boards, and flyers, which presented 
opinion articles, announcements, and messages. In some sense, this paper media can 
be considered the analogue hard copy version of online social media. Yet, in the 
context of the dictatorial regime, this material, despite being banned, were widely read, 
supported, and utilized for political participation among university students in the 
1980s. In contrast, interviews and surveys revealed many university students today 
said that they did not utilise online social media as a major forum for discussing 
politics, contrary to the hypothesis that online social media would be an important 
form of latent political participation for university students today.   
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An interesting finding from the survey on current university students was that there 
was a significant correlation between the responses ‘university peers had a big impact 
on the formation of my political views’ and ‘I discuss politics regularly with friends on 
online social media’. The Pearson r was .266, which is a weak correlation, but the 
correlation was significant at the 0.02 level. The former statement also showed a 
correlation with ‘I enjoy sharing my political views on online social media’ (Pearson r 
= .222; Significance = 0.08).  
 
This indicates that university students who say that their peers had a big impact on 
their political socialization process are more likely to discuss and enjoy sharing their 
views on politics on online social media. However, in general, many university 
students did not use online social media as a regular outlet for discussing politics, as 
the following table shows.  
 
Table 21. How often do you discuss politics on online social media? (%) 
 Very 
Often 
Often Sometimes 
Almost 
Never 
Never 
How often do you discuss 
politics on online social 
media? (N=189) 
3.5 20.7 23.2 32.8 19.7 
 
Nearly one-fifth of the respondents said that they never discuss politics on online 
social media, and more than half said that they almost never or only sometimes do so. 
Only 24.2% of the respondents said that they very often or often discuss politics on 
online social media. This largely corresponds with the responses for the other two 
questions on the survey that asked about the use of online social media as a forum for 
political discussion. The following table shows the results.  
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Table 22. Attitudes about online social media use (%) 
 
Agree 
Partially 
Agree 
Partially 
Disagree 
Disagree 
I enjoy sharing my political views on 
online social media. 
(N = 159) 
 
8.8 18.9 22.6 49.7 
I discuss politics regularly with 
friends on online social media.  
(N = 146) 
 
2.1 19.2 23.3 55.5 
I think that people who like to share 
their views on politics on online social 
media like to show off. (N = 176) 
11.9 36.9 26.7 24.4 
 
As the table above demonstrates, a clear majority of the respondents disagreed that 
they enjoy sharing their political views on online social media and that they discuss 
politics regularly with friends on online social media. This finding was largely 
corroborated by the interview responses.  
 
For instance, one respondent said that he sometimes talks about politics on online 
social media such as Facebook or Twitter. However, he said that he only does so for 
major events or issues, and that he did not think social media had a big impact on real 
politics. He said: 
 
I don’t really do anything else [aside from commenting on major issues] though. I just go in 
once a while and some people talk about politics in general, but it doesn’t seem to really affect 
real politics or anything real. (B08) 
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Some respondents held outright negative views towards peers who discuss politics on 
social networking sites. One respondent said: 
 
I really hate it. They are just showing off their biases. They just say that Lee Myung-bak sucks 
and everything, and it is supposed to influence me. I just think, ‘Is that the only way to do 
it?’…It is not like they are open to rational discussion either. (B22) 
 
Another respondent similarly said: 
 
I sometimes come across people talking about politics online, but I’d never look for it. I don’t 
want to be interested in it. I think that people who find that fun are pathetic… They talk about 
politics and criticise it, but it’s all just noise. I thought I don’t want to be a part of that pathetic 
crowd. (B21) 
 
However, there were some students who thought that online social media was a useful 
forum for encouraging friends to be more involved in politics. One respondent said: 
 
I’ve written something about encouraging people to vote. I said that even if I have exams 
tomorrow, I was going to vote, and that others should practice their political rights…Many 
people were very encouraging and said that people like us deserve half-rate tuition and that 
they were going to vote too. (B17) 
 
In sum, though some current university students use online social media today to 
discuss politics, it is not a particularly popular method for students to do so.  
 
  192 
5.2 Manifest political participation 
 
5.2.1 Voting 
 
Despite the low self-evaluation scores of political participation among university 
students today, 88.1% of the survey respondents reported that they vote in at least the 
presidential elections. 46.3% said that they also vote in the parliamentary elections and 
41.7% said that they also vote in other elections. (N=194) 
 
According to the report published by the Korean National Electoral Commission, 
68.5% of the citizens in their 20s voted in the 18th presidential elections in 2012. 
71.1% of the citizens in their early 20s voted and 65.7% of the citizens in their late 20s 
voted. Comparing this to the data gathered from our survey on current university 
students, we can infer that among the citizens in their 20s, a higher proportion of 
university students vote than their non-university counterparts.  
 
A majority of the survey respondents (74.1%) agreed with the statement that their 
electoral participation might change Korean politics. In fact, the majority of survey 
respondents rated the level of effectiveness of voting to be high. The average level of 
the perceived efficacy of voting was 3.63 and 63% of the survey respondents reported 
a level 4 or higher on a scale of 0 being low and 5 being high. The following table 
shows the results. 
 
  193 
Table 23. Level of perceived efficacy of voting (%) 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Level of perceived efficacy of 
voting 
(N = 191) 
 
1 8 12 16 33 30 
5 High; 0 Low 
 
In the interviews, many university students indicated that they thought voting was 
important. One interviewee said: 
 
If we want to change the world or make Korean politics better, the only way to do so is through 
voting. (B08) 
 
Another interviewee said:  
 
Even if the candidate I voted for does not get elected, it shows how much support was received. 
Votes show the opinion of the citizens, even the opinion of those citizens whose candidates were 
not elected. That is why voting is important. (B06) 
 
Nevertheless, many other interviewees expressed a resigned attitude to even electoral 
participation. For instance, one interviewee said: 
 
In politics, the politicians make promises they never keep…so votes really have no effect. 
They say that they respect the opinions and judgements of the people, but if you observe them, 
they don’t really…even if we participate, what’s the point? (B12) 
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Similarly, another interviewee said that she did not think voting had a real impact on 
her life and therefore did not put much effort into finding out about who to vote for. 
She said: 
 
Most of my friends vote and I do too. But in all honesty, I am not sure whether voting really 
changes politics or whether it would have a real impact on my life. So I don’t tend to put too 
much effort into trying to decide whom to vote for. (B03) 
 
Some interviewees said that they participated in campaigns to encourage people to 
vote. One interviewee described her participation in voting encouragement 
programmes. She said: 
 
I have done some voluntary work in encouraging people to vote and voter registration. 
However I have never supported a political party or campaigned for a particular candidate. 
(B01) 
 
5.2.2 Contacting politicians 
 
Aside from voting, another form of manifest political participation is to contact 
politicians. This may involve working for campaigns or contacting public officials. 
When university students today were asked how they thought university students 
today could become involved in politics, almost all of them said that they could 
contact politicians to express their views. For instance, one interviewee said: 
 
I think we could write to the city mayor on the Seoul City Facebook page or Twitter. I guess 
we could also get involved in some sort of political party activity for young people. I don’t 
know anyone who actually does those things though. (B18) 
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Similarly, another interviewee said that aside from voting, volunteering for campaigns 
or civil society organisations would be a better method of political participation for 
university students than protest activity. He said: 
 
The obvious way to be involved is through voting. Aside from that, some students get involved 
in protests and demonstrations, but I really think there are better ways than that to make a 
difference. Perhaps students could donate to or volunteer at campaigns or civil society 
organisations. (B10) 
 
Another respondent said that he was considering getting involved in a non-
governmental organisation or doing an internship at the National Assembly to learn 
more about politics. He said: 
 
I am considering getting involved in an NGO that supports social entrepreneurs. An alternative 
may also be to volunteer for a group that helps North Korean defectors. Also, I think I might 
try to get an internship at the National Assembly. I think all of these would be a good way to 
learn more about politics. (B09)56 
 
However, almost none of the interviewees said that they had experience of actually 
participating in any of these ways. One interviewee explained why he did not 
participate in these ways even though he was aware of these methods. He said he was 
discouraged from participating in politics by getting in contact with politicians and 
political parties because it may impact his reputation. He said: 
 
                                            
56 Male, Seoul National University, 2006, Yeongnam 
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There are many ways for university students to be involved in politics. You could join a 
student activist organisation, volunteer for a candidate’s campaign or do an internship at a 
political organisation. However, in reality it is really hard to get involved. There are a lot of 
bad impressions about students who become involved in politics in that way. I’m also wary of 
affiliating myself with a political party or an interest group and getting in line with the wrong 
people, as that political reputation is bound to follow me around. (B14) 
 
In fact, the perception that politicians are predominantly self-interested was not only 
confined to politicians. One respondent commented on how even major civil society 
organizations were also perceived to be self-interested and unresponsive: 
 
Even though there are currently many civil society organizations, they are mostly already well 
connected to politicians or have great wealth, and only seem to be self-interested, so that 
ordinary people and their opinions are excluded. (B22) 
 
There was an interviewee who tried to participate in a labour trade union by working 
at a factory. However, he said that this attempt failed and made him realise that there 
was very little he could do as a university student. He said: 
 
I tried to join a trade union by working at a factory packaging boxes. A friend and I went there 
to work there and find out more about the reality of the labour rights movement. But after one 
day of working there, the factory suddenly closed down without any warning. All of the other 
men who had been working there were suddenly just unemployed and had nothing they could 
do. Seeing the reality of things made me realise how powerless we were as university students. 
But even if I were to get a job at an office somewhere, it isn’t like there is more I could do. 
(B13) 
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Yet, there was one interviewee who did participate by volunteering for and doing an 
internship for a political organisation that campaigns for the expansion of proportional 
representation in the National Assembly. She explained how she came to be involved 
with this organisation. This interviewee showed that if university students have a 
cause that they support, they could find a way to participate in political organisations. 
She said: 
 
I decided to become involved because I have a diverse range of interests. I support animal 
rights and I also believe in feminism. I’m not completely liberal but that doesn’t mean I am 
conservative either. So when I first thought about how to become involved in politics, I wasn’t 
sure which group to support. After thinking and talking about it with many people, I decided to 
participate by supporting proportional representation. By expanding the proportional 
representation seats in the National Assembly, a more diverse range of interests can be 
represented. So I researched the proportional representation forum and joined. (B08) 
 
In sum, university students today recognised that volunteering in campaigns, 
contacting politicians and becoming involved in civil society organisations were a 
method of political participation. However, very few university students were 
successful in actually getting involved.  
 
5.2.3 Protest activity  
 
This section examines the experiences of protest activity amongst university students 
today. In contrast to university students in the 1980s, interviewees who were 
university students today expressed a much more negative attitude towards 
participating in protests. We begin with a discussion of the experiences and attitudes 
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of university students today in student activism on campus. We will then proceed to 
examine their experiences and attitudes towards candlelight vigils, which is a more 
common form of protest activity seen in recent years.  
Almost none of the interviewees described being involved in student activism on 
campus. However, there was one interviewee who described his experiences with the 
College of Education Singing Club, which held politically themed events and at one 
point even took over the university chairman’s office building. He said: 
 
We discuss politics a lot. We sometimes hold seminars. Every November, we have annual 
concerts, and we choose the theme of the concerts. To choose the theme, we look into what’s 
up and coming in political and educational topics, because we are in the College of Education 
after all. So we need to know about these issues, so before the concerts, we hold seminars to 
investigate problems, find our stance on it, research songs to express our stance, and if there 
are no appropriate songs, we decide whether to write a new song. So we’ve written songs, and 
that’s how we address societal problems…I’m also quite interested in the labour movement, so 
when they were doing a cultural event to fight for talent management, we went and did a 
concert for them…Also even if I couldn’t take part because I was doing my military service, 
our Singing Club, in affiliation with the school-wide and intercollegiate Singing Club took 
over the Seoul National University building that had the Chairman’s office in May and June of 
2011 to protest. (B13) 
 
Yet, he said that he actually thought that his activism would disadvantage him in 
finding employment. He said: 
 
Of course, I don’t write about it on my resume. If I were to write about it, I think I would be 
disadvantaged. When I was doing my military service, I talked about being in the Singing Club, 
and I was put under surveillance. (B13) 
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Like university students in the 1980s, a few interviewees who are university students 
today said that they admired student activists on campus. One interviewee said: 
 
I admire them for their courage. But I never had the same courage to participate. (B23) 
 
Another interviewee said that he was thankful for the student activists on campus 
because he was able to learn about political issues through their activities. He said: 
 
Although student activism on campus is not as active as it used to be, there are still some 
students who participate. They put posters and banners on campus and sometimes hold protests. 
When I see them, I actually feel thankful because I learn new things from them. I can see they 
make a real effort to make different voices heard. There are a lot of prejudices against student 
activism, but if you actually look closely and listen to what they have to say, it is really helpful. 
(B02) 
 
However, this view was in the minority. In fact, most of the interviewees held negative 
views towards student activists. Some interviewees expressed the view that they 
thought student activists acted out of a false sense of heroism. One interviewee said: 
 
 I would sometimes see posters or banners with really provocative or strong messages written 
on them around campus, and seeing those things actually turns me off from getting involved in 
student activism. I sometimes think that those student activists are too radical and may be 
acting out of a false sense of heroism. (B08) 
 
Others expressed the view that the actions of the student activists were not necessary. 
One interviewee said:  
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It all looks a bit weird. I mean, I’ve seen people sit on chairs in front of the campus and cut 
their hair and do the walk three steps and bow once ritual, but I just think, is that really 
necessary? (B03) 
 
Many interviewees shared this view. In fact, the general perception of student activists 
among the respondents was rather negative. For instance, one respondent said that: 
 
Even though we study politics and international relations, we students aren’t really interested 
in politics. Upon entering university, we’ve developed an allergy against student activists. 
(B17) 
 
She continued to say that her parents actively discouraged her from any political 
activities and treated politics as taboo. She thought that this was because: 
 
The adult generation had tried it [political activism] and told us that it didn’t really change 
anything, so I learned that it was a pointless thing to do. (B17) 
 
Other interviewees also said that they were taught not to be involved in student 
activism. One interviewee said that her mother told her that student activists were 
dangerous and discouraged her from participating. She said: 
 
When I see student activists or people active in student councils, I don’t actually care much 
about them. They can do what they want. My mother told me that student activists are 
dangerous people, and that they are rebelling against society. Some students use it as a method 
for career advancement, and that’s not good to see. I think what they do is pointless and 
meaningless. (B05) 
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Other interviewees shared the perception that student activists had their own agenda 
and were involved in politics for the advancement of their own careers. One 
interviewee said: 
 
I have a strongly negative perception of those who do [political activity] on campus. In the end, 
those who do that type of activities do so just to make it look good on their resumes when 
applying for jobs…They seem to think that they have some sort of belief or integrity, but really 
they do it as if it was some sort of career. (B15) 
 
In recent years, many young people in South Korea have participated in candlelight 
vigils for various issues. Some of the interviewees reported to having participated in 
the candlelight vigils with their friends. However, all of them said that after being 
involved in the candlelight vigils, they became disillusioned and no longer participate. 
One interviewee explained that though he participated in many candlelight vigils, he 
no longer does so after feeling like the protest was being used for the political gain of 
other actors and seeing irrational actions by some of his fellow protestors. He said: 
 
I participated in the candlelight vigils because many of my friends were going. A lot of my 
high school friends went, so I thought I should try, and it was the same in university when 
many of my university friends went, I went as well. Initially, it was kind of fun. However, the 
more I participated, I felt like we were being used. It felt like we were being incited and our 
actions being misinterpreted. On the streets, I could see rational people suddenly change and 
make irrational and emotional decisions. I realised how things could go wrong quickly, and 
decided I would no longer participate. (B18) 
 
Another interviewee who also participated in the candlelight vigils said that he was 
turned off from further participation after the movement turned more violent. He said:  
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I participated in the candlelight vigils…I went to almost all of them, at least the whole of one 
semester, but I quit later because I hated the fact that it was getting so extreme…It’s not like 
those guys drafted in to be riot police want to stop us, and I couldn’t get my head around why 
we needed to hit them. I mean that’s why we were holding candles, to signal peace, and not 
spears. (B14) 
 
This sense of disillusionment extended to interviewees who did not participate but 
observed the candlelight vigils. One interviewee said that though he initially admired 
the protestors who participated in the candlelight vigils, he became less supportive 
when he saw the movement being led away from its original objective and become 
more violent. He said: 
 
I did not participate in the candlelight vigils. Midway through the movement, it became quite 
violent. Initially, I admired the people participating in the candlelight vigils, but later, the 
whole thing moved in a direction that was very different from the initial objective, and I did 
not want to become involved. (B10) 
 
Like the attitudes towards student activism on campus, some interviewees expressed 
the view that candlelight vigils were pointless and unnecessary. One interviewee said: 
 
I could see why people participated in the candlelight vigils but my friends and I did not 
participate. Sure, the government lacked proper communication, but I didn’t think the issue of 
beef imports was something that we needed to hold a candlelight vigil for. It was just an event 
of sorts, and I felt no need to participate. (B07) 
 
In sum, though some university students today do participate in protest activity as a 
way of manifest political participation, this was not very common. Though there were 
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some university students today who admired and felt thankful towards student 
activists, this was a minority view. An overwhelming majority of university students 
today reported negative attitudes towards student activism and participation in 
candlelight vigils. This was due to university students learning from the older 
generation that student activism was pointless, the perception of student activists to be 
acting out of a false sense of heroism or self-interest and the perception that the efforts 
of student activists were pointless.  
 
5.3 Attitudes towards political participation  
 
The average self-evaluated level of political participation was 2.67; the average 
satisfaction with current level of political participation was 2.37; and the average 
perceived efficacy of political participation was 1.97. These are lower than the mean 
level of interest in politics, which was 3.17 and the mean level of perceived relevance 
of politics to everyday life, which were 3.24.  
 
These survey results showed that though university students today find politics to be 
relevant to their everyday lives and are interested in politics, their levels of political 
participation are, in comparison, lower, and their satisfaction in their current level of 
political participation and perceived efficacy of political participation even lower. In 
fact, even among those respondents who reported the highest level (5) of political 
participation, the mean level of political efficacy was only 2.3.  
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The interviews affirmed that many university students today found their current levels 
of political participation unsatisfactory. Many interviewees said something along the 
following lines: 
 
I am not satisfied with my current level of political participation. I think I should take a greater 
interest. (B12) 
 
Similarly, another interviewee said that though he was initially dissatisfied with his 
low level of political participation, he no longer cares very much about it. He said: 
 
I used to think that it was a problem that I wasn’t participating aside from voting. As a 
university student, I thought I should take a greater interest in the world. But I am really busy, 
and I am not that bothered anymore. (B02) 
 
Despite the fact that they were generally dissatisfied with their level of political 
participation, most did not make an effort to be more involved in politics. There were 
many different reasons that university students today provided for their low levels of 
political participation. These reasons will be discussed in further detail in the next 
chapter.  
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6 Reasons for non-participation  
 
In order to find out the reasons for why university students were discouraged from 
participating in politics, the survey contained a long form question that asked 
respondents about what discourages them from further political participation. The 
following table lists the results.  
 
Table 24. Reasons for not participating further in politics 
Reason Count 
Lack of efficacy of political participation 12 
Negative news about politics 11 
Dissatisfaction with current government 7 
Corruption 5 
Self-serving politicians 5 
Aversion to politics in general 3 
Busy 3 
Distrust of politicians 3 
Lack of interest 3 
Suspicions of electoral fraud in the 2012 presidential election 3 
Conflict with family  2 
Participating in politics will ruin my social life 2 
Too much political in-fighting 2 
Alienation from the political elite 1 
No difference between political parties 1 
No relevance of politics to my life 1 
Regionalism 1 
(N=68) 
 
As can be seen, the lack of efficacy of political participation and the negative news 
about politics were cited as the top two reasons for not participating in politics. Other 
respondents were more specific and cited corruption, self-serving politicians, distrust 
of politicians, suspicions of electoral fraud and too much political in-fighting as 
reasons for not participating in politics. Dissatisfaction with the current government, 
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aversion to politics in general and the negative impact of politics on social life were 
cited as other reasons. Lack of interest and being too busy to participate were also 
reported, but these were not the most common reasons for not participating in politics.  
 
Although these survey results provide a general indication of the reasons for the low 
level of political participation amongst university students today, it does not provide a 
full picture. The following sections examine these reasons in further detail through the 
interview responses. Firstly, we look at the lack of political efficacy as a reason for the 
low level of political participation. Secondly, we examine the related lack of trust in 
the political elite. Thirdly, we then proceed to discuss the lack of resources. Fourthly, 
we discuss the lack of necessity to participate in politics.  
 
6.1.1 Lack of political efficacy 
 
One of the most common reasons that university students today said was the reason for 
their low levels of political participation despite thinking that they should participate 
more was the lack of political efficacy. For some interviewees this was a structural 
issue. One interviewee said that since Korea has become a democracy, there have been 
more diverse interests seeking to achieve different objectives, and this has reduced the 
efficacy of participating to support a specific cause. He said: 
 
In Korean society today, there are so many diverse interests. In the past, it was either 
democracy or authoritarianism, and it was much more clear-cut. However, nowadays, everyone 
has something different to say, and there is that much more conflict. It seems like there is no 
point trying to support a particular interest because it would just not be effective. That’s what 
turns me off from being more involved. (B02) 
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Yet, the more common view was that there was a problem with the political system 
that made it so that political participation of an individual had little effect on political 
outcomes. One interviewee said: 
 
I don’t make an effort to participate in politics because I don’t think it will make a big 
difference. I’ve studied political affairs and political theory and I’ve come to the conclusion 
that even if the most perfect candidate became elected, there is very little he would be able to 
implement to make politics better. (B15) 
 
Similarly, another interviewee said that there was a lack of ways in which university 
students could experience political efficacy and this caused the low levels of political 
participation among university students today. She said: 
 
I think [the lack of participation] is because there is no efficacy. I think if I experienced 
something that showed me that things could be achieved through politics, there would be more 
interest. In the Korean political system, there is little room for young people to experience 
political efficacy. (B08) 
 
The survey results confirmed the general perception amongst university students today 
that they perceived a low level of political efficacy. The following table shows the 
results. A majority (73%) of the survey respondents perceived a low level of efficacy, 
giving a rating between 0 and 2.  
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Table 25. Level of perceived efficacy of political participation (%) 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Level of perceived efficacy of 
political participation (N = 199) 
12 23 34 19 8 4 
5 High; 0 Low 
 
6.1.2 Lack of trust in the political elite 
 
So what causes university students today to perceive low levels of political efficacy? 
The interview responses revealed that the cause of the low levels of political efficacy 
was the lack of trust in the political elite. There was no trust that political participation 
would translate into political outcomes. One interviewee said: 
 
It is hard to feel that voting makes a real difference in our every day lives. There are many 
layers between the people we elect and the policies that affect our every day lives and so many 
factors affect the outcome. Yet, it doesn’t mean our participation is meaningless; but if the 
processes were more transparent, I think I would feel like our participation made a difference. 
(B10) 
 
Similarly, another interviewee said that though he thought it was understandable that 
university students today had lower levels of political participation than university 
students in the 1980s. However, he said that the lack of transparency in the Korean 
political system was a problem that discouraged political participation. He said.  
 
I think it is understandable that political participation is not as high as it used to be under the 
authoritarian regime. However it is troubling that I don’t feel like my votes really affect what’s 
going on in politics. There are so many layers between my one vote and the decision-making 
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that goes on in politics, and this lack of transparency is really worrying and it discourages 
people from participating in politics. (B10) 
 
Other interviewees said that disappointment with politicians was the direct reason for 
losing interest in politics. One interviewee said: 
 
 I am not satisfied with our current levels of political participation. However, I think it is the 
fault of the politicians. I think the politicians prefer that we don’t participate. From the 
perspective of the citizens, we are really disappointed and disgusted by the way the politicians 
act. So we just take the attitude that politicians can do whatever they want, we don’t care 
anymore. (B06) 
 
Similarly, another interviewee said that the distrust of the politicians was a direct 
reason for the low levels of political participation because it made political 
participation less effective. He said: 
 
Lack of trust in the politicians is an important reason for the low level of political participation. 
If the politicians who were elected actually did what they promised and it brought about real 
change, we would be interested. However, what they do hardly ever affects our lives. (B21) 
 
Yet, this interviewee said that the more significant reason that caused university 
students today to have low levels of political participation was the lack of resources. 
He said: 
 
However, the bigger reason is just that for university students like me, we’re just too busy with 
trying to keep up with the competition, in terms of exams, extracurricular activities and finding 
employment. (B21) 
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This reason will be discussed further in the next section.  
 
6.1.3 Lack of resources 
 
Aside from the lack of political efficacy, another common reason that interviewees 
gave for their low political participation was the lack of resources. Some of these were 
external resources, like available opportunities in the political system for university 
students to participate. For instance, one of the interviewees said that her low level of 
political participation was due to the high barriers to learning about and participating 
in politics. She said: 
 
The barriers to participation are just too high. I think the barriers to entry for people who are 
interested are too high. We are strongly affected by what the older generations tell us about 
politics, and to get rid of those prejudices, there needs to be more ways for us to learn about 
politics and develop our own political values and participate in politics in effective ways. 
(B17) 
 
Similarly, other interviewees said that they did not participate in politics because they 
do not know enough about politics. This point was discussed earlier in relation to 
attitudes towards media and the lack of trust in publicly available sources of 
information about politics. For instance, one interviewee said: 
 
I think one of the reasons I did not participate very much in politics was because I didn’t know 
enough about political affairs. (B09) 
 
Although a lack of external resources like ways to learn about politics and participate 
in politics was part of the issue, the more common reason that university students 
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today gave for the low levels of political participation was the lack of internal 
resources such as time and energy. Many university students said that they simply do 
not have the time to participate because of other priorities. One interviewee said: 
 
I don’t have enough time to participate. If I were to take an interest and participate, I think it 
would take up a lot of my valuable time. I don’t think I have enough time to devote to politics. 
We need to be realistic. So now, I read about politics in the newspaper just to know the facts of 
what is going on so I can prepare for my civil service exams. I don’t bother thinking critically 
about what is going on. (B18) 
 
The interviewees expressed the view that the reason they had no time to participate in 
politics is because of societal pressures and the difficult job market. Interviewees said 
that society does not expect university students to participate in politics. This is in line 
with the discussions earlier on older generations discouraging university students 
today from participating in politics. The interviewees said that unlike university 
students in the 1980s, societal pressures on university students today restrict the time 
and energy they can spend on political participation. One interviewee said: 
 
Society requires university students to have a good CV so that they can get jobs and become 
successful. It does not expect university students to be interested in politics or carry out our 
duty as citizens. University students in the past had a sense of duty as the educated elite, but 
that is no longer the case. There are just so many universities and university students. 
Professors tell us that back in their day, they would miss classes and participate in protests. But 
we can’t do that now. We need to study for exams to get good grades and do extracurricular 
activities for our resumes. University is now a place to get credentials, and so there is no time 
as a university student to be involved in politics. (B11) 
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Another interviewee put it more bluntly and said that it was the competition for jobs 
for a larger number of university students that restricted the time that university 
students today have for participating in politics. He said: 
 
I think the biggest reason university students today don’t participate in politics is money. We 
need to earn money. We have part-time jobs to go to, we have to study to get good grades, and 
politics is just not a priority. Politics has little relevance to our busy lives. In the 1980s, there 
were fewer university students and less competition. Now we face much greater competition, 
and to eat and live we need to beat the competition. We have no time or resources to devote to 
political participation. (B14) 
 
Yet, what was inherent in the responses that cited the lack of time and energy to 
participate in politics was that politics had a lower priority when students were 
deciding how to spend their resources.  
 
6.1.4 No need to participate  
 
Some interviewees simply said that they did not feel a strong need to participate in 
politics. One interviewee said that the perceived lack of time and resources to spend on 
politics was actually simply due to the fact that the political problems were not serious 
enough to warrant sacrificing limited resources for. She said:  
 
Some people say that they don’t participate because of the lack of time and resources, but I 
wonder if that is the real reason. I think the real reason is simply that they are satisfied with the 
way things are now, and are complacent. There is just no need for us to participate in politics 
because there are no serious problems with politics. (B22) 
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Several other interviewees said that they did not think politics was relevant enough to 
their every day lives to sacrifice time that they could spend doing other things for. One 
interviewee said: 
 
It doesn’t feel like politics is actually relevant to my life. Theoretically, I know it is, but it 
doesn’t actually feel like it. It’s not very fun, and I have my own studies and life that keeps me 
busy, so I don’t participate. (B01) 
 
Similarly, another interviewee said: 
 
I don’t feel any need to lessen the time I spend on doing things I enjoy to participate in 
politics…I know there are problems with Korean politics, but it isn’t as bad as it was before. 
We have a lot of freedom to do what we want, and there is no need to protest to get what we 
want, so there’s no need to participate. (B09) 
 
Other interviewees said that from a societal perspective, it was not necessary for 
everyone to have high levels of political participation, particularly now that there were 
no serious problems with politics like those that existed during the dictatorial regimes. 
He said: 
 
They say that in times of peace, the people don’t know who the king is. I think this applies to 
South Korea. In the 1970s and 1980s, there were clear injustices being carried out by the 
dictatorships, and a lot of sacrificial political participation was needed to fix that. However, 
now, there is no such visible enemy for us to topple. Even if only a few people make the effort 
to raise an issue, that’s enough to let the others know, so I don’t think there is a need for 
everyone to be politically active. (B07) 
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7 Conclusion 
 
In the chapters above, we discussed the main elements of the political culture of 
university students today by summarising the key empirical findings. Each of the 
following elements of political culture were examined: 
 
• the attitudes towards politics and government; 
• the attitudes towards media;  
• the political socialization process; 
• the experience of political participation; and 
• the reasons for political participation or non-participation.  
 
Firstly, it was hypothesised that university students today are not interested in politics. 
This hypothesis was shown to be incorrect. The survey responses showed that 72.2% 
of those surveyed reported a level 3 or higher on their interest in politics on a range of 
0 to 5, 5 being high. A majority of the survey respondents also said that they were 
interested in politics and felt that politics was relevant to their lives. It was also 
hypothesised that university students today would have less intensely negative 
attitudes towards the presidential administration than university students in the 1980s. 
The interview and survey results confirmed this hypothesis. However, the survey and 
interview results showed that university students today were generally dissatisfied 
with the Lee administration and did not have high expectations of the Park 
administration. Many interviewees criticised the Four Rivers Project, which was 
implemented by the Lee administration. However, other than that, the interviewees 
were unable to give comprehensive explanations backed up by evidence for their 
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dissatisfaction with the Lee administration. In fact, some interviewees said that they 
did not feel confident that they knew enough to comment.  
 
However, the hypothesis that university students today do not trust politicians was 
shown to be correct. Survey and interview results revealed that there is a general 
distrust of politicians and that the pervasive view is that politicians are self-serving 
and break promises. University students today perceived politicians today are failing 
engage and communicate with the public, and that this was frustrating for them. 
 
The hypothesis that university students do not have a political party they support was 
also shown to be correct. Over half of all the survey respondents said that they did not 
have a political party they supported. In addition, 81.6% of the respondents disagreed 
or partially disagreed with the statement that they feel a strong connection with the 
political party they support. The Ahn Chul-soo phenomenon among young people also 
indicated that current political parties were failing to adequately represent the interests 
of university students today. Survey and interview results revealed that university 
students today perceived a lack of ideological and policy differences between the 
parties. University students also perceived that party competition was mainly based on 
regionalism and image. Some interviewees identified this lack of genuine competition 
as the cartelisation of political parties. This lack of trust in political parties and 
politicians lowered the perceived political efficacy of university students today, and 
was a cause of their non-participation in politics. 
 
It was hypothesised that university students today would have higher levels of trust for 
the media as a source of information about politics than their counterparts in the 
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1980s. This was partly true. Whereas none of the interviewees who were university 
students in the 1980s said that they trusted the media as a source of information about 
politics, 15.9% agreed or partially agreed with the statement that they trust publicly 
available information about politics. However, a significant majority (84.1%) of the 
respondents partially disagreed or disagreed with the statement that they trusted 
publicly available information about politics. Interviews revealed that there was a 
perceived lack of independence of the media. Although there were no overt controls 
on the media as in the 1980s, many university students reported the perception that the 
major newspapers and broadcasters were biased and failed to provide a neutral and 
comprehensive account of current affairs. Many university students said that they rely 
on a range of media sources with different biases to find out the truth about current 
and political affairs. However, they said that they wished there was a more objective 
and reliable source of information and that a lack of such information discouraged 
them from political participation. 
 
On political socialization, like university students in the 1980s, most university 
students today said that the university setting had the most significant impact on the 
development of their political views, as hypothesised. Yet, the survey data showed that 
slightly more respondents said that their parents had a big influence on their political 
views than respondents who said that their university peers had a big influence on their 
political views. Unlike university students in the 1980s, university students today said 
that their parents had a strong influence on the formation of their political views. They 
also said that their schoolteachers discussed politics in school, but the impact this had 
on political socialization was perceived to be low. An interesting finding from the 
interviews was that the mandatory military service had a significant impact on the 
  217 
political socialization of male university students today. The interview results showed 
that the political education in the military service socialized young men to believe that 
national security and foreign policy towards North Korea was of great importance. 
However, others reported developing a strong aversion through the experience. 
 
We then proceeded to discuss the experience of political participation by university 
students today by examining their experience of latent political participation and 
manifest political participation. It was hypothesised that university students today 
would have low levels of latent political participation. Survey and interview data 
showed that this hypothesis was partially correct. About two-thirds (127 out of 197) of 
survey respondents said that they discussed politics regularly with friends. Over half 
(106 out of 197) of the survey respondents said that they discussed politics with 
colleagues and classmates. The interviewees also said that they discussed politics 
regularly with their peers. However, not all interviewees said that they enjoyed the 
experience and that many of the discussions were quite superficial. Many interviewees 
also said that political discussions sometimes led to conflict. Others said that they were 
not confident that they knew enough about political issues to comment. In fact, a 
majority (62.8%) of the survey respondents agreed or partially agreed with the 
statement that they did not actually know much about the policies of the major 
political parties. Many interviewees reported frustration that the quality of publicly 
available information about politics was not comprehensive enough to be fully 
informed about key issues and policy. 
 
It was also hypothesised that online social media would be an important method of 
latent political participation for university students today. The survey and interview 
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findings revealed that though the usage of online social media is widespread amongst 
university students today, many did not actively use this tool to regularly discuss 
politics. 
 
On manifest political participation, it was hypothesised that university students today 
would have access to diverse ways of participating in politics through voting and 
engaging with political parties and civil society groups. Yet, based on the literature it 
was also hypothesised that university students today are likely to have low levels of 
political participation in general. A large majority of the survey and interview 
respondents said that they voted and many said that voting was the only way to impact 
political affairs. Many respondents indicated that voting was the only way to effect 
long-term change and said that they planned to continue to vote. However, some 
interviewees expressed scepticism that voting would make a real difference, reflecting 
the pervasive attitude of a lack of perceived political efficacy.  
 
Many interviewees identified engaging with politicians, current political parties and 
civil society organisations as a viable method for political participation. However, not 
many interviewees actually took part in such activities and most of those who did so 
expressed feelings of disillusionment afterwards.  
 
Finally, this section discussed the experience of protest activity, including 
participation in candlelight vigils. Though some university students said that they 
participated in candlelight vigils, most questioned the efficacy of such participation. 
Most of the interviewees said that they did not participate in protest activity and had 
negative attitudes towards university students who did. It was clear that protest activity 
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is no longer the only way of participation for university students. In general, there was 
a low level of manifest political participation, despite high levels of latent political 
participation. When asked whether they were satisfied with their current level of 
political participation, most respondents said that they were not satisfied. These 
findings indicated that though university students today supported democratic 
governance, they might be dissatisfied with the actual workings of the current political 
situation. 
 
It was hypothesised that university students today do not participate in politics because 
they do not feel the need to do so. This was partly correct, but there were more 
complex reasons for non-participation. One of the most common reasons for non-
participation was a lack of political efficacy. The perceived lack of political efficacy 
was caused by several reasons. Some interviewees said that the diversification of 
political interests and objectives has meant that there is no longer a single objective 
people can agree on. This has made participation for a particular cause less effective. 
The competition and conflicts between diverse political interests also have been cited 
to lower perceived political efficacy.  
 
Yet, the more common cause of the perceived lack of political efficacy was the lack of 
trust that the current political system would effectively translate political participation 
by university students into change. This is closely related to the second reason that 
interviewees who are university students today gave for their non-participation: a lack 
of trust in the political elite. The perceived lack of transparency in the Korean political 
system and the lack of trust in politicians have caused many university students today 
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to perceive low levels of political efficacy, which in turn leads to low political 
participation.  
 
Another reason that many interviewees gave for their non-participation was a lack of 
resources. Some of these were external resources. For instance, some of the 
interviewees said that they did not have the resources to learn about politics and this in 
turn made them less confident about participating. Others said that there was a lack of 
available opportunities in the political system for university students to be involved. 
However, others were internal resources, like time and energy. Many interviewees said 
that due to the highly competitive job market, they did not have time to be involved in 
politics. Many interviewees said that unlike in the past when university graduates were 
a minority and valued by employers, university students today must compete against 
greater numbers of other university graduates. They also thought learning about and 
getting involved in politics would be time-consuming and spending too much time on 
political participation would disadvantage them when applying for jobs. They said that 
society expected university students today to spend time on getting good grades and 
extracurricular activities rather than be involved in politics. Yet inherent in these 
responses was the reason that politics was simply not a priority for university students 
today.  
 
Finally, many interviewees said that they simply did not feel a need to participate in 
politics. Interviewees said that the political situation was not dire enough to warrant 
active political participation. Some interviewees said that they did not feel politics was 
very relevant to their lives or found politics to be interesting or fun. They said that 
they had other priorities over spending time on political participation. They thought 
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that though Korean politics had its problems, it was not serious enough to warrant 
ordinary university students becoming involved in politics. 
 
Many of the hypotheses on the political culture of university students today were 
confirmed. It was correct that university students today exhibited lower levels of 
political participation and felt alienated from politics. However, this did not mean that 
university students today were not interested in politics. Rather, though they were 
interested in politics, many university students felt that they were not fully informed 
on political issues. They also perceived low levels of political efficacy caused by many 
different factors, which demotivated them from participating in politics.  
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 IV    Comparison & Analysis 
 
1 Introduction 
  
The following chapters discuss the explanations for the changes in the political culture 
of university students in Korea between the 1980s and today.  
 
According to Norris (2012), there are broadly three types of explanations for the 
decline of political participation in democracies today: (1) demand-side theories; (2) 
intermediary theories; and (3) supply-side theories. Demand-side theories explain 
changes in political culture by reference to underlying social, economic and cultural 
shifts in the society. Intermediary theories focus on the impact of media coverage of 
politics on political culture. Supply-side theories explain changes in political culture 
by reference to changes in the political system and the quality of governance.  
 
As will be discussed further, demand-side theories are particularly useful for 
explaining some of the changes in the reasons for political participation part of the 
changes in the political socialization process. In particular, demand-side theories can 
explain why university students no longer perceive themselves to be the educated elite 
charged with a duty to participate in politics. Demand-side theories also help to 
explain why parents have become more important in the political socialization process. 
 
We then proceed to discuss how intermediary theories can explain the changes in the 
attitudes towards the media and the experience of latent political participation. 
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However, the biggest problem with intermediary theories is that it is difficult to 
separate the effects of media on political culture with the effects of the supply of 
politics, which is reflected through the media. 
 
It was hypothesised that the changes in the political system of Korea would explain the 
changes in the political culture of university students. We will discuss the applicability 
of supply-side theories for explaining the changes in the political culture of university 
students. Supply-side explanations are useful for explaining the changes in the 
attitudes towards government and politics, the experience of manifest political 
participation, the reasons for political participation, non-participation and some 
elements of political socialization.  
 
Although each of these types of theories cannot be a standalone explanation of the 
changes in the political culture of university students in Korea, they are 
complementary and interrelated. When all three explanations are examined together, 
the changes in the political culture of university students can be more fully explained. 
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2 Demand-side explanations 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The basic premise of demand-side explanations is that social, economic and cultural 
shifts cause changes in the political culture of a society. The most prominent 
contemporary demand-side explanations of political culture have been in the work of 
Inglehart. Based on the cross-national data collected in the World Values Surveys and 
European Values Surveys, Inglehart identifies parallel developments on both 
socioeconomic indicators and political culture indicators when a society undergoes the 
shift from agrarian to industrial society (1997). In more recent work, Inglehart and 
Welzel have also identified shifts in political culture towards greater emphasis on  
‘self-expression’ or ‘emancipative’ values as a society develops from an industrial to 
post-industrial society (2005). Similarly, Dalton (2005) identified a trend of a rapid 
decline of political trust among the young and better educated. He concluded that: ‘We 
have entered a new period when governments must confront a public sceptical of their 
motivations, doubtful about the institutions of representative democracy, and willing 
to challenge political elites’ (Dalton, 2005: 150).  
 
However, these theories based on the experience of advanced Western democracies 
are not entirely applicable to the Korean case for two reasons. Firstly, Korea has 
undergone rapid modernisation, urbanisation and economic development, which 
created unique conditions different from the more gradual socioeconomic 
development that can be observed in Western democracies. Secondly, unlike the 
advanced Western democracies, Korea experienced a turbulent political history, 
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including being under colonial rule, experiencing a civil war and being ruled by 
successive dictatorships. These differences in the socioeconomic development 
trajectory means that the Korean case does not neatly fit the theories developed based 
on Western democracies. 
 
Although theories based on developed Western democracies are not entirely applicable 
to the Korean case, this section discusses potential demand-side explanations for the 
changes in the political culture of university students. In the Korean case, demand-side 
explanations are particularly useful in explaining changes in the reasons for political 
participation and non-participation and one of the elements of the political 
socialization process. More specifically, demand-side explanations effectively explain 
why university students today no longer perceive themselves as the educated elite 
charged with the duty to participate in politics and say that they have no time to devote 
to political participation. Demand-side explanations also explain why parents play a 
larger role in the political socialization process of university students today. 
Nevertheless, as will be discussed further, there are inherent limitations of demand-
side theories in explaining the changes in all elements of political culture.  
 
2.2 Reasons for political participation and non-participation 
 
Despite the high personal risks of participation, many interviewees who were 
university students in the 1980s said that they participated because they felt a duty to 
do so. University students in the 1980s perceived themselves to be part of a privileged 
elite charged with the duty to participate in politics despite the sacrifice required. In 
contrast, university students today no longer perceive themselves to be the privileged 
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educated elite with a duty to contribute to society. University students today are 
instead concerned with finding employment in an increasingly competitive job market. 
Many interviewees said that they had no time to devote to political participation as 
they had other priorities that they felt were either more useful for developing their job 
prospects or found more enjoyable. This change in the reason for political 
participation can be explained through demand-side theories that link changes in the 
socioeconomic structure of society to changes in the political culture.  
 
Some explanations of student activism in Asia and other developing countries 
emphasise the sense of social responsibility that students felt as a minority privileged 
elite in predominantly uneducated peasant societies (Lyonette, 1966; Lipset, 1967; 
Kelliher, 1993). Particularly, educational systems in which middle-class children are 
admitted into universities based on merit have been observed to generate what may be 
termed ‘etudiant oblige’. This is the belief that students, as the educated elite, have a 
duty to lead their country and speak out on behalf of the powerless against injustice 
and oppression (Aspinall and Weiss, 2012: 283).  
 
Indeed, one of the reasons that many interviewees who were university students in the 
1980s cited for being involved in student activism was that they felt a duty to do so as 
the educated elite. Yet, the socioeconomic status of Korea in the 1980s was not what 
could be called a ‘predominantly uneducated peasant society’. By the 1980s, South 
Korea had undergone rapid economic development. The Korean War (1945-1950) had 
devastated the Korean economy and destroyed most of its industrial infrastructure. 
However, a state-led economic development programme that began under the 
President Park Chung-hee administration facilitated rapid industrialisation and 
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economic development (Heo and Roehrig, 2010: 78).  By 1985, Korea’s GDP had 
increased to US$103 billion and GDP per capita of US$2,542. This was a rapid 
increase from GDP of only US$3.9 billion and GDP per capita of US$155 in 1960 
(The World Bank, World Development Indicators). By the 1980s, Korea had also 
become a modernised country as reflected in the high levels of primary and secondary 
education. In 1985, 99.2% of Koreans in the relevant age group obtained at least a 
middle school diploma; 90.7% obtained at least a high school diploma; and 36.4% 
went on to obtain a university degree. (E-Narajipyo. Educational attainment).  
 
Nevertheless, in the 1980s, university students were still a minority and had 
significantly more formal education than previous generations. For instance, in 1985, 
the average years of schooling for people in the 20-29 age group was 11 years, which 
was significantly higher than the average of all age groups of only 8.6 years (E-
Narajipyo. Mean years of schooling). University students in the 1980s were also likely 
to be from wealthier and more highly educated families (Kim, K. U., et al., 2003).  
The interviews of university students in the 1980s confirmed that university students 
perceived themselves to be the educated elite with a duty to contribute to the public 
good even if that required self-sacrifice.  
 
However, today, things have changed. One of the key reasons that university students 
today gave for non-participation in politics was that the socioeconomic status of 
university students has changed. One interviewee who was very active in the student 
activist movement in the 1980s and is currently a member of the National Assembly 
said that non-participation by university students today is caused by socioeconomic 
changes. He said: 
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I don’t think we can blame university students today for not participating in politics. It is so 
difficult for them to get the jobs they want these days. Back in 1987-1990, the Korean 
economy was booming. Anyone who wanted a job could get one back then. Even if you were a 
student activist, you could get a job at a good company if you went to a good enough 
university. However, nowadays, university students face so much competition. (A04)57 
 
One interviewee who is currently a university student explained how the society today 
has changed and how that affects the time and energy he had available for political 
participation. He said: 
 
There is just too much pressure. There is no time to spend on politics. Even if I wanted to think 
freely and participate in politics, everyone tells me that I shouldn’t and instead spend that time 
and energy on getting a job. Before, if you graduated Seoul National University, you had your 
pick of jobs and had the time to participate in politics and still get a good job. However, after 
the IMF crisis, we university students no longer have that luxury. (B10)58 
 
Similarly, another interviewee said:  
 
Back then in the 1980s, university students were clearly part of a privileged elite, so they felt a 
duty to participate. Now, everyone goes to university. We can’t afford to spend time doing 
other things because we need to compete. There are only so many jobs. (B22)59 
 
As discussed in the empirical findings of this thesis, many interviewees who are 
currently university students held similar views. The socioeconomic status of 
university students today is very different from that of university students in the 1980s. 
                                            
57 Male, Hanyang University, 1989, Honam 
58 Male, Seoul National University, 2008, Seoul and Gyeonggi 
59 Female, Chonnam National University, 2011, Honam 
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For one thing, they face greater competition. The percentage of young people going to 
study at university increased from 27.2% to 70.7% from 1980 to 2013, peaking at 
83.8% in 2008 (Korean Educational Development Institute). Whereas university 
students formed a minority in the 1980s, this is no longer the case with the majority of 
young people obtaining a university education.  
 
Despite the very high levels of education attained by young Koreans today, university 
education does not necessarily translate into employment (Oh, H. Y., Song, C. Y. and 
Song, G. M., 2012: 3-5). In fact, evidence shows a clear disparity between the types of 
jobs university students prefer and the types of jobs young people actually obtain. 
Although 65.9% of university graduates want to work at large corporations, only 13% 
of people in the age group of 20-29 actually work at large corporations (Oh, H. Y., 
Song, C. Y. and Song, G. M., 2012: 97-99). This disparity increases the intensity of 
the competition felt by young people today for a limited number of coveted job 
opportunities.  
 
In addition, university students spend a lot of time and energy trying to obtain the 
credentials necessary to get the competitive job positions. According to KOSTAT 
(2012: 6), 78.8% of male university students and 19.8% of female university students 
reported taking gap semesters or gap years during their university degree. While 
95.8% of male students cited the mandatory military service as the reason for taking a 
gap year; 47.9% of female students cited preparing for employment and qualifications 
as the reason for taking a gap year, followed by 32.4% citing participation in foreign 
exchange programmes, internships or apprenticeships (KOSTAT, 2012: 6). In 2012, 
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the average length of time it took for university graduates to find jobs was 11 months 
(KOSTAT, 2012: 11). 
 
These difficulties faced by young people today reflect the slowing growth of the 
Korean economy in recent decades. After peaking at 14.78% in 1974, the economic 
growth rate has been steadily declining, with deeper and deeper troughs. In 1997-
1998, the Asian Financial Crisis had a serious impact on the Korean economy and 
required the Bank of Korea to request support from the International Monetary Fund 
(the IMF financial crisis). Since then, the rate of annual growth has for the most part 
remained in single figures.  
 
In addition to the slowing growth of the economy, a bigger problem has been the 
widening gap of inequality. Since the IMF financial crisis, there has been a steady 
increase in socioeconomic inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient of urban 
household income distribution in the three decades between 1993 and 2013 (Korean 
Statistical Information Service, 2015). In 1996 just before the IMF financial crisis, the 
top 20% earned 4.74 times the income of the lowest 20%; however, this increased to 
6.75 times in 2000, 8.22 times in 2005, and 8.41 times in 2008 (Choi, J. J., 2010: 27). 
Another indicator of increasing inequality is the steadily widening wage gap between 
employees at large companies and those at small companies. In the early 1980s, the 
average wage for employees at small companies with 10-29 employees was at nearly 
the same level as for employees at large companies with more than 500 employees. 
However, the relative average wage at small companies has steadily decreased since 
the 1980s and is now less than 60% of the average wage at large companies (Korea 
Labor Institute, 2015: 61).  
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University students today face greater competition with more young people obtaining 
university education. Previously, a university degree meant job security; however, 
now, university students face greater competition and there is a disparity between the 
jobs that they want and the jobs that they actually get. Amongst university graduates, 
there is a disparity between the types of employment that the students want and the 
types of employment that are available to them. It has become common practice for 
young people to take gap years and spend longer time in education to obtain the 
credentials necessary to get the coveted jobs. In a slowing economy, obtaining 
employment is harder and the consequences of failure more dire with increasing levels 
of inequality.  
 
These socioeconomic changes have resulted in changes in the political culture of 
university students. University students no longer perceive themselves as part of a 
privileged elite of society. The problems of increasing inequality and difficulties in 
obtaining desirable employment compel university students to focus on competing for 
jobs rather than spending time on political participation. 
 
2.3 Political socialization  
 
One of the elements of the political culture of university students that has changed the 
most is the influence of parents on the political socialization process. Almost all 
interviewees who were university students in the 1980s said that their parents did not 
have a significant impact on the formation of their political views. In contrast, a clear 
majority (60.4%) of the survey respondents who are currently university students said 
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that their parents had a big influence on their political views. Many interviewees said 
that their parents gave them guidance on learning about politics and sometimes even 
told them which political party to support. In contrast, interviewees who were 
university students in the 1980s said that their parents were not interested in politics 
and generally discouraged them from getting involved in politics. 
 
Demand-side explanations can provide a partial explanation for this greater influence 
that parents have on the political socialization process of university students today. 
Socioeconomic development has meant that Korea has become a more developed and 
highly educated country since the 1980s. The parents of university students today are 
likely to be more highly educated than the parents of university students in the 1980s. 
In fact, in the 1980s, only 50% of the fathers of university students admitted to Seoul 
National University had at least university level education; and less than 20% of the 
mothers of those admitted had university level education (Kim, K. U., et al., 2003: 88). 
In contrast, according to the 2014 press release by the Seoul National University 
Centre for Campus Life & Culture, 86.9% of the fathers of university students 
admitted to Seoul National University in 2014 had at least university level education; 
and 77.3% of the mothers had at least university level education.   
 
Many interviewees who were university students in the 1980s said that their parents 
were more concerned about food on the table than politics. In contrast, the parents of 
university students today were more likely to have had higher levels of education and 
have the resources to teach their children about politics. In addition, the parents of 
university students today are in the generation that had been university students in the 
1980s. The generational effect of the common experience of the democratic transition 
  233 
of 1987 has meant that the parents of university students today are more likely to have 
a greater interest in politics and activism.  
 
However, an interesting finding was that some university students today said that their 
parents actively discouraged them from getting involved in politics. The parents of 
university students discouraged their children from being involved in politics telling 
them it was futile to do so based on their own experiences of student activism or 
political participation. This in turn lowered the political efficacy of university students 
today.  
 
In conclusion, demand-side explanations are useful for explaining certain aspects of 
the changes in the political culture of university students in Korea. It is particularly 
useful for explaining the changes in the perception of the role of university students in 
society as the educated elite as well as the changes in the role of parents in the political 
socialization process. It is also able to explain the reasons for the non-participation of 
university students today to the extent that the non-participation is caused by the lack 
of internal resources such as time and energy to devote to political participation. 
 
However, it is unable to fully explain the changes in other aspects of the political 
socialization process, such as the changes in the role of school, university and military 
in the political socialization process. It is also unable to explain the changes in the 
forms of latent political participation of university students. Finally, demand-side 
explanations are poorly suited to explaining the changes in the attitudes that university 
students hold towards politics and government. These other elements of political 
culture are better explained by intermediary or supply-side explanations.  
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3 Intermediary explanations 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The basic premise of intermediary explanations is that media coverage of political 
affairs cause changes in the political culture of a society. There are many different 
types of intermediary explanations for changes in a political culture. One type of 
intermediary explanation posits that negative coverage of political events and elections 
reduces political trust (Cappella and Jamieson, 1997). Such negative coverage lowers 
political efficacy, leading to voter disaffection (Pinkleton, Austin and Fortman, 1998). 
Related studies have also argued that excessively negative news about sexual scandals 
and financial corruption are damaging to the reputation of the political actors and 
institutions, leading to broader disillusionment with the way democracy works 
(Germent, 1991; Orren, 1997). In the Korean context, it has been argued that the so-
called ‘racehorse journalism’ of electoral media coverage causes political distrust and 
cynicism (Kang, N. W., 2004). Past studies have found that university students who 
use the media to learn about politics more often have lower levels of perceived 
political efficacy and are less likely to vote (Kim, G. G., 2008: 214). 
 
Yet, not all studies concur that the media have such a negative effect on political 
participation. Especially in more recent research based on the Korean case, it has been 
argued that the key variable is not the length of time spent on using media but the 
purpose of using the media (Kim, C. S., 2012; Lee, J. G. and Keum, H. S., 2012; Shah, 
Kwak and Holbert, 2001). Studies based on psychology have found that regardless of 
the length of time spent on using media, if this time is spent on watching films or 
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similar entertainment, this lowers civic engagement; however, if this time is spent on 
reading the news or participating in online debates, it is linked to increased civic 
engagement (Zuniga and Valenzuela, 2011; Scheufele and Nisbet, 2002). In fact, 
cross-national studies have revealed that there is little evidence to support the 
connection between media coverage of scandals and corruption and subsequent levels 
of trust and confidence in government or satisfaction with democracy (Norris, 2012; 
Chanley, Rudolph and Rahn, 2000; Anderson and Tverdova, 2003; Moreno, 2002).  
 
Yet, as discussed in the literature review, there are some problems with relying on 
intermediary explanations for changes in political culture. The biggest problem with 
intermediary accounts is that it may not be the media coverage of corruption and 
scandals that lower political trust and efficacy but the corruption and scandals 
themselves that lead to voter disaffection. In other words, the problem may lie in the 
deterioration of the quality of democratic performance. As such, it may be the case 
that intermediary theories that emphasise political communication do not provide an 
adequate standalone explanation for the changes in the political culture of university 
students in South Korea.  
 
In fact, as will be further discussed, the perception that the media is not an 
independent, reliable source of information about politics has a negative impact on 
political trust and political efficacy. In the Korean context, because the media is not 
perceived to be an independent actor and is perceived to act in the interests of 
government and business, intermediary theories only explain a part of the issue. 
Nevertheless, examining the role of the media does yield useful explanations to some 
of the changes in the political culture of university students. In particular, the changes 
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in the media may explain the changes in the experience of latent political participation 
and the attitudes towards the media. In this chapter we will examine intermediary 
explanations for the changes in these elements of political culture. 
 
3.2 Attitudes towards media and latent political participation 
 
Latent political participation involves citizens being interested, keeping informed and 
discussing political issues with others (Ekman and Amna, 2012). In a political system, 
media plays an important role in informing the minds of the public on political and 
current affairs. The experience of latent political participation is therefore largely 
shaped by the role of the media.  
 
However, in the 1980s, the media were not an independent source of information that 
provided objective coverage of political and current affairs. The mainstream media in 
the 1980s were strictly controlled by the Chun administration that had wide-ranging 
powers over all of the major broadcasters and newspapers. The government issued 
‘broadcast guidelines’ for the media companies to follow. The Chun administration 
also had a large role in the recruitment and promotion of individual journalists and 
managers in mainstream media companies (Kang, J. M., 2007).  
 
All interviewees who were university students in the 1980s recognised that the Chun 
administration controlled the media. They were also able to see that what they 
experienced on the streets and learned through foreign media were very different from 
what was broadcast on mainstream Korean media. They were therefore very sceptical 
of the media as a source of reliable information about political affairs. University 
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students in the 1980s said that they did not trust mainstream television broadcasts or 
newspapers because these mainstream media outlets were strictly controlled by the 
Chun administration in the 1980s.  
 
Instead, they learned about political issues through the information that student 
activists distributed on campus through booklets, flyers and posters. They joined secret 
student groups and societies to discuss politics and learn more about political affairs 
and political theory. Due to the high costs of being involved in any form of student 
activism, the experience of latent political participation in the 1980s was organised 
and covert. Even latent political participation had high personal costs, and latent 
political participation often led to manifest political participation.  
 
In contrast, the experience of latent political participation for university students today 
was much more loosely organised and less intense. Many interviewees listened to 
‘Naneun Ggomsuda’, a popular podcast on politics, and read various sources to learn 
more about politics. Almost all university students today said that they discussed 
politics with family, friends, classmates and colleagues. However, many interviewees 
said that they sometimes did not enjoy the experience and wondered whether they 
knew enough about politics to discuss political issues. In general, though university 
students today attempted to engage in latent political participation, many interviewees 
expressed frustration at the lack of reliable information about politics to learn about 
and discuss politics. In fact, a significant majority (84.1%) of the respondents 
disagreed or partially disagreed with the statement that they trust the publicly available 
information about politics. In fact, a clear majority (62.6%) of university students 
today said that they actually did not know very much about the policies of major 
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political parties. This was largely supported by a wider study conducted on Korean 
voters in 2012 in which 73.6% of the respondents said that they did not know about 
the policy manifestos published by the parties. The results of this study are shown 
below (Jeong, H. O., 2012: 138). 
 
Table 26. Voter Awareness of Manifestos 
Answer Percentage of Voters 
I know it very well. 4.8% 
I know it somewhat well. 21.6% 
I don’t really know about it. 35.4% 
I don’t know about it at all. 38.2% 
(Source: Jeong, H. O., 2012: 138) 
 
The general distrust that university students today hold towards the media are largely 
caused by the perception that the media are not fully independent from the 
government. In fact, according to the 2013 Freedom of the Press Index by Freedom 
House, South Korea ranks 64 and has the status of ‘partly free’. It has a score of 31, 
with 0 being the best and 100 being the worst. One of the restrictions on the freedom 
of the press in South Korea is through informal methods, such as the appointment of 
top positions in the major broadcasters. It is still customary in Korea that each 
incoming President appoints new chairmen and directors in the key mainstream 
broadcasters, such as KBS and MBC (Cha, J. H. and Lee, C. H., 2009: 190). When the 
Lee Myung-bak administration came to power, former presidential campaign aides and 
advisers were appointed to key positions at a number of private media companies, 
despite the objections of journalists seeking to maintain the broadcaster’s editorial 
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independence.60 Because the government has such a direct influence on the livelihoods 
and careers of the journalists themselves, it is hard to expect impartiality.  
The informal restrictions on the freedom of press are further reinforced by more 
formal controls on freedom of press through the operation of defamation law, national 
security law and electoral law. Defamation is a criminal offence in South Korea, and 
charges are occasionally threatened or brought against journalists who criticise the 
government.61  Another area of law that restricts the freedom of press and expression 
is the National Security Law. According to Article 7 of the National Security Law, 
expressing sympathy for North Korea is an imprisonable offence. This broad remit of 
the offence has meant that even those members of the public who express their opinion 
or disseminate information on North Korea may be at risk of prosecution and 
censorship.62  
 
Finally, the Public Election Law itself impedes freedom of expression. Under the 
Public Election Law, any political activity that supports one candidate over another 
outside of the ‘Electoral Campaign Period’ is considered to be pre-electioneering and 
                                            
60 In January 2012, over 700 employees from MBC went on strike, claiming that the network president, 
who had been appointed by the government, had interfered with fair reporting. The strike expanded to 
other networks with similar management issues, including about 650 employees at KBS, the largest 
network in Korea (Freedom House South Korea Profile). According to the opposition Democratic Party, 
over 450 journalists have been penalized and 19 fired at KBS, MBC, YTN, and Yonhap News for 
objecting to presidential appointments into the media industry during the five years of the Lee Myung-
bak administration (Kim, J. G., 18 June 2013, Sisa Jeju).  
61 A recently controversial case was that of Chung Bong-ju, a prominent political commentator, who 
served a one-year prison sentence in late 2011 on the charge of defamation for spreading false rumours 
about President Lee Myung-bak’s connection to alleged stock market fraud (Cho, M. D., 26 Dec 2011, 
Kyunghyang Shinmun).  
62 For instance, in 2012, Park Jung-geun, a member of the public who re-tweeted messages from the 
North Korean government’s twitter account, was found guilty of an offence against Article 7(1) of the 
National Security Law (Kim, Y. N. Y., 22 Aug 2013, Pressian News). Aside from prosecutions, 
according to the Korea Communications Standards Commission (KCSC), in 2011, an official body 
responsible for monitoring online content, 304 websites and accounts were shut down and about 67,000 
web posts were deleted by the police for ‘threatening national security by praising North Korea, and 
denouncing the U.S. and the (South Korean) government’ (Freedom House Profile on South Korea).  
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thus prohibited. This means that much of what may be considered political 
commentary and not strictly campaigning could potentially be caught as pre-
electioneering.63 
 
The restrictions on the media make it difficult for university students to gain access to 
impartial and trustworthy information about politics. These restrictions not only makes 
it difficult for new political entrants to reach the public, but also disadvantages the 
non-governing party or commentators challenging the government as it opens them up 
to criminal prosecution. These shortcomings in the role of the media as a reliable 
source of political information affect the perceived political efficacy of university 
students today. Indeed, many interviewees who are currently university students said 
that they did not feel confident about participating in politics or discussing politics 
with others because they did not think they were adequately informed to do so. 
Negative news about politics was also one of the most commonly cited reasons for 
non-participation according to the surveys conducted on current university students.  
 
The main difference between university students in the 1980s and university students 
today was the effect that the distrust of the media had on the motivation to participate 
in politics. University students in the 1980s said that they were partly motivated to join 
student activist groups to find out more about political affairs. University students in 
the 1980s turned to covert, organised efforts to learn about politics and discuss 
political affairs with one another, despite the high personal risks of doing so. In 
contrast, university students today said that the general lack of reliable sources of 
information about politics directly affected their motivation to participate in politics. 
                                            
63 In the run up to the 18th National Assembly Elections, the National Electoral Commission deleted 
10,581 web posts and websites for slander, false propaganda, and pre-electioneering, with 89.2% of the 
cases involving pre-electioneering. 
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University students today remained frustrated at the lack of reliable publicly available 
resources about politics. One of the reasons that university students today gave for 
their lack of participation was the lack of confidence that they knew enough to become 
involved in politics. Although many interviewees said that they looked at primary 
sources or multiple secondary sources to learn about politics, they said they found the 
process time-consuming, frustrating and ultimately demotivating.  
 
This difference in the effect of the distrust of the media on university students in the 
1980s and university students today is something that the intermediary explanation 
cannot fully explain. The intermediary explanation is useful for examining why even 
after the democratic transition university students are sceptical and distrustful of media 
and publicly available information about politics. However, it cannot explain why, 
under similar circumstances, university students in the 1980s tried to learn more about 
politics through covert organised forms of latent participation; and university students 
today simply remain frustrated. This disparity may be caused by the changes in the 
perceived duty to learn about and be involved in politics or the changes in the 
seriousness of political problems. These factors are analysed through the demand-side 
and supply-side explanations. In the South Korean case study, the perception of the 
media as not being an independent actor means that there are limitations with the 
explanatory power of the intermediary theory. 
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4 Supply-side explanations 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The basic premise of supply-side explanations is that the supply of governance and 
political systems affect the political culture of a society. Within the literature based on 
the experience of Western democracies, it has been argued that public satisfaction is a 
product of the government’s public policy performance, especially economic policies 
(Clarke, et al., 1992; Anderson, 1995). Yet, due to globalisation, internationalisation of 
capital markets, privatisation, deregulation and the increasing importance of 
supranational institutions like the EU, IMF and WTO, the traditional scope and 
autonomy of the modern state has diminished (Hay, 2007). In addition, the 
professionalization of legislatures and low levels of incumbency turnover have 
insulated politicians from electoral defeat (Norris, 1997) and the lack of influence of 
minor ‘protest parties’ has failed to provide a channel for disaffected voters (Miller 
and Listhaug, 1990). It has also been pointed out that intermediary institutions such as 
political parties, interest groups and parliament have weakened over time, making 
government less accountable and responsive to the citizenry (Hayward, 1995; 1996).  
 
The problems in the political system during the dictatorship of the Chun 
administration caused university students in the 1980s to hold intensely negative views 
towards the government and politics characterised by fear and anger. The injustices in 
the social structure and the injustices carried out by the government against democratic 
protestors and student activists drove university students in the 1980s to participate in 
politics despite the personal risks of doing so.  
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Since the democratic transition in 1987, South Korea has undergone significant 
political change. Direct elections and electoral laws that provide for free and fair 
elections have meant that university students today perceive voting to be an effective 
method of manifest political participation. University students today do not hold the 
same intensely negative attitudes towards the government and politics as their 
counterparts in the 1980s. One of the reasons that university students today gave for 
not participating in politics was that the government no longer imposed policies that 
resulted in severe social injustices or infringements of personal freedom.  
 
However, according to the empirical findings, university students today were not 
entirely satisfied with politics and government. In fact, university students today held 
generally negative attitudes towards government and politics. The interviews and 
surveys revealed that university students today have a deep-seated lack of trust in 
politicians. They perceived politicians to act for their own self-interest and not for the 
public good. Both the government and politicians were perceived to lack 
communication with the public and university students. Although most of the 
interviewees and survey respondents said that they voted, very few said that they had a 
political party they actively supported. In addition, many interviewees and survey 
respondents said that they could not perceive clear policy and ideology differences 
between the major political parties. All of these perceptions negatively affect the 
perceived efficacy of political participation amongst university students today. In fact, 
a lack of political efficacy was one of the most commonly cited reasons for non-
participation amongst university students today.  
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One explanation for these changes in the political culture of university students is that 
there are problems in the supply of governance in the Korean political system. These 
problems have caused university students today to have a lack of trust for politicians, a 
lack of support for political parties and a low level of political efficacy. There is a 
consensus in the literature that the Korean political party system is failing to 
adequately aggregate the interests of civil society and translate these into government 
policy (Kim, Y. H., 2001; Choi, J. J., Park, C. P. and Park, S. H., 2007; Chung, J. M., 
2008). Many studies also identify regionalism as having a negative impact on Korean 
politics (Shin, M. S., 1986, 1994; Kim, M. H., 1994; Lee, G. Y., 1998; Ohn, M. G., 
2003; Park, M. H., 2004; Park, S. H., 2006).  
 
In this chapter, we first discuss the issues with the Korean political system that may be 
a cause for some of the changes in the political culture of university students. This 
section examines the changes in public funding for political parties, the role of 
regionalism in Korean politics and the ideology and policy differences between the 
major political parties. We then discuss how each of these elements of the Korean 
political system has affected the changes in the political culture of university students.  
 
4.2 Issues with the Korean political system 
 
Unlike university students in the 1980s who expressed intensely negative attitudes 
towards politics and government characterised by fear and anger, university students 
today held much less intense and more diffused negative attitudes towards politics and 
government. Whereas university students in the 1980s were able to clearly identify the 
oppressive policies of the Chun administration as the reason for their negative attitudes 
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towards politics and government, not many university students today were able to 
explain their generally negative attitudes towards politics and government today. The 
empirical findings show that university students today have a low level of trust for 
politicians, do not perceive clear differences in the major political parties, do not have 
a political party they support, perceive a lack of communication with politicians and 
held the view that even if politicians are in different parties, they ultimately act like a 
cartel.  
 
These findings indicate that the cartel party thesis, developed by Katz and Mair (1995) 
may, to some extent, be applicable to the Korean case. In their 1995 article, Katz and 
Mair put forth the cartel party thesis based on the evidence in Western European 
countries. The cartel party thesis holds that political parties increasingly function like 
cartels, employing state resources and limiting political competition to ensure their 
own electoral success. They argue that the cartelization of the party system means that 
political parties become instruments of the state, rather than acting as the bridge 
between the state and civil society. This leads to voter disaffection, reduced voter 
loyalty, and a decline in party membership, which has been observed in many Western 
European democracies from the 1970s onwards.  
 
Though not all elements of the cartel party thesis are applicable to the Korean case, 
there are four features of a cartelised political system that are applicable to Korean 
politics: 
 
(1) the increase of public funding for political parties; 
(2) electoral laws that favour the major political parties;  
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(3) restriction of ideological and policy competition between the major political 
parties; and  
(4) the role of regionalism as a cleavage in elections.  
 
All of these elements of the Korean political system indicate that a mechanism similar 
to the cartel party thesis may be at work. Each of these four features of the Korean 
political system is examined in greater detail in the sections below. 
 
4.2.1 Public funding for political parties 
 
Firstly, increased public funding for political parties takes tax revenue away from 
other institutions that may benefit citizens and directly benefits the politicians. Public 
funding can also be used to restrict new entrants. Politicians making favourable public 
funding laws for political parties may explain why university students today have the 
perception of politicians being self-interested and acting like a cartel.  
 
Immediately after the democratic transition in 1987, during the negotiations for the 
choice of political institutions in the beginning of the Sixth Republic (1987 – present), 
the governing party and the opposition parties argued vigorously over the type of 
electoral system for the parliamentary elections. In contrast, they failed to debate over 
such issues as political party laws, campaign laws, and party funding laws, and simply 
inherited the institutions from the authoritarian era. According to Lee Jung-jae, one of 
the eight negotiating members, the opposition felt constantly under pressure to finish 
the negotiations, and therefore was unable to debate any of the more ‘peripheral’ 
issues (Jang, H., 2003: 51). One of the key issues that were tabled in the initial 
  247 
negotiation process was political party funding laws. As the parties in power in the 
National Assembly passed amendments to the party funding laws in subsequent years, 
they heavily favoured those parties that were already represented.  
 
Though the first Political Funds Law of 1965 introduced the principle of public 
subsidies for political parties, it was only in the 1989 amendment of the law that public 
funding truly expanded. The total amount of money set aside for subsidizing political 
parties increased from around 1 billion won (US$838,000) in 1988 to over 108 billion 
won in 2012 (US$90,504,000) (National Election Commission Reports 2006-2012).64 
In addition, the proportion of public subsidies in the total income for the political 
parties has also substantially increased. In 1988, public subsidies took up 1.3% of the 
total income of the political parties, but since then, this has risen to 13.13% in 1991, 
9.2% in 1994, 31.3% in 1995, and 35.2% in 1998 (Kwak, J. Y., 2001: 44). This trend 
has roughly remained the same in the 2000s and the percentage of the public funding 
in the total income of the political parties has remained in the low-to-mid 30% range 
(National Election Commission Reports 2006-2012).  
 
Although the laws regarding the amount of public subsidies to be provided to the 
political parties have constantly changed, the principle of distributing the subsidies has 
not. According to the laws amended in 1991, 40% of the total funds available are 
distributed to those parties that have created a negotiating bloc in the National 
Assembly.65 Of the parties that failed to form a negotiating bloc, those parties with at 
                                            
64 KRW-USD exchange rates calculated based on 26 September 2015 rates. 
65 According to s33 of the National Assembly Law, a negotiating bloc in the National Assembly can be 
formed with at least 20 members, regardless of party membership. Usually, parties with more than 20 
members elected into the National Assembly form a negotiating bloc, but irregularly, members of 
different parties have created negotiating blocs in order to benefit from the preferred status negotiating 
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least 5% of the seats are given 5% of the funds; those parties that earned at least 2% of 
the votes in the parliamentary elections get 2% of the funds (Jang, H., 2003:53).  
 
This distribution law was later amended, but the principle remains the same. Currently, 
50% of the funds are distributed among the negotiating blocs formed by the same 
political party. 5% of the funds are distributed to each political party that has more 
than 5 seats in the National Assembly but was unable to form a negotiating bloc. 2% 
of the funds are distributed to each political party that has obtained at least 2% of the 
votes in the political parties but have secured less than 5 seats or did not participate in 
the last parliamentary elections (Korean Electoral Funding Law, Regulation No. 
11376). The result is that the political parties that benefit are the large, established 
political parties that have other significant sources of funding. Meanwhile, nascent 
political parties are left out from receiving a share of the immensely large public 
subsidies fund or get meagre portions of it. The following chart showing the 
breakdown of funding by party show the disparity in the public subsidies provided to 
the two main established parties and the other minor parties.  
 
                                                                                                                              
blocs have in public subsidies. Yet, according to the current amended party funding laws, it is not 
possible to get the preferred distribution status by forming negotiating blocs with other parties. 
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Figure 7. Breakdown of funding by party in 2012 (KRW) 
 
 
 
Table 27.  Breakdown of funding by party in 2012 (KRW) 
(Source: National Election Commission Reports 2006-2012) 
 
In this section, we have examined the public funding available for parties in South 
Korea. As we have observed, the amount of public funding given to parties have 
increased tremendously since 1990, and public funding currently makes up over 30% 
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of the income of the parties. This shows that parties rely on state subsidies, which one 
of the key indicators of cartelisation. In addition, the public funding distribution 
system greatly favours the established parties. As a result, public funding acts as an 
institution that keeps out new competitors.  
 
4.2.2 Electoral laws 
 
Although the 1987 presidential election marked the first truly democratic elections, 
there have been elections in place in Korea since the 1948. Of the ten presidential 
elections between 1948 and 1978, six were by direct popular vote. However, these 
direct elections were little more than efforts to legitimise the presidential office for the 
authoritarian leader while maintaining a façade of democratic rule. Yet, if maintaining 
that façade risked losing office, the authoritarian leaders did not hesitate to resort to 
vote manipulation or change electoral rules to their favour. Korea has also had a 
parliament called the National Assembly since 1948 whose members were directly 
elected. Yet, until the democratic transition in 1987, the electoral system had been 
extremely distortionary and heavily favoured the governing party. The governing party 
had been able to earn a much larger proportion of the seats than the proportion of votes 
under this system; on average the bonus rate was 22.04% (Croissant, 2002: 240).  
 
After the democratic transition in 1987, direct presidential elections were introduced 
with a limit of one five-year term for each president. This law has remained in place 
since 1987 without change. However, three slightly different types of mixed 
proportional representation systems were adopted for parliamentary elections (Chung, 
T. I. and Kim, I. S., 2010). Firstly, for the 13th National Assembly in 1988, 224 out of 
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299 seats were allocated on a plurality single member constituency system. Half of the 
remaining 75 seats were allocated to the party that won the most seats in the plurality 
single member constituency system. The rest of the 37 seats were allocated to the rest 
of the parties in accordance to the proportion of seats they earned in the plurality 
single member constituency system. Parties that earned less than five seats in the 
plurality single member constituencies were not included in the proportional 
representation system. This mixed system again heavily favoured the governing party 
because half of the proportional representation seats were reserved for the party that 
obtained the most seats in the single member constituency system. This acted as a sort 
of safety mechanism for the governing party (Shin, M. S., 1995: 246). As a result, 
though this first mixed proportional representation system seemed to lower barriers to 
entry for smaller parties, it did not do so, and in reverse protected the interests of the 
governing party (Kim, D. H., 2010: 420-421).  
 
The second mixed proportional representation system adopted for the 14th, 15th and 
16th National Assemblies was more representative. For the 14th National Assembly, 
224 of the 299 seats were reserved for the plurality single member constituency 
system; and 75 seats were reserved for the proportional representation system. For the 
15th National Assembly, 237 of the 299 seats were reserved for the plurality single 
member constituency system; and 62 seats were reserved for the proportional 
representation system. For the 16th National Assembly, 227 of the 273 seats were 
reserved for the plurality single member constituency system; and 46 seats were 
reserved for the proportional representation system.  
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The proportional representation system in each of these National Assemblies was that 
parties that earned five or more seats in the plurality single member constituency 
system or 5% or more of the valid votes were allocated seats in the proportion of the 
seats they won (14th) or the proportion of the votes they earned (15th and 16th). Even 
for those parties that failed to elect anyone to the plurality single member constituency 
system, if they had earned more than 3% of the votes, they were granted one seat. 
Though the electoral system in this second period was less biased in favour of the 
governing party, the basis of the system was the plurality single member constituency 
system, and was therefore not conducive to multiple political parties (Choi, T. W., 
2011:47-48).  
 
Finally, the third mixed proportional representation system adopted for the 17th, 18th, 
and the most recent 19th National Assemblies attempted to reform the electoral system. 
Here, again, 243, 245, and 246 of the 299, 299, and 300 seats, respectively, were 
allocated on a plurality single member constituency system. For the remaining 56, 54, 
and 54 seats, respectively, proportional representation applied. For this proportional 
representation system, each voter casts two votes, one for the candidate they support, 
and another for the party they support. The objective of this ‘One person-Two votes’ 
system was to help those minor parties whose leaders were not very well known. Each 
party gets the proportion of proportional representation seats in accordance to the 
proportion of the votes they won. Only those parties that have earned more than 5 
seats in the plurality single member constituency system or 3% of the votes get 
represented in the proportional representation seats (Chung, T. I. and Kim, I. S., 2010: 
221).  
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Table 28. Difference in the votes and seats received by the governing party (1988-
present) 
 Votes received by 
Governing Party 
(%) 
Seats received by 
Governing Party 
(%) 
Bonus 
Rate 
First Mixed System 
13rd National Assembly (1988) 34.0 41.8 7.8 
Second Mixed System 
14th National Assembly (1992) 38.5 49.8 11.3 
15th National Assembly (1996) 34.5 46.5 12.0 
16th National Assembly (2000) 39.0 48.7 9.7 
Third Mixed System 
17th National Assembly (2004) SMC 42.0 53.1 11.1 
PR 38.3 41.1 2.8 
18th National Assembly (2008) SMC 43.4 53.5 10.1 
PR 37.5 40.7 3.2 
(Source: Modified from Croissant, 2002; National Election Commission Statistics) 
 
The changes in the electoral system in the Sixth Republic have, to a certain extent, 
mitigated the disproportionality that existed in the First to the Fifth Republics. The 
Bonus Rate has been reduced from an average of 22.04% to the 10% range, as can be 
seen the chart above. In addition, in the recent 17th and 18th National Assemblies under 
the third mixed electoral system, the bonus rate arising from the proportional 
representation system was an average of 3%, showing that the proportional 
representation system was rectifying some of the distortionary effects of the plurality 
single member constituency system.  
 
Yet, the proportional representation element is quite small in the Korean mixed 
system. The ratio between the seats allocated by the single member constituency 
system and the proportional representation system is approximately 4.3:1. In 
comparison, the ratio in the Japanese mixed system is 1.6:1, and the ratio in the 
German system is 1:1. In this way, the Korean electoral system is predominantly a 
single member constituency system, and therefore favours a two-party system. In 
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addition, the barrier for entry into the National Assembly for minor parties is still high. 
The thresholds for being allocated proportional representation seats is five seats earned 
in the plurality single member constituency system or 3% of the total votes in a single 
national district. This makes it very difficult for new parties and political actors to 
break into the existing party system.  
 
The reason why such a disproportionate parliamentary electoral system was created 
can be traced back to the negotiations that took place at the beginning of the Sixth 
Republic. When the key political actors were debating which type of parliamentary 
electoral system to adopt, representativeness or accessibility were not key factors to be 
considered. Instead, they were focused on finding a system that would maximize their 
individual interests in the party power game (Jang, H., 2003). After the presidential 
elections had taken place in December 1987, the governing Democratic Justice Party 
and the two opposition parties – Kim Young-sam’s Reunification Democratic Party 
and Kim Dae-jung’s Party for Peace and Democracy – began negotiations on the 
parliamentary electoral system.  
 
The governing Democratic Justice Party, which had the upper hand in the negotiations, 
initially suggested an electoral system that would have given some opportunities for 
new entrants into the political arena. The Democratic Justice Party had demonstrated 
during the 1987 presidential elections that they were strongly supported in the rural 
areas, but relatively less so in the urban areas. Therefore, they suggested that a 
plurality single member constituency system should be maintained in the rural districts 
while a two or three member per constituency system should be adopted for the urban 
districts.  
  255 
 
On the other hand, the Party for Peace and Democracy led by Kim Dae-jung had 
confirmed through the presidential election that their support base was in the Honam 
area. Therefore, they preferred the single member constituency system in order to 
maximize the number of seats they could earn in the National Assembly. Meanwhile, 
the other opposition party, Kim Young-sam’s Reunification Democratic Party 
preferred the mixed single and multi-member constituency system suggested by the 
governing Democratic Justice Party because this would have maximized their share of 
the seats in the National Assembly. However, because of the opinion within the party 
that the opposition forces should show solidarity, the Reunification Democratic Party 
leaned in favour of the single member constituency system, as preferred by the Party 
for Peace and Democracy (Jang, H., 2003).  
 
Against this context, there were largely two reasons for the Democratic Justice Party 
subsequently withdrawing its suggestion of the mixed single and multi member 
constituency system and announcing its support for the single member constituency 
system. Firstly, the multi-member constituency system, in form of the binomial 
system, had been first implemented under the Yushin constitution under the dictatorial 
Park Chung-hee regime. It was therefore unpopular among the public because of the 
perception that it was a legacy from that era. As a result, the Democratic Justice Party 
was willing to accept a fully single member constituency system, which had a clearer 
democratic justification from the US and UK electoral experience, as long as its party 
interests were sufficiently protected (Brady and Mo, 1992). Secondly, the Democratic 
Justice Party had the expectation that should the two opposition parties fail to 
cooperate, that they would be able to gain the plurality in some of the more 
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contentious constituencies (Jang, H., 2003). So in the end, the electoral system to be 
thus implemented was one in which 224 seats were to be elected in single member 
constituencies, 75 seats through a proportional representation system, to elect a total of 
299 members to the National Assembly. 
 
As explained above, the first type of proportional representation system to be 
implemented was one in which half of the proportional representation seats were 
allocated to the party with the most seats earned through the single member 
constituency system, and the remaining allocated according to the proportion of seats 
earned by each party. Though this distortionary system has later been changed, the 
biggest problem with the proportional representation element of the Korean 
parliamentary electoral system is the excessively high electoral threshold. The 
electoral threshold is five seats earned through the single member constituency 
system; in other words, those parties that won the plurality vote in less than five 
districts would not be represented through proportional representation. This made it 
very difficult for new, small parties to gain seats in the National Assembly (Jang, H., 
2003: 50). Therefore, the structuring of the electoral system has been dominated by the 
established parties, and effectively functions to restrict the access of minority parties. 
 
4.2.3 Regionalism  
 
Thirdly, regionalism further contributes to the cartelisation of the Korean political 
system. Regionalism has been identified by some academics as the ‘chronic disease 
that will be the ruin of the nation’ (Park, S. H., 2009: 9-10). The main problem with 
regionalism is that it does not allow for genuine policy competition. It guarantees 
  257 
parties and politicians votes from their respective regions, while drawing the attention 
of the electorate away from other policy issues. Since the outcomes of elections are 
decided by regionalism, politicians are not incentivised to communicate with the 
electorate. In effect, regionalism functions as a way for parties to restrict policy 
competition. This lowers the perceived political efficacy of electoral participation 
(Sohn, B. C., 1998: 183). The issue of regionalism at least partially explains why 
university students today feel a low level of political efficacy, even when voting. 
Some university students today said that their votes felt meaningless because they 
thought that others, particularly the older generations would simply vote as 
regionalism dictated.  
 
There are six major provinces in Korea, and these are: Seoul, Yeongnam, Honam, 
Chungcheong, Gangwon, and Jeju. Dialects in Korean language make it easy for 
people to identify where others come from, and there exist certain prejudices about 
people from certain areas on their personality or work ethic. Of the six major areas, 
Chungcheong, Gangwon, and Jeju do not have key political parties or politicians 
associated with them, and hence are not seen to exhibit a clear political bias. 
Chungcheong is located in the centre and west of the country, Gangwon in the 
northeast bordering North Korea, and Jeju on an island in the Southern coast.  
 
The two clearly politically charged areas are Yeongnam and Honam. Yeongnam 
consists of the North and South Gyeongsang, Daegu, and Busan areas in the southeast 
of the country. Honam consists of the North and South Jeolla and Gwangju in the 
southwest of the country. Seven out of eight Korean presidents have come from the 
Yeongnam area, and have favoured developing their home region. As a result, people 
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from the Honam area have deeply held grievances against politicians from the 
Yeongnam region. This longstanding Honam-Yeongnam provincial divide has often 
been played out in national politics (Jung, H. G., 2011: 179-182).  
 
The origin of the Honam-Yeongnam provincial divide between the Yeongnam and the 
Honam areas can be traced back to the authoritarian regime of President Park Chung-
hee. President Park, who was from the Gyeongsang province (Yeongnam), awarded 
lucrative local development projects to his hometown, appointed Yeongnam people 
into influential positions, and favoured businesses originating from Yeongnam. 
Because President Chun Doo-hwan was from the Yeongnam region, this regional 
favouritism for Yeongnam continued during the Chun regime (Jung, H. G., 2011: 179-
182). 
 
By the Fifth Republic (1980-1988), regional favouritism had gone to such an extent 
that of the high-ranking public officials, 43.6% were from the Yeongnam area, 
whereas only 9.6% were from the Honam area. Amongst the top 50 chaebols during 
the Fifth Republic, Yeongnam businessmen owned 23, whereas Honam businessmen 
owned only 4. As for urbanization in the same period, North Gyeongsang and South 
Gyeongsang reached 57% and 75%, respectively. On the other hand, urbanization 
reached only 43% and 40% for North Jeolla and South Jeolla, respectively (Dong-A 
Ilbo, 5 January 1988).  
 
Even after the democratic transition, politicians and political parties exploited regional 
identities, rivalries and prejudices to garner votes, further exacerbating regionalism in 
Korea. In the 1987 presidential elections, each of the four major candidates – Kim 
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Dae-jung, Kim Young-sam, Roh Tae-woo, and Kim Jong-pil – were strongly 
supported by their home regions. Kim Jong-pil had the support of his native 
Chungcheong province; Roh Tae-woo had the support of the Daegu and North 
Gyeongsang province (Yeongnam); Kim Young-sam of the Busan and South 
Gyeongsang province (Yeongnam); and Kim Dae-jung of the Gwangju and Jeolla area 
(Lee, Y. S., 2010: 284). This was evident in the electoral statistics: each of the voters 
won the highest percentage and the majority of the votes in their native regions as 
displayed in the table below. 
 
Table 29. Votes earned by candidates in the 1987 presidential election by region 
Name (Party) Region of Origin Region % of 
votes 
Roh Tae-woo 
(Democratic Justice) 
Daegu and North Gyeongsang  Daegu 70.7% 
North Gyeongsang 66.4% 
Kim Yong-sam  
(Reunification Democratic) 
Busan and South Gyeongsang  Busan 56% 
South Gyeongsang 51.3% 
Kim Dae-jung 
(Peace and Democracy) 
Gwangju and Jeolla province Gwangju 94.2% 
North Jeolla 83.8% 
South Jeolla 90.3% 
Kim Jong-pil 
(New Democratic Republican) 
Chungcheong province Chungcheong 18.8% 
(Source: Lee, Y. S., 2010: 284) 
 
One of the most illustrative examples of regionalism being played out in national 
politics was the Cho-won Bok-jip incident in the run-up to the 1992 presidential 
elections. On 11 December 1992, before the presidential election, Kim Ki-chun, Kim 
Young-hwan, Park Il-yong, Lee Kyu-gam, Woo Myeong-soo, Jeong Kyeong-shik and 
Park Nam-su gathered at a restaurant called the ‘Cho-won Bok-jip’. These men were, 
respectively, the Minister of Justice, the Mayor of Busan, the Commissioner of the 
Busan District Police Agency, the chief of the Busan branch of the National Security 
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Planning Agency, the superintendent of Education in the Busan District, Director of 
the Busan District Prosecutor’s Office, and the chairman of the Busan Chamber of 
Commerce. At this meeting, these men discussed strategies for getting Kim Young-
sam elected into office and methods of tainting the reputation of the other major 
candidates Kim Dae-jung and Chung Ju-young. In particular, they said, ‘We must 
incite regional emotions,’ ‘If another person gets elected, us Busan, Southern 
Gyeongsang people should just jump from the Yeongdo Bridge and die’ (Ohmynews, 
30 July 2005).  
 
These statements were secretly recorded with the help of ex-National Security 
Planning Agency officers and released to the press by candidate Chung Ju-young’s 
United People’s Party. However, Kim Young-sam held that this was a conspiracy, and 
the major newspapers reported the incident with an angle criticizing the immorality 
and unfairness of wiretapping. As a result, the whole incident backfired on the United 
People’s Party, which suffered a fall in public support, and the ironical result was that 
the Yeongnam support solidified in favour of Kim Young-sam, who was then elected 
(Ohmynews, 30 July 2005).  
 
Aside from this incident, the Three Party Merger in the Democratic Liberal Party that 
got Kim Young-sam elected into office itself was an embodiment of political strategy 
relying on regionalism. Though the self-interested motivations of each of the key 
leading figures – Kim Young-sam, Kim Jong-pil, and Roh Tae-woo – were explained 
in the previous section, regionalism was the key reason that this uneasy union worked. 
Kim Young-sam brought South Gyeongsang; Roh Tae-woo brought North 
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Gyeongsang, and Kim Jong-pil brought the swing region, Chungcheong. In effect, the 
Honam region, which supported Kim Dae-jung, was excluded from the bargain. 
 
When Kim Dae-jung himself was finally elected in 1997, he was also accused of 
pandering to regional interests. In the April of 1998, he filled 14 of the 25 
government-affiliated agency director positions with officials from the Honam region 
(Maeil Economy, 20 April 1998). When the Financial Supervisory Service was 
launched in 1999, of the 40 directors and managers, 14 were from the capital, 13 were 
from Honam, 9 were from Yeongnam, 3 were from Chungcheong, and 1 from Jeju 
(Maeil Economy, 7 January 1999). In May 2001, the Grand National Party said, ‘Of 
the 35 major positions in the 9 government inspection agencies, 57.1% (20 seats) are 
taken by officials from the Honam region,’ and ‘Especially, in the presidential 
secretariat, the National Tax Service, the Ministry of Defence and the National Police 
Agency, the 13 major inspector positions are 100% filled by people from the Honam 
region. In response, Chun Yong-hak, the spokesperson for the Democratic Party said, 
‘These accusations by the Grand National Party that we are selecting officials only 
from certain regions is merely mudslinging the government, and they are forgetting 
what they did when they were in charge of the government in the past’ (Noh, J. H., 14 
May 2001, JoongAng Ilbo).  
 
Regionalism has also regularly featured in the campaign rhetoric of politicians. In 
April 2000, ahead of the parliamentary elections, Grand National Party’s Huh Tae-
yeol MP asked during a speech, ‘Can those of you who think your household has 
improved raise your hands?’ To those people who raised their hands, he said, ‘Are you 
from the Jeolla region?’ and continued, ‘No matter how hard they study and no matter 
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what business acumen they may have, Busan’s children are doomed. Who can say that 
from now on, our sons and daughters won’t need to walk on eggshells to serve the 
others [Honam people]?’ and attempted to incite regionalist emotions (Sisa Focus, 18 
February 2013).  
 
It also seems that some politicians take regionalism for granted, and expect public 
support simply on the basis of regions. In May 2006, ahead of the 13 May regional 
elections, Moon Jae-in, the former Senior Secretary to the President for Civil Affairs 
said, ‘I can’t understand why Busan citizens do not accept the current government to 
be a ‘Busan government’ when our president is from Busan himself’. He was 
frustrated by the lack of support from the Busan region for the Roh Moo-hyun 
government. He also said, ‘Our president has always considered and supported Busan 
during the APEC Summit, the redevelopment of the new port and the north ports, and 
personnel appointments, but the citizens are not being loyal at all’ (Min, Y. G., 15 
May 2006, The Hankyoreh).  
 
President Roh Moo-hyun (2002-2007) was quite unique in the respect that although he 
was from the Yeongnam (Busan) area, he was elected with the strong support of the 
Honam region. This was possible because the Millennium Democratic Party, which he 
was elected in, was of the line of liberal parties supported by the Honam region with 
the legacy of Kim Dae-jung. Because of the fact that a Yeongnam person was elected 
with Honam support, many commentators at the time hoped that this was a signal that 
regionalism was finally becoming less of a priority for the voters (Jeon, S. S., 2010). 
He ran on a platform of ‘reforming politics’, and this met with the voter’s hopes and 
desires for a reformed political system. He chose ‘overthrowing regionalism’ as one of 
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his key political agendas, and accordingly created his own party, the Opened Our 
Party, to throw off the image of a Honam-based liberal party and thus appeal to the 
whole national electorate. Yet, this only created conflicts with the Honam-rooted 
branch of the liberal party, which created its own Democratic Party, and subsequently 
supported the impeachment process against President Roh. Though in the end, he was 
not impeached, President Roh failed to ‘overthrow regionalism’, despite his efforts.  
 
That regionalism remained a pertinent part of Korean politics could be seen in the 
recent Lee Myung-bak administration. According to figures released by the 
Democratic Party’s MP Kim Yoon-duk in 2013, a disproportionate amount of the 
budget for the Lee administration’s ‘Top 30 Projects’ was being spent in the 
Yeongnam region. Fifteen of the thirty-four projects were located in the Yeongnam 
region, and 47% of the total budget was being spent on these projects. Meanwhile, in 
the Honam region, there were only three projects that were allocated 3% of the total 
budget (Park, Y. M., 5. 11. 2013, Jeonbuk Ilbo). There were also stark differences in 
resource allocation by region in the research and development funding. According to 
the parliamentary inspection report of the administration released by Democratic 
Party’s Choi Min-hee MP in 2013, over the five years of the Lee Myung-bak 
administration, the total R&D investment funds spent in the Yeongnam region was 
nearly triple the amount spent in the Honam region (Lee, J. H., 29. 10. 2013, 
MoneyWeek). 
 
That regionalism remains one of the strongest cleavages in the Korean political system 
is illustrated by the recent presidential election results.  
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Figure 8. Results of the Presidential Elections by Region (2002-2012) 
 
16th (2002) 17th (2007) 18th (2012) 
 
 Roh Moo-hyun 48.9% 
(Millennium Democratic) 
 
Lee Hoi-chang 46.6% 
(Grand National) 
Chung Dong-young 26.1% 
(Democratic) 
 
Lee Myung-bak 48.7% 
(Grand National) 
Moon Jae-in 48.0% 
(Democratic) 
 
Park Geun-hye 51.6% 
(New World) 
 
*Red – Conservative; Grand National / New World Party 
Yellow – Liberal; Millennium Democratic / Democratic Party  
 
(Source: Shim, I. S., 20 December 2012, Yonhap News) 
 
The yellow-coloured sections show the regions that supported the liberal candidates; 
the red-coloured sections show the regions that supported the conservative candidates. 
As can be seen, the Yeongnam region supports the conservative party; the Honam 
region supports the liberal party. 
 
The interviews of university students today revealed that regionalism was perceived to 
be a problem in Korean politics. However, a majority of the respondents who are 
university students today said that their political preferences were not affected by 
region. Nevertheless, in-depth questioning of interviewees revealed that regionalism 
did affect the political socialization of university students today and also may affect 
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the political views of university students today. This contradiction has been observed 
in previous studies which find that Koreans identify regionalism as a problem in 
Korean politics and are reluctant to admit that they are affected by regionalism, yet 
still take into account regional origins of candidates when voting (Na, E. Y. and Min, 
K. H., 1998: 84).  
 
4.2.4 Restriction of ideological and policy competition 
 
Fourthly, restriction of ideological and policy competition assists the cooperation of 
different political parties on certain policy matters. In Korean politics, political parties 
particularly play up the differences in their security and foreign policy and policies 
towards North Korea. Yet, as will be discussed below, studies show that citizens are 
actually more interested in economic policy than security and foreign policy. This 
explains why a slight majority (54.1%) of survey respondents who are currently 
university students said that they did not perceive major differences between the major 
political parties. The lack of ideological and policy competition may also signal that 
the political parties are failing to represent the diverse interests present in the citizenry. 
This may contribute to the perception amongst university students today that 
politicians lack communication. It may also be a reason for why most university 
students today said that they did not have a political party that they supported.  
 
There have been various studies conducted by Korean academics on the policy and 
ideological differences between the major political parties. Kang Won-taek (2012) 
identified that the members of the two major political parties consistently rated 
themselves on different ends of the ideological scale in the 16th to 19th National 
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Assemblies. However, the problem with the self-placement scores for measuring 
ideological differences is that it lacks objectivity. Because there is no absolute 
measure by which respondents score themselves, the scores are subjective. Each 
respondent gives a self-placement score based on their own conception of ideology, 
which makes objective comparisons between respondents impossible. Since 
respondents may project their own differing ideological perceptions on the self-
placement scores, it is not possible to impose absolute meanings on to the scores (Lee, 
K. Y. and Lee, H. W., 2008: 146; Yoon, S. Y. and Lee, M. K., 2011: 65). Kang Won-
taek (2004, 2012) therefore identified four policy dimensions on which conservative 
and liberal ideologies may diverge:  
 
(1) Foreign Policy / Security / Anti-Communism 
(2) Economy 
(3) Society 
(4) Post-Modernism / Post-Materialism 
 
Firstly, the Foreign Policy, Security and Anti-Communism dimension is one of the 
most salient characteristics in the ideological differences between political parties in 
the South Korean context. Because of the Cold War context in which Korea 
partitioned into the communist North and capitalist South Koreas, there is a clearly 
anti-communist rhetoric in South Korean politics. Also, due to the real and perceived 
threats posed by North Korea and the close cooperation with the US for security, 
views on foreign policy and security policy is a prominent area of political conflict 
within South Korea. Before the 1997 election of President Kim Dae-jung, most of the 
political elite took a very hard-line stance against North Korea, and there was not 
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much debate about what policy should be adopted on the foreign policy and security 
front. However, the Kim Dae-jung administration implemented the ‘Sunshine Policy’ 
that sought to encourage cooperation with North Korea through increased emergency 
and development aid, investment, and joint tourist ventures, which was a wholly new 
direction in the foreign policy of South Korea. Yet, this Sunshine Policy was heavily 
criticised by the hard-liners in South Korea, who believed that the aid and investment 
were an unwarranted waste of resources. The liberal-conservative divide on the 
Foreign Policy, Security and Anti-Communism dimension is therefore primarily 
concerned with South Korean policy against North Korea, and by extension the US.  
 
Secondly, the Economy dimension relates the issue of the distribution of economic 
and material goods. It relates to the conflict between equality and efficiency, the state 
and the market, labour and capital. This left-right divide is what governs the party 
divide in most Western European democracies, and is reflected in Korean politics as 
well.  
 
Thirdly, the Social dimension reflects the conflict between authority and libertarianism 
(Kitschelt, 1994). Here, the conservatives emphasise authority, traditional values, 
hierarchy, social order, and crime prevention; the liberals emphasise libertarianism, 
social and political equality for minorities, freedom of expression, political 
participation, and human rights.  
 
Fourthly, the Post-materialism / Post-modern dimension reflects the conflict between 
the traditional modern, materialistic values espoused by the conservatives and the 
post-modern, post-materialistic values supported by the liberals. The importance of 
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this divide is emphasised by such scholars as Inglehart (1977). He argues that during 
the peace and prosperity experienced in the West after the Second World War, a new 
group of interests that could not be explained by economic or social ideological 
differences began to emerge. These include the environment, animal rights, and anti-
nuclear movements and the emergence of parties like the Green Party, and have 
created new divisions. In South Korea, the controversy surrounding the creation of the 
Dong-gang dam, the Cheonggyecheon Stream Project, and the Four Rivers Project 
show the conflict along this dimension.  
 
The following table outlines the key policy issues that lie on each of the four 
ideological dimensions. 
 
Table 30. Policy Issues relating to the four ideological dimensions 
Ideological Dimension Specific Policy Issues  
Foreign Policy / Security / 
Anti-Communism 
 
• Aid to North Korea  
• Relations with the US  
• National Security Laws 
Economy 
(Left-Right) 
 
• Regulation of the Chaebol System 
• Protection of Non-Regular Workers 
• Introduction of Wealth Tax 
• Social Welfare System 
• Government regulation of the price of necessities 
Society 
(Libertarian-Authority) 
 
• Student Human Rights 
• Public Electoral Law Reform 
• Religious abstention from mandatory military 
service 
• The right to gather and demonstrate 
Post-Modernism /  
Post-Materialism 
 
• Expansion of nuclear energy  
• Environmental Policy 
• Euthanasia 
• Migrant Worker Policy  
(Source: Modified from Kang, W. T., 2005: 198-199, 2012: 9; Park, K. M., Han, J. T. 
and Lee, J. H., 2012.) 
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Based on a 2012 survey conducted by SBS and the Korean Association of Party 
Studies, members of the 19th National Assembly were asked 20 multiple-choice 
questions on current policy issues. Kang Won-taek (2012) rated each of the four 
answers to each question on a 0 to 10 liberal-conservative scale. He then classified 
each of the policy issues according to the four ideological dimensions as above, and 
found the average ideology scores of the members of each of the major parties based 
on their policy preferences.  
 
Based on the data collected by Kang Won-taek (2012), it was possible to observe that 
the policy dimension with the consistently largest difference in the ideological scores 
between the two major parties was the foreign policy, security, and anti-communism 
dimension. Although in the 19th National Assembly, the society dimension showed a 
large divergence between the two parties, the data showed that even within a single 
party, there was considerable diversity of opinion. In contrast, on the foreign policy, 
security, and anti-communism dimension, members of the same political party largely 
held very similar positions. As for economic policy and post-modernism and post-
materialism dimensions, the study showed that both parties tended to take a moderate 
position, with a small gap on the liberal-conservative scale. In other words, the two 
dimensions with the greatest policy competition were foreign policy, security, and 
anti-communism and society.  
 
However, an interesting finding in a 2008 study conducted by the Korean Association 
of Party Studies was that 30.8% of the respondents said that employment was the most 
important policy issue, followed by 26.2% for economic regulatory reform, 15.2% for 
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welfare policy, 11.8% for education policy, and finally 10.7% for North Korea 
relations (Kim, Y. T., 2009: 208). This shows that economic policy issues are the 
forefront of the voters’ concerns in their voting, while foreign policy, security and 
anti-communism are not as important. The fact that the voters consider economic 
policy to be the most important when it is an area where the ideological differences 
between the two parties are not as pronounced, suggests a restriction of policy 
competition between the major parties. This lack of policy competition on the policy 
dimensions that voters consider most important explains around half of the university 
students today surveyed said that they did not observe clear differences between the 
major political parties.  
 
4.3 Explanation of the changes in the political culture of university 
students  
 
These issues with the Korean political system can explain many elements of the 
changes in the political culture of university students in Korea.  
 
Attitudes towards politics and government 
 
For one thing, the changes in the Korean political system explain the changes in the 
attitudes towards government and politics held by university students.  The empirical 
findings revealed that general attitudes held by university students in the 1980s 
towards the Chun administration were very negative, characterised by fear and anger. 
Much of this fear and anger was caused by the violent and oppressive practices of the 
Chun administration towards university students and democratic protestors. Events 
  271 
such as the Gwangju Democratic Movement particularly affected the interviewees’ 
attitudes towards the Chun administration. The violent and oppressive policies used 
against university student activists were also a significant factor in causing the 
negative attitudes towards the Chun administration. 
 
In contrast, university students today held less intensely negative attitudes towards the 
presidential administration than university students in the 1980s. However, the survey 
and interview results showed that university students today were generally dissatisfied 
with the Lee administration and did not have high expectations of the Park 
administration. Many interviewees criticised the Four Rivers Project, which was 
implemented by the Lee administration. However, other than that, the interviewees 
were unable to give comprehensive explanations backed up by evidence for their 
dissatisfaction with the Lee administration.  
 
Survey and interview results revealed that university students generally did not trust 
politicians and that politicians were perceived to be self-serving and break promises. 
University students today perceived that politicians today are failing to communicate 
with the public and with university students. In addition, over half of all the survey 
respondents said that they did not have a political party they supported. In addition, 
81.6% of the respondents disagreed or partially disagreed with the statement that they 
feel a strong connection with the political party they support. The Ahn Chul-soo 
phenomenon among young people also indicated that current political parties were 
failing to adequately represent the interests of university students today. Survey and 
interview results revealed that university students today perceived a lack of ideological 
and policy differences between the parties. University students also perceived that 
  272 
party competition was mainly based on regionalism and image. Some interviewees 
identified this lack of genuine competition as the cartelisation of political parties. 
 
Research into primary and secondary sources revealed that since the democratic 
transition, there has been a rapid and dramatic increase in the public funding for 
political parties. Since this public funding comes out of tax revenues and directly 
benefits politicians, it is possible that this increased public funding may be one reason 
why university students today think that politicians are self-serving. It was also 
revealed that this public funding was concentrated on the two major political parties, 
effectively restricting the resources available to new entrants. When new entrants are 
restricted from political decision-making, interests not represented by the major 
political parties are effectively restricted. This may be a cause of why university 
students perceive politicians to lack communication with the public and university 
students. It may also be a cause of the perception that even politicians in different 
political parties act like a cartel. In fact, increased public funding of the major political 
parties may be just one of the manifestations of a trend of politicians acting out of self-
interest.  
 
Since the democratic transition in 1987, there have been important changes in the 
electoral system of Korea. Most importantly, direct presidential elections were 
introduced, as demanded by the student activists and democratic protestors in the 
1980s. However, a closer examination of the electoral system shows that the single 
member constituency system in parliamentary elections still gives a bonus rate of over 
10% to the governing party. The proportional representation system, which reduces 
this bonus rate to around 3%, is applied only to slightly over 50 seats in a nearly 300-
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seat National Assembly. These distortions in the electoral system that favour the 
governing political party may explain why some university students said that they had 
low political efficacy even in relation to voting. This also explains why one of the 
interviewees actively participates in a civil society organisation to support the 
expansion of the proportional representation system. 
 
An investigation into the role of regionalism in Korean politics also showed that 
regionalism has historically been and continues to be a prominent social cleavage in 
Korean society. Even after the democratic transition, politicians often use regional 
favouritism as a method of securing votes. Many citizens also vote along regional 
lines, and the impact of regionalism is evident in the electoral results. The problem 
with regionalism is that it does not facilitate genuine policy competition because it 
structures votes for particular parties and politicians. It draws the attention of the 
electorate away from national policy by focusing their attentions on the benefits for 
their particular region. Interview and survey results revealed that university students 
perceived regionalism to be a salient feature of Korean politics. However, most survey 
respondents who are currently university students said that regionalism did not have a 
significant impact on their political preferences. Yet, the fact that regionalism has such 
a significant impact on electoral outcomes may be a reason why university students 
today report a low level of political efficacy, even when voting. Regionalism may also 
be part of the reason why university students do not have a particular political party 
they support. Since university students today say that region is not an important 
consideration when voting, the fact that the major political parties cater to a particular 
region may mean that an important distinguishing feature of the major political parties 
is irrelevant for university students. In fact, the regional favouritism that politicians 
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show may also be a reason for the perception that politicians are self-serving and do 
not act for the public good.  
 
A review of secondary sources revealed that there was a restriction of ideology and 
policy competition. Kang Won-taek’s 2012 study showed that the policy dimension 
with the consistently largest difference in the ideological scores between the two major 
parties was the foreign policy, security and anti-communism dimension. However, an 
interesting finding was that only 10.7% of the respondents in a 2008 survey said that 
relations with North Korea were the most important policy issue. In this study, 30.8% 
of the respondents said that employment was the most important policy issue, 
followed by 26.2% for economic regulatory reform (Kim, Y. T., 2009: 208). However, 
both the major political parties tended to take a moderate position in relation to 
economic policy (Kang, W. T., 2012). This disparity in the policy dimension that 
citizens care about and the dimension with the clearest difference in ideology and 
policy positions between the major political parties suggests that the current political 
party system may be failing to adequately represent the interests of the society. This 
may be a cause for why university students today perceive politicians to lack 
communication with the public and university students. It may also be a reason why 
university students today do not have a political party they support.  
 
Manifest political participation 
 
One of the most important changes in the Korean political system since the democratic 
transition in 1987 was the introduction of direct presidential elections. New electoral 
laws were also adopted for parliamentary elections that have reduced the bonus rate 
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for the governing political party. These changes explain why voting is the most 
commonly used method of political participation amongst university students today 
and is perceived to be an effective method of political participation.  
 
Interviewees who were university students in the 1980s said that they recognised 
voting to be meaningless because of the circumstances that made elections neither free 
nor fair. Most did not even mention voting as a method of political participation they 
considered. In contrast, the survey and interview results revealed that university 
students today actively participated in voting. 89.1% of the survey respondents said 
that they voted in at least the presidential elections. 74.1% of the survey respondents 
also agreed or partially agreed with the statement that their electoral participation can 
change Korean politics. Voting was by far the most popular and widely supported 
method of political participation amongst university students today. Some 
interviewees said that voting was the only way to change Korean politics.  
 
However, though voting was a form of manifest political participation that university 
students today participated in more actively than their counterparts in the 1980s, the 
same could not be said for other forms of manifest political participation such as 
contacting politicians or participating in protests. 
 
Firstly, in the 1980s, university student organisations often contacted and cooperated 
with opposition political elite, such as the New Democratic Party led by Kim Dae-jung 
and Kim Young-sam. Yet, the relationship between the opposition and student 
activists was not very stable. The opposition elite also at times renounced the violent 
protests of student activists. In turn, student activists often felt betrayed by the 
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compromises that the opposition elites made once elected to government. 
Nevertheless, in the 1980s, supporting political campaigns and contacting politicians 
was a form of manifest political participation many student activists engaged in. Many 
university students today also recognised that campaign activity and contacting public 
officials was a method of political participation they could engage in. However, only a 
very small minority of the interviewees who are currently university students actually 
engaged in this form of manifest political participation.  
 
Secondly, almost all interviewees who were university students in the 1980s identified 
protesting as the only method of political participation available to them at the time 
and expressed a strong support for university students who engaged in protest activity 
despite the personal risks. In contrast, university students today expressed generally 
negative attitudes towards student activists on campus. Fellow students who engaged 
in protest activity were perceived to be doing something that was unnecessary and 
meaningless. Some interviewees even held the perception that university students 
engaging in student activism and protest activity were doing so for their own career 
advancement. Some of the interviewees who are currently university students said that 
they had participated in the candlelight vigils. Yet they said that they soon became 
disillusioned with the way other political actors were using the candlelight vigils and 
the way the movement later became more violent and radicalised.  
 
There are potentially two explanations for this change in the experience of and 
attitudes towards contacting politicians and participating in protests as a method of 
political participation. Firstly, since voting has become available as a method of 
political participation, university students today may feel that their interests are 
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adequately represented without having to engage in other forms of manifest political 
participation. However, the general attitude that there is a lack of communication 
between politicians and university students and the lack of support by university 
students of political parties make this explanation unlikely to be the only explanation.  
 
Secondly, the lack of trust for politicians and political parties may be the reason why 
university students today do not contact politicians, participate in campaign activity or 
participate in organised protests as a method of political participation. In fact, some 
interviewees expressly stated that they were wary of being affiliated with political 
organisations and political parties and associating with politicians or interests they did 
not fully support. Some university students even expressed distrust for civil society 
organisations.  
 
Reasons for political participation and non-participation 
 
Aside from voting, university students today showed lower levels of manifest political 
participation, both in campaign activity and contacting public officials and protest 
activity. Some university students in the 1980s did not participate in politics because 
they were simply not interested in politics and focused on their studies and finding 
employment. Others disagreed with the tactics or ideologies of university student 
activists. Yet, for university students in the 1980s, the main reason for non-
participation was the fear of the consequences of participation. The violent oppression 
of the Chun administration against student protestors discouraged many university 
students from participating in politics. 
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Despite the high personal costs of political participation, university students in the 
1980s participated in politics. Some interviewees, particularly those from lower 
socioeconomic backgrounds said that they became involved in politics because of 
social injustice. These types of interviewees became involved in student activism 
through an interest in labour rights and class conflict. Yet, university students in the 
1980s, even more so than now came from middle or upper class households.  
 
A more common reason for political participation was anger at the injustices carried 
out against democratic protestors and student activists. The Gwangju Democratic 
Movement had a particularly significant influence in motivating university students in 
the 1980s to participate in politics. It has been argues that the sense of ‘indebtedness’ 
and ‘survivor’s guilt’ motivated many students to disseminate information on the 
Gwangju Democratic Movement, demand rightful compensation and fight for political 
reform and democracy (Kim, Y. C., 2007: 284-286). In addition, the deaths and 
injuries of fellow student activists caused by the violent and oppressive measures 
carried out by the Chun administration further motivated university students in the 
1980s to participate in protests. In particular, when fellow classmates were wrongfully 
detained, tortured, injured or killed, students were compelled to act by emotions like 
anger, rage and a desire to seek retribution. These responses are in line with 
psychological work on intergroup emotion theory (Mackie, Devos and Smith, 2000). 
 
On the other hand, none of these reasons were applicable to university students today. 
In contrast to interviewees in the 1980s who spoke at length about their experiences of 
manifest political participation, interviewees who are university students today mostly 
spoke of their experience of latent political participation and non-participation. Many 
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interviewees said that they simply did not feel a need to participate in politics. 
Interviewees said that the political situation was not dire enough to warrant active 
political participation. Some interviewees said that they did not feel politics was very 
relevant to their lives or found politics to be interesting or fun. They said that they had 
other priorities over spending time on political participation. They thought that though 
Korean politics had its problems, it was not serious enough to warrant ordinary 
university students becoming involved in politics.  
 
Yet, a majority of interviewees who are currently university students stated that they 
were dissatisfied with their current level of political participation. One of the most 
common reasons for non-participation was a lack of political efficacy. A majority of 
the survey respondents (72%) reported a low level of political efficacy, giving a rating 
between 0 and 2 on a scale from 0 being low to 5 being high. This perceived lack of 
political efficacy was caused by various reasons. Some interviewees said that the 
diversification of political interests and objectives since the democratic transition has 
meant that there is no longer a single objective on which people could focus their 
efforts. This has made participation for a particular cause less effective. The 
competition and conflict between diverse political interests also lowered perceived 
political efficacy.  
 
Yet, the more common cause of the perceived lack of political efficacy was the lack of 
confidence that the current political system would effectively translate political 
participation by university students into change. University students today expressed a 
generally low level of trust for the government, politicians, political parties and the 
media. The perceived lack of transparency in the Korean political system and the lack 
  280 
of trust in politicians have caused many university students today to perceive low 
levels of political efficacy, which in turn leads to low political participation.  
 
Political socialization 
 
Compared to university students in the 1980s, university students today were more 
likely to be influenced by their parents in their political socialization process. 
However, many interviewees also said that their parents discouraged them from 
getting involved in politics because it was futile to do so.  
 
Also, compared to university students in the 1980s, university students today were less 
likely to be influenced by university in their political socialization process. All 
interviewees who were university students in the 1980s said that their interest in 
politics increased significantly when they entered university. They said that this was 
because there was a general atmosphere of student activism and political participation 
on campus in the 1980s. Many interviewees said that there was a general consensus on 
campus that university students should participate in the democratic movement and 
take an interest in politics. University students who participated in politics were 
perceived to be courageous and admired.  
 
Compared to all of the interviewees who were university students in the 1980s who 
said that political views developed the most in university through interactions with 
university peers, a relatively smaller   percentage (50.6%) of survey respondents who 
are currently university students said that their university peers had a big impact on the 
formation of their political views. Although some interviewees who are currently 
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university students said that there was an element of peer pressure to be more 
interested in politics, it was clear from the interviews that there is no longer the same 
pervasive atmosphere of political participation on university campuses as was the case 
in the 1980s before the democratic transition.  
 
These changes in the political socialization processes of university students can be 
explained by the lack of political trust and lack of perceived political efficacy 
discussed in the section on reasons for non-participation. Due to the lack of perceived 
political efficacy, university students are discouraged from political participation both 
by their parents and by their peers at university. Interviews of university students in 
the 1980s who are now in the generation that are parents of university students today 
revealed that they were generally dissatisfied with the current political situation. 
Having participated in student activism but dissatisfied with the current political 
situation, the generation of university students in the 1980s may be discouraging 
university students today by telling them it is futile to participate in politics and that 
they should instead focus on their careers and individual lives. These attitudes of a 
perceived lack of political efficacy may also then be reflected in the general culture on 
university campuses.   
 
An interesting change in the political socialization process of male university students 
since the 1980s was the changing role of the military service. Since 1951, all male 
Korean citizens over the age of 18 who are physically fit must serve around 2 years in 
the mandatory military service. In the 1980s, military service was used as a tool to 
punish and re-educate student activists. Politically active students would be drafted 
into the military with very short notice and sent to particularly difficult posts with 
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gruelling regimens. Many interviewees who were university students in the 1980s 
described the military service as being very harsh. Overt efforts at political 
socialization were undertaken to depoliticise young men, but the interviewees said that 
they saw through this and it did not affect their political views.  
 
Since then, the role of military service has somewhat changed. It is no longer used as 
an oppressive tool to discourage political participation. Overt efforts at political 
socialization are still undertaken, and some university students see through this and 
say that knowing that they were being subject to political socialization helped resist 
being indoctrinated. However, many interviewees said that some of their peers who 
were not aware that this was going on were more susceptible to political socialization. 
The interview responses revealed that male university students today learned from the 
military service that national security, and in particular relations with North Korea, 
was an important policy issue. It was interesting that the emphasis on national security 
and North Korean policy in the political socialization efforts in the military coincided 
with the main policy dimension with the clearest ideology and policy difference 
between the major political parties. 
 
In conclusion, supply-side explanations are useful for explaining certain aspects of the 
changes in the political culture of university students in Korea. It is particularly useful 
for explaining why university students hold negative attitudes about government and 
politics. In the 1980s, university students held negative attitudes about government 
and politics because of the Chun administration’s oppressive policies. As for 
university students today, the cartel party thesis, in particular, provided a useful 
explanation for the attitudes university students today held towards politics. Yet, 
  283 
despite the problems with Korean politics today, it is clear that these issues are not as 
prominent or significant as the issues that impressed upon the minds of university 
students in the 1980s. This explains why some university students today say that they 
do not feel compelled to participate in politics because there is no need to participate.   
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5 Conclusion 
 
In the above chapters, we examined the applicability of demand-side, intermediary and 
supply-side theories to explain the changes in the political culture of university 
students.  
 
The basic premise of demand-side theories is that underlying socioeconomic changes 
in the society affect political culture. Demand-side theories were useful for explaining 
the changes in the perception of the role of university students in society. It provided a 
partial explanation for the greater influence that parents have on the political 
socialization of university students today. Compared to university students in the 
1980s, university students today were more influenced by their parents in the 
formation of their political views. One explanation for this is that parents of university 
students today tended to be more highly educated than parents of university students in 
the 1980s and therefore more likely to be interested in political education of their 
children and have the education and resources to do so.  
 
Intermediary explanations focus on the influence of the media on political culture. 
However, in the South Korean context, the lack of independence of the media made it 
difficult to ascertain which elements of the changes in the political culture of univesity 
students were due to the media. Yet, by examining the continuing lack of 
independence of the media, we were able to observe why university students today are 
distrustful of the media as a source of reliable political information and how this in 
turn impacted on their political trust and political efficacy. 
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  Supply-side explanations assume that the supply of governance and political systems 
affect the political culture of society. The empirical findings of this research indicated 
that the cartel party thesis may be applicable to the Korean case. There were four 
elements of Korean politics that were examined in further detail: the increase of public 
funding for political parties; electoral laws that favour the major political parties; 
restriction of ideological and policy competition between the major political parties; 
and the use of regionalism as a cleavage in elections. These characteristics of Korean 
politics today were useful for explaining the attitudes towards politics and government, 
experience of manifest political participation, reasons for political participation and 
non-participation and the role of the military in the political socialization process of 
university students today.  
 
Taken collectively, demand-side, intermediary and supply-side explanations were able 
to explain the changes in the political culture of university students today. The 
variables identified in the three types of explanations such as socioeconomic 
development, the role of media and issues in the political system were interrelated. 
Therefore, examining all three types of theories helped to provide a comprehensive 
explanation of the changes in the political culture of university students in South 
Korea. 
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V    Conclusion 
 
1 Research questions and answers 
 
There were three main research questions that this thesis sought to answer: 
 
(1) What was the political culture of university students in the 1980s before the 
1987 democratic transition? 
(2) What is the political culture of university students today? 
(3) What are the explanations for the changes in the political culture of university 
students between these two periods? 
 
The elements of political culture which were examined in this thesis were: 
 
• the attitudes towards politics and government; 
• the attitudes towards media;  
• the political socialization process; 
• the experience of political participation; and 
• the reasons for political participation or non-participation.  
 
Attitudes towards politics and government 
 
As hypothesised, university students in the 1980s before the democratic transition held 
intensely negative attitudes towards the government characterised by fear and anger. 
Events such as the violent oppression of the Gwangju Democratic Movement and the 
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oppressive policies of the Chun administration towards student activists had a 
significant impact on the attitudes of the university students towards the Chun 
administration. All of the interviewees who were university students in the 1980s 
welcomed the democratic transition in 1987.  
 
Although university students today held less intensely negative attitudes towards 
politics and government, university students today were still generally dissatisfied 
with politics and government. Many interviewees particularly disapproved of the Four 
Rivers Project in the Lee administration (2008-2013) and held low expectations of the 
Park administration (2013-present). An overwhelming majority of survey respondents 
and most interviewees said that they did not think that politicians acted for the public 
good and instead acted for their own interests. In addition, politicians were perceived 
to not keep campaign promises. A related complaint was the politicians lacked 
communication, amongst themselves, with society and with university students. These 
findings suggested that there was a perception of the politicians being disconnected 
from society that contributed to the generally negative attitudes towards government 
and politics.  
 
Towards political parties, a majority (69.4%) of the survey respondents who are 
university students today agreed with the statement that even if politicians are in 
different parties, they ultimately act like a cartel. Some interviewees expressly stated 
this perception. The survey and interview responses showed that most university 
students today do not have a political party they support or perceive clear policy 
differences between the major political parties. An overwhelming majority (81.6%) of 
survey respondents who are currently university students said that they did not have a 
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political party they supported. The Ahn Chul-soo phenomenon confirmed that the 
existing major political parties were failing to fully represent the interests of university 
students today.  
 
A slight majority (54.1%) of survey respondents who are currently university students 
said that they did not perceive major differences between the major political parties. 
Secondary sources confirmed that there were indeed not many major differences in 
policy or ideology between the two major political parties, except in the foreign policy, 
security and anti-communism dimension. Interview and survey responses and 
secondary sources revealed that regionalism was a significant social cleavage in the 
Korean political system. Regionalism is particularly apparent in elections and is 
reinforced by the policies and rhetoric of the politicians. Although most survey 
respondents who are currently university students said that region did not have a 
significant impact on their political preferences, it was clear through the interviews 
that many university students perceived regionalism as an important cleavage and was 
affected by it, though they may not readily admit it.  
 
Attitudes towards the media 
 
As hypothesised, university students in the 1980s did not trust the mainstream media 
to provide an objective and reliable account of political affairs. However, an 
unexpected finding was that university students today also do not trust the mainstream 
media to provide an objective and reliable account of political affairs. In fact, the 
reasons for these attitudes were very similar. University students in the 1980s said that 
they did not trust mainstream television broadcasts or newspapers because the media 
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were strictly controlled by the Chun administration in the 1980s. Although the level of 
government control over the media are not as overt as it was in the 1980s, secondary 
sources revealed that the presidential administration still has a significant level of 
control over recruitment, promotion and sanctions of journalists in the major media 
companies. In addition to these informal methods of media control, the Korean 
government also censors the press through restrictive legislation such as the 
defamation law, the National Security Law, and the Public Election Law. These 
continuities in the restriction of freedom of press had a direct impact on the low level 
of trust that university students today had towards the media.  
 
Political socialization  
 
As hypothesised, university students in the 1980s stated that the university setting had 
the greatest effect on their political socialization process. However, university students 
today did not report the same general atmosphere of student activism on campus as 
university students in the 1980s. Compared to all of the interviewees who were 
university students in the 1980s who said that their political views developed the most 
in university through interactions with university peers, a relatively smaller   
percentage (50.6%) of survey respondents who are currently university students said 
that their university peers had a big impact on the formation of their political views. 
 
One of the elements of the political culture of university students that has changed the 
most between the 1980s and today was the influence of parents on the political 
socialization process. Almost all interviewees who were university students in the 
1980s said that their parents did not have a significant impact on the formation of their 
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political views. In contrast, a clear majority (60.4%) of the survey respondents who are 
currently university students said that their parents had a big influence on their 
political views. Though some interviewees said that their parents gave them guidance 
on learning about politics, others said that their parents actively discouraged them 
from getting involved in politics.  
 
Latent political participation 
 
Due to the high costs of being involved in any form of student activism, even only 
latent forms of political participation, the experience of latent political participation in 
the 1980s was organised and covert. Even latent political participation had high 
personal costs, and latent political participation often led to manifest political 
participation. In contrast, the experience of latent political participation for university 
students today was much more loosely organised and less intense. However, university 
students today had a higher level of interest in politics than hypothesised and almost 
all university students today said that they discussed politics with family, friends, 
classmates and colleagues. Yet, a majority (62.6%) of university students today said 
that they actually did not know very much about the policies of major political parties 
and many interviewees said that they sometimes did not enjoy discussing politics with 
others. Though university students today attempted to engage in latent political 
participation, many interviewees expressed frustration at the lack of reliable 
information about politics to learn about and discuss politics. 
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Manifest political participation 
 
As hypothesised, almost all interviewees who were university students in the 1980s 
identified that protesting was the only method of political participation available to 
them at the time. Secondary sources revealed that in the 1980s, university student 
organisations often contacted and cooperated with the opposition political elite, such 
as the New Democratic Party led by Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam. Yet, the 
relationship between the opposition and student activists was not very stable. The 
opposition elite at times renounced the violent protests of student activists. In turn, 
student activists often felt betrayed by the compromises that the opposition elites made 
once elected to government. Nevertheless, in the 1980s, supporting political 
campaigns and contacting politicians was a form of manifest political participation 
many student activists engaged in. Mentions of contacting and cooperating with 
opposition politicians in the interviews further confirmed this.  
 
In contrast, voting was by far the most popular and widely supported method of 
political participation amongst university students today. However, some interviewees 
expressed some doubt as to the political efficacy of even voting. It was hypothesised 
that university students today would have more diverse ways of participating in 
politics through voting and engaging with political parties and civil society groups. 
However, although many university students today recognised that campaign activity 
and contacting public officials was a method of political participation they could 
engage in, only a very small minority of the interviewees actually engaged in this form 
of manifest political participation. In fact, some interviewees expressed distrust even 
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for civil society organisations and were wary of being affiliated with organisations and 
associating with politicians they did not fully support.  
 
An unexpected attitude amongst university students today was the strongly negative 
attitudes they held towards protest activity. Fellow students who engaged in protest 
activity were perceived to be doing something that was unnecessary and meaningless. 
Some interviewees even held the perception that university students engaging in 
student activism and protest activity were doing so for their own career advancement. 
Some of the interviewees who are currently university students said that they had 
participated in the candlelight vigils. Yet they said that they soon became disillusioned 
with the way other political actors were using the candlelight vigils and the way the 
movement later became more violent and radicalised.  
 
Reasons for political participation and non-participation 
 
As hypothesised, the main reason university students in the 1980s were discouraged 
from political participation was the fear of oppressive methods used by the Chun 
administration. However, many university students in the 1980s participated despite 
the high personal costs of doing so was because the political situation was very dire 
and they felt a duty to participate as the educated elite.  
 
In contrast, university students today do not participate in politics because they do not 
feel the need to do so, as hypothesised. However, there were additional reasons for the 
non-participation of university students today. These included a lack of political 
efficacy, a lack of trust in the political elite and a lack of external and internal 
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resources. University students today said that they were no longer the minority 
educated elite and that they had other priorities to focus on due to a more competitive 
job market. 
 
Explanations 
 
Finally, it was hypothesised that the main reason for the changes in the political 
culture of university students is due to the changes in the structure of the political 
system from a dictatorship to a democracy. The discussion of the demand-side, 
intermediary and supply-side explanations revealed this to be the case. However, 
demand-side and intermediary explanations were able to explain specific elements of 
the changes in the political culture of university students. 
 
Firstly, demand-side explanations partly explain why university students in the 1980s 
participated in student activism despite the personal costs of doing so. In the 1980s, 
university students considered themselves to be part of a minority educated elite 
charged with the duty to change politics. In contrast, part of the reason why university 
students today exhibit lower levels of political participation is due to the fact that 
university students today no longer perceive themselves to be part of a minority 
political elite. Instead, university students today face greater competition in an 
economy with a widening inequality gap. These socioeconomic changes have meant 
that political participation is no longer a priority for university students today. 
Demand-side theories also explain why university students today were more 
influenced by their parents in their political socialization process than university 
students in the 1980s. This was because the socioeconomic development of Korea 
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since the 1980s meant that the parents of university students today were more likely to 
be highly educated than the parents of university students in the 1980s. 
 
Secondly, intermediary theories are able to explain the effects of the media on the 
attitudes towards media and the experience of latent political participation. Both in the 
1980s and today, university students perceived the media to be unreliable in providing 
comprehensive and objective coverage of current and political events. Though this was 
to be expected in the 1980s during the dictatorial Chun administration, this finding 
was unexpected for university students today where there are diverse media sources 
for information on political affairs. However, secondary sources revealed that there are 
still informal and formal restrictions on the freedom of press in South Korea. This has 
affected the attitudes that university students today hold towards the media. The role 
of the media also affects the experience of latent political participation. Due to the 
distrust of the media, university students in the 1980s participated in covert 
organisations to learn more about politics and discuss politics with others. In contrast, 
due to the distrust of the media, university students today say that they are discouraged 
from discussing politics with others or getting involved in political participation 
because they are not confident that they are informed enough about political affairs. 
Whilst intermediary explanations explained these experiences to some extent, it failed 
to explain this disparity in the political participation of university students in response 
to similar conditions. 
 
Thirdly, supply-side theories explain the attitudes that university students hold are due 
to the supply of politics and government. As hypothesised, the political system of 
oppressive dictatorship in the 1980s was a key reason for the negative attitudes 
  295 
towards politics held by university students in the 1980s. University students today did 
not have the same level of intensely negative attitudes about politics and government 
as their counterparts in the 1980s. However, university students today were largely 
dissatisfied with politics. They said that: the government lacked communication; 
politicians were self-interested and collusive; political parties did not have clear policy 
differences; and they did not have a political party they supported. Many of these 
attitudes could be explained by the cartelisation of the political party system. Further 
examination of primary and secondary sources revealed that there had been a rapid and 
dramatic increase of public funding for political parties in Korea since the democratic 
transition in 1987; that there was a restriction of ideology and policy competition; and 
that regionalism was used as a key political cleavage. These issues provided an 
explanation for the attitudes that university students today held towards politics and 
government. It also explained why university students today felt a lack of political 
efficacy.  
 
The findings from this study revealed interesting insights into the role of university 
students today. In the 1980s, university students acted as an activist social group with 
the specific goal of attaining direct presidential elections. As only a minority of the 
population attended university, university students in the 1980s were more likely to 
perceive themselves as the educated elite of a developing country and a duty to 
participate despite the high personal risks of doing so. However, today, a majority of 
young people in South Korea go to university. Even after attaining university 
education, university students today report that it is difficult to get the jobs they want 
in an increasingly competitive market. University students today are less likely to see 
themselves as the educated elite, and feel less of a duty to participate in politics even 
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though the risks of doing so are much lower than in the 1980s. Current university are 
dissatisfied with corrupt and self-interested politicians, regionalist political behaviour 
and the lack of political competition. However, even as they say they are not satisfied 
with their own levels of political participation, they fail to participate in politics other 
than through voting. Their reasons for this non-participation include that they do not 
feel they lack sufficient understanding of politics, lack the resources to participate and 
lack the confidence that the political system will be responsive to their efforts. These 
findings suggest that university students today are dissolving into a wider, pressurised 
and impoverished middle-class. Though the age group and the educational status of 
university students in the 1980s and university students today remain the same, 
changes in society, economy and politics may mean that the role of university students 
has changed. This change in the role of university students in wider Korean society 
was not examined in detail in this thesis, but would be a very interesting further 
research topic. In particular, comparing the political culture of university students to 
other social groups and age groups and evaluating the impact of the political 
participation by university students on Korean politics would reveal useful insights 
about the role of university students.  
 
2 Theoretical implications 
 
The main contribution of this thesis is that it provides original empirical data on the 
political culture of university students in South Korea before and after the democratic 
transition in 1987. There are also several theoretical implications to the findings in this 
thesis. 
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For one thing, this thesis shows that the voter disaffection, particularly amongst young 
people, is not unique to advanced Western democracies. The findings show that 
university students today in Korea, a relatively new democracy, also exhibit low levels 
of political trust, political efficacy and political participation. The analysis of the 
applicability of the cartel party thesis to the Korean case showed that there were trends 
in Korean politics that mirrored that of trends in advanced Western democracies. 
Further research on whether similar trends can be found in the political systems and 
political cultures of other new democracies should be conducted. Such research may 
assist in a better theoretical understanding of the workings of modern democracy.  
 
Another theoretical implication of this thesis is that demand-side, supply-side and 
intermediary theories can provide a comprehensive explanation of political culture. 
Although none of these three explanations were able to provide a standalone 
explanation of the changes in the political culture, when used together, they were 
complementary and showed that the explanations and elements of political culture 
were interrelated. Future studies on political culture should therefore seek to examine 
all three types of explanations of political culture.  
 
3 Policy implications 
 
It was not within the scope of this study to determine whether the changes in the 
political culture of university students in Korea since the democratic transition are 
good or bad. However, the empirical findings of this thesis may be used to develop 
policies to encourage university students today to become more involved in politics.  
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Firstly, it was clear that university students today wanted a more reliable source of 
information on politics. The media were not perceived to be an independent and 
objective source of information on current and political affairs. Legislative reform to 
facilitate freedom of the press may improve the role of the media as a conduit for 
political communications. Mainstream media companies that wish to be relevant to 
university students today as a source of information on political affairs should make an 
effort to be independent of the government. A related finding was that university 
students did not find information about politics to be accessible. Media sources should 
make an effort to make coverage of politics more accessible through better quality 
journalism and more intuitive user interfaces.  
 
Secondly, the interviews of university students today revealed that politicians lacked 
communication with university students. In order to elicit greater political 
participation amongst university students today, politicians should make an effort to be 
more responsive and communicative. One suggestion that multiple university students 
made was that politicians could make an effort to be more engaging, for instance, 
through the use of humour.  
 
Yet, the finding that university students were distrustful of politicians and that most 
university students did not have a political party they supported indicated deeper 
issues with the Korean political system. The implication of these findings was that the 
current Korean political system fails to fully represent the interests of university 
students. This affects the political efficacy of university students and discouraged them 
from participating. Further research should be done to examine possible policies to 
improve the representativeness of political parties. This may be through amendments 
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to the electoral system to allow for more seats in the National Assembly to be elected 
by proportional representation; amendments to public funding laws to provide greater 
access for nascent political parties; efforts to mitigate the effects of regionalism; and 
ways to facilitate meaningful policy competition amongst the major political parties. 
 
4 Limitations 
 
There are four main limitations of this study. Firstly, the available data collected from 
university students in the 1980s and university students limit the findings and analysis 
of this study today. A total of 61 interviewees and 199 survey respondents contributed 
to the data used in the empirical findings of this thesis. Due to limited resources, it was 
not possible to carry out surveys and interviews over a larger set of respondents. 
However, as discussed in the research design, efforts were made to improve the 
representativeness of the sample. Where possible, data from other studies and statistics 
were also used to corroborate certain findings.  
 
Secondly, a related issue with the availability of data is that interviewees who were 
university students in the 1980s and university students today were interviewed under 
different conditions. University students today were interviewed in their present status 
as university students. However, interviewees who were university students in the 
1980s had to recount events, attitudes and experiences from nearly three decades ago. 
This meant that the responses of the interviewees who were university students in the 
1980s may not be entirely representative of the attitudes and experiences that 
university students in the 1980s may have expressed had they been asked in the 1980s. 
Efforts were made to mitigate this by telling interviewees at the outset that they should 
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recount experiences and attitudes that they held at the time, rather than their current 
evaluations of past events. Where needed, secondary sources were also used to provide 
contextual information about politics in the 1980s. 
 
Thirdly, an inherent problem with using survey and interview methods for data 
collection is that the data are only as accurate as the responses provided. Some of the 
interviewees expressed contradictory attitudes. For instance, some university students 
today said that they were interested in politics and kept up to date about political 
affairs. However, when asked whether they perceived any differences between the 
major political parties, they said that they did not know enough about politics to 
comment. Other university students today said that regionalism does not affect their 
political views, but would then later say that they held a certain attitude towards 
politics because they were from a particular region. When these contradictions arose, 
these were noted in the relevant sections. 
 
Fourthly, a problem with relying predominantly on qualitative methods to analyse a 
single case study is that it is difficult to identify causal relationships. It was for this 
reason that this thesis does not point to specific causes of the changes in the political 
culture; instead, it seeks to explain the changes in the political culture by referring to 
parallel developments going on at the time. It is hoped that some of the relationships 
between particular developments and political culture identified in this thesis may be 
further studied through cross-national and large-n studies.  
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5 Further research 
 
There are broadly four further research agendas that may be pursued based on the 
findings of this research. Firstly, a comparative study on the political culture of Korea 
and democracies may assist in identifying common issues with the workings of 
democracy. Such comparative literature has already been developed on advanced 
Western European democracies. However, a comparative study comparing the 
political culture of new democracies in Asia, Latin America and Central Europe may 
identify trends that occur in new democracies. In particular, an interesting finding of 
this thesis was that the cartel party thesis had a significant explanatory power on the 
political culture of university students in Korea. A comparative study on new 
democracies would be able to test whether similar mechanisms are at work in other 
new democracies experiencing voter disaffection. 
 
Secondly, a large-n study on the political culture of university students in Korea or the 
Korean public as a whole may assist in confirming the findings of this thesis and 
investigating the relationship between different elements of political culture. The use 
of quantitative methods to analyse such data may reveal further causal relationships 
between the variables identified in demand-side, intermediary and supply-side 
explanations and elements of political culture.  
 
Thirdly, research into specific issues with Korean politics should be undertaken to 
identify particular policy recommendations to elicit greater political participation 
amongst university students and the general public. This study revealed that university 
students today have a low level of trust for politicians and a low level of political 
efficacy. Supply-side explanations attributed this to the cartelisation of the Korean 
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political party system as evidenced by the increase in public funding, unfavourable 
electoral rules for new entrants, lack of ideological and policy differences between the 
major political parties and regionalism. Further research into the cartelisation of the 
Korean political party system and each of these issues would be able to diagnose 
issues with the Korean political party system in greater detail.  
 
Finally, further theoretical investigations should be undertaken to better understand the 
impact of the changes in political culture on democratic governance. This may involve 
revisiting the definition of democracy and considering the theoretical implications of a 
decline in political participation by the public. It may also involve evaluating the 
effects of such a decline in the political participation on the stability of an established 
democracy or the democratic consolidation process. It is hoped that this study, and 
others like it, ultimately contribute to a better understanding of the workings of 
democracies.  
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Appendix I. Interview guide  
 
1. For interviewees who were university students in the 1980s 
 
Introductory Questions 
When you were a university student in the 1980s: 
• What was your level of interest in politics from a scale of 0 to 5 (5 High; 0; 
Low)?  
• What was your level of political participation from a scale of 0 to 5? 
• How relevant did you think politics is to your everyday life?  
 
Attitudes towards politics and government 
When you were a university student in the 1980s: 
• What were your attitudes towards the Chun administration? 
• What were your attitudes towards the democratic transition in 1987? 
 
Political Socialization 
When you were a university student in the 1980s: 
• How did your parents influence your political views? 
• How did your schoolteachers influence your political views? 
• How did your university peers influence your political views? 
• Did your political views change after serving in the military? How did it 
change and what role did the military play in that change? 
• How did the media influence your political views?  
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Political participation 
When you were a university student in the 1980s: 
• How did you learn about politics? 
• How did you participate in politics?  
• What were your attitudes towards students who participated in politics in the 
1980s?  
 
Reasons for political participation or non-participation 
When you were a university student in the 1980s: 
• What are the reasons for your political participation or non-participation? 
 
On current political state of affairs 
• How satisfied are you with the overall political situation in Korea today? How 
does this compare to your views on the political situation back in the 1980s?  
 
2. For current university students 
 
Introductory Questions 
• What was your level of interest in politics from a scale of 0 to 5 (5 High; 0; 
Low)?  
• What was your level of political participation from a scale of 0 to 5? 
• How relevant did you think politics is to your everyday life?  
 
Attitudes towards politics and government 
• What are your attitudes towards the Lee administration? 
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• What are your attitudes towards the Park administration? 
• What are your attitudes towards politicians? 
• What are your attitudes towards political parties? 
• Do you perceive differences between the political parties and candidates? 
• What are your attitudes towards regionalism?  
 
Political Socialization 
• How did your parents influence your political views? 
• How did your schoolteachers influence your political views? 
• How does your university peers influence your political views? 
• Did your political views change after serving in the military? How did it 
change and what role did the military play in that change? 
• How does the media influence your political views?  
 
Political participation 
• How do you learn about politics?  
• How do you participate in politics?  
• Do you discuss politics with your family, friends and acquaintances? 
• Do you vote? How effective do you think voting is? 
• What are the ways that you think university students can get involved in 
politics? Have you ever participated in any of these ways? 
• Have you participated in a group that has a political objective or has relevance 
to politics?  
• Do you discuss politics through online media (e.g. Twitter, Facebook)? 
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• Do you think your political participation so far has been effective? Do you 
plan to continue the aforementioned forms of political participation? 
• Do you think that your current level of political participation is satisfactory? 
• Do you have any memorable experiences from your political participation? 
• What are your attitudes towards students who participate in politics? 
 
Reasons for political participation or non-participation 
• What are the reasons for your political participation or non-participation? 
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Appendix II. Online survey questionnaire for current university 
students 
 
1. Introductory information  
• Name  
• Age 
• Gender 
• University  
• Region of Origin 
• Current Region 
• How would you describe your socioeconomic background? (Upper 
class/Upper Middle Class/ Middle Class/ Lower Middle Class/ Lower Class)  
• Do you vote? (No/ Yes, but only for Presidential Elections/ Yes, for 
Presidential and other elections/ Yes, for other elections except for Presidential 
elections) 
• Do you discuss politics with friends, family, or other acquaintances? (Check all 
that apply: Friends, Family, university professors, others, None)  
• Do you discuss politics through online social media? (Yes, a lot / Yes, but only 
sometimes / Very rarely / Not really / Never) 
 
2. Please rate on a scale from 0 to 5 (5 High; 0 Low) 
• What is the level of influence that your region of origin has on your political 
preferences? 
• What is your level of interest in politics?  
• What is your level of political participation? 
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• How satisfied are you with your current level of political participation? 
• How effective do you think your political participation has been? 
• How relevant do you think politics is to your everyday life?  
• How effective do you think voting is?  
• How satisfied are you with the overall political situation in Korea? 
• How satisfied were you with the previous presidential administration?  
• How satisfied are you with the current presidential administration? 
 
3. On the following statements, do you Agree/ Partly Agree/ Partly Disagree/ 
Disagree? 
• My parents had a big influence on my political views.  
• My schoolteachers did not have a big impact on the formation of my political 
views. 
• My university peers had a big impact on the formation of my political views. 
• I do not consider a candidate's region of origin when I vote.  
• My electoral participation can change Korean politics. 
• I have a political party that I actively support.  
• I enjoy sharing my political views on online social media.  
• I think that people who share their views on politics on social media like to 
show off. 
• I discuss politics regularly with friends on online social media.  
• I do not think politics is relevant to everyday life. 
• I think the proverb 'People do not know who the king is in times of prosperity 
and peace' applies to politics today. 
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• I would like to participate in politics more but I do not know how. 
• I think politicians work for the good of the citizens. 
• Even if I knew how to participate in politics, I would not do so. 
• Even if another political party were to be in power, it wouldn't make a big 
difference. 
• I trust publicly available information about politics. 
• There is a clear difference between the major political parties. 
• Even if another political party were to be in power, it would not make a big 
difference. 
• Politicians act for their own interests. 
• I feel a strong connection with the political party I support. 
• I think political parties should make more of an effort to earn support. 
• Even if politicians are in different parties they ultimately act like a cartel. 
• I actually do not know much about the policies of the major parties 
• I want to become a politician in the future.  
• I do not want to participate in politics because I think people will form a 
negative opinion of me if I do. 
 
4. Please provide your own explanations for the following questions.  
• What are the first three words that come to your mind when you hear 
‘politics’?  
• How have you participated in politics? 
• Do you have any memorable experiences relating to politics?  
• What are your reasons for political participation and non-participation? 
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• Do you think there are any general factors that hinder political participation for 
university students? 
• Do you have a political party that you specifically support?  
o If so, why did you choose that party? 
o If not, why do you not choose a party to support?  
• What are your hopes for the current administration? 
• Do you have any other general comments, feedback, or questions about the 
issues covered in this survey? 
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Appendix III. Profiles of Interviewees and Survey Respondents 
 
Interviewees 
 
Code Gender University Major 
Year of 
entering 
university 
Region 
of 
Origin66 
A01 Male Chonnam National University New Materials Engineering 1988 HN 
A02 Male Seoul National University Physics 1982 YN 
A03 Male Korea University Chemistry 1983 HN 
A04 Male Hanyang University Inorganic Material Engineering 1989 HN 
A05 Male Inha University Resource Engineering 1985 SG 
A06 Male Korea University Public Administration 1975 SG 
A07 Male Hanyang University Journalism and Broadcasting 1989 SG 
A08 Male Chosun University Philosophy and Politics 1984 HN 
A09 Male Kosin University Theology 1974 YN 
A10 Female Busan Women's College Visual Design 1981 YN 
A11 Male Inha University Education 1985 HN 
A12 Male Pusan National University Psychology 1981 YN 
A13 Female Pusan National University Physics 1990 YN 
A14 Male Pusan National University Dentistry 1981 YN 
A15 Female Pusan National University Pharmacy 1984 YN 
A16 Male Kyungpook National University Physics 1982 YN 
A17 Male Kosin University Theology 1983 YN 
A18 Male Seoul National University Agriculture and Life Sciences 1983 SG 
A19 Male Seoul National University Agriculture and Chemistry 1986 CC 
A20 Male University of Incheon Political Science and Diplomacy 1981 SG 
A21 Male Chonnam National University Economics 1983 HN 
A22 Male Chonbuk National University Horticulture 1984 HN 
A23 Male Chosun University Economics 1984 HN 
A24 Male Kyungpook National University 
Mathematics 
Education 1984 YN 
A25 Female Kyungpook National University Science Education 1985 YN 
A26 Female Dong-Eui University Music 1987 YN 
A27 Male Pusan National University Music 1985 YN 
B01 Male Seoul National University Medicine 2007 YN 
B02 Male Seoul National University Korean Language Education 2009 HN 
B03 Female Korea University English Language Education 2012 SG 
                                            
66 SG: Seoul and Gyeonggi; CC: Chungcheong; YN: Yeongnam; HN: Honam 
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B04 Male Yonsei University Biochemistry 2012 SG 
B05 Female Kyunghee University Fashion Design 2010 SG 
B06 Male Korea University Political Science and Diplomacy 2008 SG 
B07 Male Seoul National University Anthropology 2005 CC 
B08 Female Korea University Political Science and Diplomacy 2009 YN 
B09 Male Seoul National University Political Science 2006 YN 
B10 Male Seoul National University Diplomacy 2008 SG 
B11 Female Yonsei University English Language and Literature 2010 CC 
B12 Male Yonsei University Earth System Science 2007 SG 
B13 Male Seoul National University Korean Language Education 2009 CC 
B14 Male Seoul National University Political Science 2007 SG 
B15 Female Yonsei University Business Administration 2009 SG 
B16 Female Hanyang University Public Administration 2010 SG 
B17 Female Pusan University of Foreign Studies 
Political Science and 
Diplomacy 2011 SG 
B18 Male Seoul National University Korean Language Education 2008 YN 
B19 Male Pusan National University Mechanical Engineering 2010 YN 
B20 Male Pusan National University Political Science and Diplomacy 2013 YN 
B21 Male Pusan National University Architectural Engineering 2011 YN 
B22 Female Chonnam National University Philosophy 2011 HN 
B23 Female Chonnam National University Global Environment 2012 HN 
B24 Female Chonnam National University Philosophy 2010 HN 
B25 Male Chonnam National University Industrial Engineering 2012 HN 
B26 Male Chonnam National University Computer Science 2012 HN 
B27 Male Pusan National University Special Education 2010 YN 
B28 Male Seoul National University Agriculture and Life Sciences 2003 SG 
B29 Male Chonnam National University Industrial Engineering 2007 HN 
B30 Male Handong Global University Law 2004 HN 
B31 Female Chonnam National University Economics 2009 HN 
B32 Female Pusan National University Political Science and Diplomacy 2013 YN 
B33 Male Kyungpook National University 
Mechanical 
Engineering 2011 YN 
B34 Male Pusan National University Ethics Education 2014 YN 
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Survey respondents 
 
Code Gender University Major 
Year of 
entering 
university 
Region 
of Origin 
R01 Male Chungnam National University 
Technology 
Education 2009 SG 
R02 Male Korea Baptist Theological University Church History 2013 CC 
R03 Male Paichai University Drama and Cinema 2011 SG 
R04 Female Hankuk University of Foreign Studies 
English Language 
and Literature 2010 SG 
R05 Male No response Sociology No response SG 
R06 Male Pyeongtaek University American Studies 2008 SG 
R07 Female Gachon University Composition 2013 SG 
R08 Female Anyang University Vocal Music 2011 SG 
R09 Male Jeonju University Design 2009 SG 
R10 Female Hankuk University of Foreign Studies 
Business 
Administration 2009 SG 
R11 Female Dankook University Piano 2011 SG 
R12 Male Yuhan College Die Design 2013 SG 
R13 Female Korea National University of Arts Performance 2014 SG 
R14 Male No response No response No response SG 
R15 Female Baekseok University Christian Practical Music 2011 YN 
R16 Male Seoul National University of Science and Technology 
Global Convergence 
of Industrial 
Engineering 
2013 SG 
R17 Male Inha University 
High Polymer New 
Materials 
Engineering 
2008 SG 
R18 Male Handong Global University 
Mechanical 
Engineering and 
Science 
2005 SG 
R19 Female Yonsei University Political Science 2007 YN 
R20 Female Kyunghee University Hotel Management 2005 YN 
R21 Female Inha University Law 2011 HN 
R22 Male Handong Global University Media Information and Cultural Studies 2000 YN 
R23 Female University of Incheon Mechanical Robotics 2009 SG 
R24 Male Inha University Law 2005 YN 
R25 Male Korea University Sociology 2012 SG 
R26 Male Korea University Sociology 2007 SG 
R27 Female Inha University Korean Literature 2011 SG 
R28 Female Korea University Sociology 2004 CC 
R29 Female No response No response No response SG 
R30 Male Handong Global University Mechanical Control Engineering 2001 Other 
R31 Male Korea University Sociology 2010 YN 
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R32 Female Inha University Education 2012 SG 
R33 Female Korea University Sociology 2007 SG 
R34 Female Chungkang College of Cultural Industries Stage Art 2013 SG 
R35 Male Inha University Education 2009 SG 
R36 Female Seoul Theological University Japanese Language 2012 SG 
R37 Male No response No response No response SG 
R38 Female Baewha Women's University Early Childhood Education 2010 SG 
R39 Female Dongduk Women's University Piano 2012 YN 
R40 Male Sogang University Economics 2009 SG 
R41 Male Kosin University Pastoral Theology 2005 YN 
R42 Female No response Police Administration 2009 SG 
R43 Male Kosin University Theology 2009 CC 
R44 Male Namseoul University International Trade 2010 SG 
R45 Male Handong Global University Law 2004 SG 
R46 Female Dong-A University Financial Studies 2009 YN 
R47 Female Dong-Eui University Performance 2012 YN 
R48 Female Pusan National University Design 2012 YN 
R49 Female Kyungnam University Early Childhood Education 2012 YN 
R50 Male Yangsan University Hotel Culinary 2013 YN 
R51 Female Kosin University Vocal Music 2009 YN 
R52 Male Kosin University Vocal Music 2011 YN 
R53 Female Bukyong National University Nursing 2010 YN 
R54 Female Kyungpook National University 
Environmental 
Engineering 2008 YN 
R55 Female Kyungpook National University French Education 2012 YN 
R56 Female Kyungnam University Music Education 2010 YN 
R57 Female Pusan National University 
Geography and 
Environmental 
Sciences 
2010 YN 
R58 Male Kyungpook National University Law 2007 YN 
R59 Female Kyungsung University Home Economics 2010 YN 
R60 Female Kyungsung University Social Welfare 2010 YN 
R61 Male Pusan National University Music Percussion 2008 SG 
R62 Male Pusan National University Environmental Engineering 2007 YN 
R63 Female Bukyong National University Nursing 2010 YN 
R64 Female Korea Maritime University East Asian Studies 2013 YN 
R65 Male Dongwon Institute of Science and Technology 
Administration and 
Accounting 2013 YN 
R66 Male Pusan National University Microbiology 2008 YN 
R67 Male Inje University Mechanical Car Engineering 2009 YN 
R68 Female Inha University 
Computer 
Information 
Engineering 
2013 YN 
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R69 Female Inha University 
International 
Languages and 
Culture 
2011 SG 
R70 Male No response Law 2000 SG 
R71 Female Hankuk University of Foreign Studies 
English Language 
and Literature 1997 CC 
R72 Male Seoul National University Computer Engineering 2004 SG 
R73 Male Seoul National University Electrical Computer Engineering 2008 SG 
R74 Male UC Berkeley Computer Engineering 2008 YN 
R75 Male Dankook University Medicine 2013 SG 
R76 Male Pohang University of Science and Technology Chemistry 2008 SG 
R77 Male Seoul National University Korean Language Education 1999 HN 
R78 Male Sejong University Photoelectronic Engineering 2010 HN 
R79 Male Yonsei University Political Science and Diplomacy 2009 SG 
R80 Female Kwangwoon University Social Welfare 2008 SG 
R81 Male No response Machine Design No response SG 
R82 Female Kyungin Women's College Nursing 2012 SG 
R83 Male Baekseok University Social Welfare 2006 SG 
R84 Male Hongik University Video and Film 2009 YN 
R85 Female Sejong University Business Administration 2012 SG 
R86 Female Seoul National University Korean Education 2009 SG 
R87 Male Kyunghee University Nuclear Engineering 2010 SG 
R88 Male Yonsei University Biochemistry 2012 SG 
R89 Female Inha University Korean Language Education 2010 SG 
R90 Male Inha University Mechanical Engineering 2011 SG 
R91 Female Korea University Political Science and Diplomacy 2011 YN 
R92 Female Duksung Women's University Computer System 2009 SG 
R93 Male Sungkyunkwan University Korean Language and Literature 2006 SG 
R94 Male Seoul National University Korean Language Education 1999 CC 
R95 Male Sejong University Photoelectronic Engineering 2010 SG 
R96 Female No response Hair Design No response SG 
R97 Male Hongik University Electron and Electric Engineering 2010 SG 
R98 Female Inha University Education 2009 YN 
R99 No response Inha University Social Education 2008 SG 
R100 Female Kyungin Women's College Aviation and Tourism 2010 SG 
R101 Male Kongju National University Mold Engineering 2013 SG 
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R102 Female Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology Chemistry 2010 SG 
R103 Female Shingu College Tax Accounting 2010 SG 
R104 Female Duksung Women's University Korean Language and Literature 2009 SG 
R105 Female University of Incheon Fashion Industry 2011 SG 
R106 Female Kyonggi University Correction and Rehabilitation 2012 SG 
R107 Female No response Korean Language and Literature 
No 
response SG 
R108 Female Kyunghee University Global Communication 2012 SG 
R109 Female University of Incheon Economics 2011 SG 
R110 Female Sungkonghoe University Sociology 2012 SG 
R111 Female No response Korean Language Education 2001 SG 
R112 Female Korea University English Language Education 2012 SG 
R113 Male Namseoul University Child Welfare 2006 SG 
R114 Male Myongji University Visual Design 1994 SG 
R115 Female Chungang University Child Welfare 2011 YN 
R116 Male Dongguk University Korean Language Education 1994 SG 
R117 Female Suwon Science College Dental Hygiene 2012 SG 
R118 Male Dongyang Mirae University Mechanical Design 2010 Other 
R119 Female Seoul National University Korean Language Education 2003 YN 
R120 Female Sangmyung University Business Administration 2012 SG 
R121 Female Myongji College Creative Writing 2013 HN 
R122 Female Gachon University Law 2010 SG 
R123 Female Chungang University Social Welfare 2011 SG 
R124 Female Gachon University Law 2012 SG 
R125 Female Seoul National University Korean Language Education 2004 SG 
R126 Male Sejong University Photoelectronic Engineering 2010 SG 
R127 Female Hankuk University of Foreign Studies Social Science 2011 SG 
R128 Male University of Incheon Urban Administration 2013 SG 
R129 Female No response Korean Language and Literature 2009 CC 
R130 Female Duksung Women's University Korean Language and Literature 2010 CC 
R131 Male Hanseo University Sports Science 2013 SG 
R132 Female University of Incheon Law 2012 SG 
R133 Female Hoseo University Social Sports Science 2012 SG 
R134 Female Kyungin Women's College Secretary Administration 2012 SG 
R135 Male University of Incheon Urban Architecture 2013 SG 
R136 Male No response No response No response SG 
R137 Male Yonsei University Sociology 2013 SG 
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R138 Female Handong Global University International Relations 2012 HN 
R139 Female Kyunghee University International Development 2010 SG 
R140 Female Seoul National University Biology Education 2007 YN 
R141 Male Kangwon National University Agricultural Resources Economics 2006 SG 
R142 Male No response No response No response SG 
R143 Male No response Internet Business 2007 SG 
R144 No response No response No response 
No 
response YN 
R145 Male Handong Global University Law 2004 SG 
R146 Male No response Korean History 2001 SG 
R147 Female No response Political Science and Diplomacy 2006 SG 
R148 Male Gyeongin National University of Education Education 2012 SG 
R149 Female Handong Global University International Relations 2008 SG 
R150 Male Korea Polytechnic University Machine Design 2011 YN 
R151 Male Handong Global University Business Administration 2004 YN 
R152 Female Yonsei University English Language and Literature 2010 CC 
R153 Male Chonnam National University Industry Engineering 2012 HN 
R154 Female Korea University Political Science and Diplomacy 2010 HN 
R155 Female Chungang University Business Administration 2011 HN 
R156 Female Korea University Economics 2010 SG 
R157 Female Korea University International Studies 2011 SG 
R158 Female Korea University Political Science and Diplomacy 2009 YN 
R159 Male Korea Nazarene University Speech Therapy 2013 SG 
R160 Female University of Incheon Economics 2010 SG 
R161 Female Anyang University Korean Language and Literature 2012 SG 
R162 Female Handong Global University Visual Design 2008 SG 
R163 Female Hanyang Women's University 
Computer 
Information 
Engineering 
2013 SG 
R164 Female Seoul National University Korean Language Education 2001 SG 
R165 Female No response No response No response SG 
R166 Male Sogang University International Relations 2009 CC 
R167 Female Inha University Business Administration 2012 CC 
R168 Female Chungang University Composition 2013 SG 
R169 Female Myongji University Life Science 2010 SG 
R170 Male Mokpo Science University Radiology 2013 SG 
R171 Female KDI School of Public Policy Development Policy 2013 YN 
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and Management 
R172 Female Inha University Social Science 2013 SG 
R173 Female Kyungin Women's College Food and Nutrition 2012 SG 
R174 Female No response No response No response SG 
R175 Male Seoul National University Korean Language Education 2009 CC 
R176 Male No response Sports Management 2009 SG 
R177 Male Seoul National University International Politics 2008 SG 
R178 Female Kyunghee University Fashion Design 2013 SG 
R179 Male Gwangju Institute of Science and Technology 
Computational 
Physics 2004 HN 
R180 Male Gwangju Institute of Science and Technology Mechanics 2012 YN 
R181 Female Dongah Institute of Media and Art Video Production 2013 SG 
R182 Male Gwangju Institute of Science and Technology Electronics 2013 HN 
R183 Male Gwangju Institute of Science and Technology 
Information 
Technology 2002 SG 
R184 Male University of Seoul Urban Sociology 2010 SG 
R185 Male Liberty University International Relations 2010 SG 
R186 Male No response Mechanical Engineering 2009 HN 
R187 Female Liberty University Education 2010 CC 
R188 Female Chosun University Law 2010 HN 
R189 Male Chosun University Law 2010 HN 
R190 Female Chosun University Law 2010 HN 
R191 Female Chosun University Law 2007 YN 
R192 Female Chosun University Law 2007 HN 
R193 Female Chosun University Law 2007 HN 
R194 No response Chosun University Nursing 2013 
No 
response 
R195 Female Sunchon National University Japanese Language 2010 HN 
R196 Male Chosun University Law 2007 HN 
R197 Male No response No response No response YN 
R198 Female Chosun University Law 2010 HN 
R199 Male Sunchon National University Business Administration 2011 HN 
 
 
 
 
